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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts to evaluate the planning experi-
ence of the new city of Brasilia, Brazil's new capital after
the beginnings of the official settlement in 1960. In order
to evaluate the urban imbalances due to the initial observa-
tion that less than one third of the total metropolitan
population is living in the planned area, a sequence of
paradigms has been developed.
Paradigm I develops a theoretical estimation on the
ideological foundations of the phenomena denoted as "the
rational city." This section includes a structural break-
down of the rationalist urban thought and strategies
analysis through three different planning alternatives pre-
sented as entries in the national context for choosing the
Brasilia Plan.
Paradigm II analyzes some institutional barriers
interfering with the process of economic and social choice
for urban space in the Brazilian "traditional" cities, and
compares these processes to Brasilia in the double context
"rationalism-populism" underlying the resulting contradic-
tions and solutions adopted.
Paradigm III analyzes the effects on Brazilia's urban
space by the institution of market mechanisms after the
revolution of 1964, resulting in the great expansion of the
"satellitization" process initiated in the "populist" period.
Paradigm IV explores some feasible changes for the
actual metropolitan structure in order to achieve a more
balanced growth under the effects of an increasingly
progressive distribution of income.
Thesis Supervisor: Ralph A. Gakenheimer
Title: Associate Professor of
Urban Studies
INTRODUCTORY SUMMARY
This thesis attempts to evaluate the planning experi-
ence of the new city of Brasilia, Brazil's new capital,
fifteen years after the official settlement in 1960.
Special emphasis is given to the evaluation of the urban
imbalances due to the striking observation that less than
one-third of the total metropolitan population is living
within the physical boundaries of the "officially" planned
area. In order to evaluate these urban problems, we
developed a sequence of "paradigms," since we consider as
highly positive, the analysis that encompasses the broad
spectrum of the subject, with little reference to specific
minor issues. The standpoints developed in each of the
paradigms, it is hoped should be useful in furthering more
specific and concentrated future investigative studies.
Part A - Introduction
We argue the impossibility of a sectional analysis of
urban problems as an explanatory theory for the urban
inequalities shown by Brazilia's settlement. Therefore,
for such intent we call upon an interdisciplinary approach
within the framework of a personal ideological impression
as a basic condition for a dynamic and personal standpoint
in the urban problem's analysis.
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Paradigm I
Develops a theoretical estimation on the ideological
foundations of the phenomena denoted as "the rational city."
Historically, "the rational city" is seen as an ephemerous
and frustrated attempt for the reconciliation between the
rational scientific-aesthetic urban decision doctrine and
the social demands for the compliance of the growing urban
social conflicts. Brazilia's plans, historic and ideologic
roots are identified as a modern version of the Renaissance
ideas of urban order developed and systematized through the
French Rationalism, of which LeCorbusier is seen as the most
didactic example. The paradigm concludes in a structural
analysis of the rationalist urban thought, particularly its
urban planning physical strategies formally based on the
aesthetical determinism and socially embedded in utopic
assumptions of the social relations due to the adoptions of
biased middle class cultural and professional values. Three
distinct urban design alternatives for Brasilia are analyzed
in order to show their intimate ideological connection in
spite of their resembling formal differences. For these
purposes the Rocha-Gon9alves plan is considered as a typical
example of the additive and mechanic physical process used
by rationalists to overcome the problems originated in the
process for the urban growth. This process, while criti-
cized, was not considered by the static assumption of
Costa's plan. The Rino Levi Plan is presented as a positive
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example of the implementation of high populational densities
for the midddle class residential sector. The social out-
comes of high densities are compared against a survey made
in a well known mixed neighborhood in Rio de Maneiro
(Copacabana). Finally, the M. M. Roberto Plan is analyzed
by its positive aspects such as the attempts for regional
planning and the policies for informal settlements and by
its negative features such as the rationalist assumption of
growth by urban independent poles, without taking into
consideration problems such as scale economies due to
urbanization processes.
Part B - Praxis
Describes and analyzes the impact upon Brazilian
realities of the rationalistic assumptions embodied in the
Brasilia Master Plan (Plano PilOto) elaborated by architect
Lucio Costa. In order to find a valid urban indicator to
test the new city social performance, two distinct paradigms
are suggested; both of them used to highlight the problems
induced by the pilot plan assumption under two different
political, economic and social Brazilian scenarios. They
follow.
Paradigm II
Analyzes some institutional barriers interfering with
the process of economic and social choice for urban space
in the Brazilian "traditional" cities context and compares
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these processes to Brasilia in the double context "rational-
ism-populism," underlining the resulting contradictions and
solutions adopted. The concluding assumptions consider the
"unplanned" urban form such as the old cities as more open,
particularly to the participation of the dispossed strata.
Consequently, the rational city is considered, particularly
in the context of the populist political environment, as an
exceptional and provisional epoch within which the inherent
social regressivity of the rationalist urban standards
proposed by the original Master Plan are to some extent
neutralized by the urban demands of the masses through the
existent participatory electoral process.
Paradigm III
Analyzes the effects on the Brazilian urban scene
institution of market mechanisms after the revolution of
1964. There is conclusive evidence showing a growing and
irreversible process of social and economic elitism of the
pilot plan timorously started in the populist period, now
as a result of a double policy of "favelas erradication"
and by the operation of the government financial institu-
tions, particularly through housing financing. These
processes further contributed to the intensification and
consolidation of the urban satellitization processes
already occurring throughout the metropolitan area. An
explanatory hypothesis is discussed, showing the institu-
tion's successful attempt in segmenting internally the
6
working strata weakly divided by irrelevant occupational
and monetary differences as a result of the paramount econo-
mic and social role performed by such sectors as civil
construction and services, all characterized as unskilled
employment typologies. This process, resulting in a
homogenization of the working class demands, was confronted
with antagonistic government urban policies classified as
"negatives" based on the fear of "unexpected social
behaviors" resulting from the incorporation of large masses
in the official and distinct urbanization framework, and by
the avoidance of the populist "calculated risk" policies.
Paradigm IV
Explores the forecasted changes that the actual urban
structure will suffer during the next ten years as a result
of a growing government services sector and the diminishing
role of the civil construction sector in creating new jobs.
At the same time the actual central employment trends are
likely to continue, further enhancing the pattern of
employment concentration in the pilot plan's area. There-
fore, metropolitan disequilibrium between jobs and residen-
tial locations is likely to continue and grow. Actual
policies do not strive for any continualizing effects; on
the contrary they contribute to further satellitization,
even for the middle class sectors. From these arguments,
new possibilities for alternative urban policies
are explored. These policies assume the basic economic and
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political feasibility for a progressive income redistribu-
tion on a macro-level and the consequent effects on the
metropolitan area. Some guidelines are described as
examples for new metropolitan policies aimed to allow a
locational equilibrium. It's suggested to use intrajuris-
dictional migrations as an indicator for the opening up of
the central area through the adoption of new land use
standards and zoning codes for the pilot plan area replacing
in some cases the restrictive and elitist rationalistic
standards. The use of taxation is proposed to encourage
more balanced metropolitan growth. As a conclusion, it is
argued that in absence of an open political process, the
process of "urban opening" using the pilot plan's surround-
ings areas will depend upon the willingness of some
political forces located with the government's decisional
apparatus and striving for a broader participation for some
new social groups in the social process of using the
Brasilia urban space. From this standpoint the best urban
policy would be that of trying to achive a progressive
liberalization of the urban space synchronized with the
growing feasibility of a progressive income distribution
adopted at the macro-economic level.
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INTRODUCTION
THE EVALUATION OF URBAN QUALITIES
Fifteen years after the beginnings of the official
settlement in 1960, the city of Brasilia, Brazil's new
capital, has less than one-third of the total metropolitan
population living within the physical boundaries of the
"officially" planned area. The remaining two-thirds live
in cities without any planning process: the satellite
cities. Table I shows the population in each one of
these cities in comparison with Brasilia, between 1960
and 1970.
As we can see, the "Pilot Plan" (the official city),
while doubling its own population in ten years, has a
diminishing share on the total population from 48.44
percent in 1960 to 28.69 percent in 1970; at the same
time the subnucleus or satellite cities not included in the
original plan and following an unplanned growing process
increased several times their populations, generally com-
prising low-income stratanot sheltered in the Pilot Plan.
Some nuclei had entered a process of rapid growth, as
for example, Taguatinga, Sobradinho, and Planaltina, until
they reached a constant percentage due to the appearance
of new peripheral settlements which began to absorb new
populations with new distributional income scale, as
Guara, Gama, and the Invasions which can be defined as
18
TABLE I
BRASILIA: DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL POPULATION IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA
Localities
1. Pilot Plan
2. Taguatinga
3. Gama
4. Sobradinho
5. Guard
6. Ncleo
Bandeirante
7. Planaltina
8. Braslandia
9. Invas~es
Ceilandia
Urban Zones
Rural Zones
Federal District
1960
Population
68.665
26.111
8.478
21.033
2.915
127.204
14.538
48.44
1970
Population
156.688
18.42 107.347
----- 72.405
5.98 39.458
----- 24.864
14.84 11.268
2.06 18.508
----- 9.592
89.74
10.26
84.204
524.315
21.700
141.742 100.00 546.015
Source: I.B.G.E.--Brazil
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Official
Settle-
ment
Satellite
Cities
28.69
19.66
13.26
7.23
4.55
2.06
3.39
1.76
15.42
96.03
3.97
100.00
areas of irregular and/or illegal settlement. Nowadays,
the population is still growing at very high rates, and all
trends are likely to show that the populational share of
the Pilot Plan would be less if compared to the satellite
group of cities whose tendency is to continue to enter a
process of growth and densification.
From these basic data, we start toward the main
purpose of this thesis which would be trying to answer the
following basic questions:
1. Which are the main conditions that make
Brasilia (with all its planning process supposed
to be the most sophisticated of Brazil) the city
that, due to its natural symbolic values had
concentrated all the best technical capabilities
of the country, barely houses a minority of the
intended population, mainly medium and high-
income strata?
2. Is this unequal settlement pattern merely a
result of a "momentary neglect" on the program
of construction of the city, or a structural and
cultural bias linked with the professional plan-
ning ideology and reflecting the unwillingness
to let the poor indulge their particular
societal goals?
We are aware of the difficulties in trying to build
a process intended to evaluate the complex and contradic-
tory qualities and problems of a given urban space. Two
different types of difficulties arise as a conceptual
obstacle to our task:
- The total impossibility, due to the nature of
the universitarian pattern of organizing an
interdisciplinary work in order to evaluate a
broader range of interconnected issues and prob-
lems far deeper than the unilateral, academic,
and one-directional, either economic, or
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social, or political, or physical urban under-
standing.
- The difficulty in establishing "universal and
valid objective criteria in order to qualify
different urban properties as economic effi-
ciency" or "urban quality of life."
As for the first topic, we have to discuss several
theoretic postures. Even if we found some economic or
social indicators that can be considered as basic, these
qualifications always represent a value judgment which
strongly depends on the nature of our individual ideologi-
cal gesture. The relative achievements brought to the
urban scene by the methodological development of the social
sciences during the last decade, particularly by adopting
quantitative methods had only increased the number of
variables rather than contribute to the relative clearness
and simplification of the urban problem, while the number
of disciplines studying the relation of human actor/
environment had experienced a rapid growth. At the same
time, the process of defining "values" had entered a
critical stage because sectorial knowledge had become
synonymous with professional effectiveness and/or success.
We argue that it is harder to analyze urban issues within
the context of the economic and social system than to
identify partial relationships within a sub-part of that
system. However, we think that a mediocre effort that
reaches for too much is better than taking on ineffective
problems. Moreover, if an approach of a certain technique
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can be successful in one field of science, it cannot neces-
sarily be transferred to another. This holds particularly
true for urban systems that combine a high degree of com-
plexity with a high degree of interaction, resisting cate-
gorizing by sectorial studies. In this process, the more
detail is added, the more tempting it becomes to accept it
as the true explanation if we consider the urban structure
as emerging only from individual independent transactions.
In recognizing these realities, we will develop through
this thesis, an effort for integrative concepts rather than
categorical approaches. This posture also implies an inte-
grative effort to understand and explain urban form as
"embedded" in a broad and extremely complex social-
economic and political system. As a result of these pro-
cesses, the main concern of the architects, almost exclu-
sively devoted to the aesthetic or physical qualities of
the spatial envelope of the city, had changed dramatically
toward a new correlation of interdisciplinary disciplines
in order to understand space as a dependent variable. We
therefore are now interested in building bridges linking
the most recent achievements in different cognitive fields,
bringing new insights to the spatial problems and their
relationships with man.
Only recently, urban social facts are beginning to
be explained by reference to "hidden" social, economic, or
cultural facts and there is a tendency to recognize that
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urban institutions are shaped by economic and social fac-
tors requiring a critical analysis to uncover them. In
consequence, the task of a modern urban theory is to show
that the structure of the urban institutions are only the
means in the social process, of which the end is material
accumulation. Institutions are only the outcome of a
centuries-long transition. And the analysis has to be
concentrated on the changing power relations between dif-
ferent social classes trying to explain how the structure
of the instiutions are shaped in order to allow the power
of one social strata over another. This new approach
explains why urban sociology and political economy, with a
renewed focus on the class and the distributional system,
are now joining efforts in order to explain the most acute
urban problems, as unemployment, subemployment, marginality,
the persistence of poverty or the expansionary drive of
developed countries vis-a-vis the underdeveloped economies
as different aspects of the material accumulation process.
As in the case of social methodology, economic science too
had abandoned the self-functional structure. Orthodox
economic theory, by defending the optimality of the perfect
competitive market, has never provided useful insight into
the real working of the economic sphere. As a theory of
a general equilibrium to cover production and consumption,
classical economic theory cannot explain a social system
or social class conflicts. Urban actors are considered
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only as market agents, never as parts of a social and real
structure. As an independent science, there is a tendency
to demonstrate an intrinsic derive for natural equilibrium
rather than by conflict. As a result, the unilaterality of
a pure economic approach has little to say about such
important and connected urban questions as the social
consequences of a given distribution of income and wealth.
It cannot describe the evolution of the social process and
the development of the different social contradictions.
The new integrated vision of urban problems must be par-
ticularly interested in structure, in the overall patterns
of dependency and interdependency between the established
institutions, in how the system works together or fails to
work. The new vision has to be concerned with how a given
urban economy keeps going and what is supposed to happen
in the social and spatial sphere, and what can be the
"paradigm" heading toward new social relations. Therefore,
we don't believe that an "accidental" view of the urban
issues could provide a coherent vision of the urban history.
The classical approach has always assumed that an urban
theory will emerge after a relative "broad collection" of
facts by direct induction. Those who tried to create
theory out of facts never understood that it was only
theory that could constitute them as facts in the first
place. Therefore, we believe that urban events are only
meaningful in terms of a structure which will establish
24
them as such. We refuse to accept as scientific the notion
that facts and interpretation are two different and
separable moments. To describe an urban experience so
complex as Brasilia, it is necessary first to make a selec-
tion of facts and an interpretation of each one which in
turn are determined by our personal values. The unique
form to verify the degree of accuracy of these values is
to compare the theory assumed with the imminent movement
of reality through a process of historical discussion. As
for history, as Levi-Strauss has pointed out, "history is
a heterogeneous collection of chronological facts." The
problem of re-integrating these seemingly independent
temporal structures into an integrated and meaningful prac-
tice suggests evidence to reinforce our interdisciplinary
thesis, in which we state that the urban problem will not
be understandable through a single-handed effort of iso-
lated individuals (as myself, writing an individual thesis
on individual problems and using my limited and restricted
knowledge even though I can understand the real nature of
the problem) but through a combined cultural historic
"assault."
Individualistic theories had provided a constant
escape route from the necessity to reformulate historical
concepts. Urban theorists must form their own institutions,
but they should at the same time, attempt to design the
theoretical foundations of a general theory dealing with
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the interpretation of the morphology of whole urban cul-
tures as a collective and participant intellectual task.
Therefore, instead of pursuing the "conservative science"
methods by looking at urban problems through multitudes of
particular minor cases, I will adopt as a "method" for the
discussion on this thesis, the concept of "paradigm." A
"paradigm" is neither a model nor a complete theory. It
encompasses the whole subject, yet says little that is
"specific." However, its advantages stem from this very
basic posture: It is a standpoint from which to develop
specific theories. It can provide the principle which
generates models, yet it cannot be grasped apart from the
models and theories it creates, and in which it becomes
embodied. It is just a new standpoint I hope will be
helpful in emerging some of the main urban problems we will
now address ourselves.
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PARADIGM I.
THE THEORY FOR A "RATIONAL" CITY
1.1 The Ideology of the "Rational" City
To understand Brasilia's "physical design," we need
to make a cultural effort, trying to rebuild the historical
and cultural roots of the modern rationalistic conceptions
of urban design. The first problem to deal with is thus an
historical and cultural one. We have to remit ourselves to
the analysis and evolution of the urbanistic European
thought during the beginnings of our century, particularly
the trajectory of the French academic urbanism and rational-
ism, and their ideological connections with the Renaissance.
1.1.1 The Formulation of a "Theory of Order":
As soon as the cultural reaction to the socio-
economic phenomena resulting from the modern industrializa-
tion was over, a "rational" doctrinary cultural reaction
appears in Europe, mainly in those countries which have to
cope with the tremendous problems generated by the
intensive rural-urban migrations. With the spread of
capitalistic enterprises, a new basis for city life
developed in the urban centers of the Western world, chang-
ing quantitatively and qualitatively all pre-existing social
and economic relations within the towns and between town
and country. The larger cities, to which much of the
migrations were directed, lacked the physical and
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administrative facilities for dealing with so many struc-
tural problems. In slums and working-class quarters, crime
and drunkenness rapidly became the normal condition of life.
There appears to be no social dimension; rather, social life
becomes a force operating far beyond the law and common
sense. Cities are delivered to autonomous government, and
there is a continuous breakdown of older traditional social
and economic structures based on family ties, local asso-
ciations, culture, with the subordination to a clear and
consented order. Precapitalistic cities were limited by the
countryside, not only physically but culturally insofar as
the city reflected the social relations on the land. But
once the capitalistic manufacture system spread, all that
traditional structure collapsed. The new system developed
in leaps and engulfed space and time, creating a dynamic
hitherto unknown. At that point, society faces a double
contradiction: at one side the principles of economic
liberalism aiming at the establishing of a self-regulating
social and economic system relying on the market mechanisms
and the laissez-faire having free trade as its method; at
the other side, the principle of social protection aiming
at the conservation of man and the physical ambience as
preconditions for the functioning of the productive orga-
nization. The intensity and insensibility of the market
laws had no sensorial institutional organ to "detect" the
dangers such as, the destruction of family life, the spatial
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devastation of neighborhoods, the denudation of forests, the
pollution of rivers, and all th degradation of human stan-
dards. An institutional governmental effort was then
launched to ensure some degree of health and salubrity in
the housing of the poor, providing them with allotments.
Some poor tenants were rescued from their slum dwellings by
the first legislative acts designed to protect their inhabi-
tants from the rents derived from free market prices under
normal operations. The main scope of these first insti-
tutional urban interventions was a social defense of the
dispossessed classes facing the operation of extreme specu-
lative market mechanisms. These legislative acts, mainly in
respect to land, "saved" the tenants (the peasants) from
the most violent effects of urbanization. However, a long
way would be pursued until these institutional purposes
could gain professional clarity, as in the fifteenth cen-
tury when professional doctrine for an urban theory and the
principlesof spatial planning were directed by ideas coup-
ling the institutional necessity of intervention with a
core of physical-aesthetical central ideas. Historically,
it was the same rationalistic necessity to organize the
whole society within a coherent and gradually increasing
spatial self-consciousness which generated the development
of the modern "rational" urban design. theory. Therefore,
some of these historical assumptions must be briefly
described. 29
1.1.2 The Renaissance and the Rise of the "Rational-
istic" Conception of Space
Our "rationalistic" conception of space and urban
design is essentially a creation of the Renaissance. How-
ever, the interest in the individual object, the search for
a scientific lawis is a natural continuation of the historic
process developed through the Middle Ages in which indivi-
dual concepts of relative independent unities began to arise.
In the Re issance, these individual characteristics are
submitted to a scientific method. In this sense what is
really new is the totalitarian character of the method and
the conscious deliberation and consistency criterion with
which reality and space were designed; while in the Gothic
period, space and their independent tract were considered
to be "symbols,' The Renaissance asks for a methodological
connection of the physical objects considered in their
immediate reality. Hauser considers that:
"The more society and economic life emancipate
themselves from the fetters of ecclesiastical
dogma, the more freely does art turn to the
consideration of immediate reality..."
The new basic concept in the representation of reality is
the principle of uniformity and the power of the total
effect and the tendency towards space uniformity, despite
all details. Whether reality is made up of different and
individual parts or is not analyzable into such parts, it
is always the principle of concentration and not coordina-
tion and the closed geometric form which dominates. The
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method is not to separate any single spatial element from
the whole composition but to force it into the basic frame-
work. For this new conception space forms an indivisible
unity and the urban actors have to grasp the whole urban
space through the principles of central perspective with a
single glance. Space, therefore, is interpreted by a
simultaneous rather than a successive knowledge. Historic-
ally this conception corresponds with the revival of the
economic life in Italy and the system of free competition in
opposition to the guild system of the Middle Ages. Socially,
due to the emancipation of the urban middle class over
feudalism, as a result of the formation of a financial
aristocracy, the Renaissance deepens the influence of the
medieval economic and social development with its striving
toward a more complex division of labor. Now society is
dominated by abstract rational laws regulating the capital-
istic economic system. These laws express the capitalistic
needs for planning, calculability, and expediency leading
to quantitative gains. They are creations of the same
intellectual effort which makes its way in the organization
of the productive labor, in the trading methods of the
credit system, the bookkeeping control, or in the method
for the rational government or warfare. Therefore, the
concept of space becomes also part of the total process of
rationalization. Space is now felt as a logical conformity
of the individual parts of a whole, the geometric or
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arithmetically definable harmony of the different relation-
ships and the calculable equilibrium of a composition, and
therefore the exclusion of discords in the relation of com-
plex activities in space. Central perspective is adopted
as a means to consider space from a mathematical standpoint
in order to achieve systematic organization of the indivi-
dual forms. As a consequence, the production of forms
emancipated from the spirit of pure craftsmanship and a new
professional educational system was created.
1.1.3 The New Professional of Planning
From the educational standpoint, the new professional
demand had to begin with the abolition of the teaching
monopoly of the guilds.
"As long as the right to practice as a professional
was conditional on apprenticeship under a guild
master, neither the influence of the builds nor the
supremacy of the craft tradition could be broken.
The education of the rising generation had to be
transferred from the workshop to the school and
practical instruction had to yield partly to
theoretical in order to remove obstacles which the
old system put in the way of a young talent." (12)
The process begins by the authority of the masters being
replaced by the ideal of nature, and ends with the finished
body of doctrine represented by academic instruction, in
which the place of the old discredited models is taken by
new ideals, just as strictly limited but from now on
scientifically based. The old workshop community and craft
tradition are abolished and replaced by a purely intellec-
tual teacher-pupil relationship. From now on it's possible
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to build an urban conceptual method "in abstract" as an
intellectual and scientific conception. The professional
has to comprehend the world empirically and derive rational
laws from this experience, endeavoring to control reality.
Alberti is the first to express the idea that mathematics,
as both the theory of proportions and the theory of per-
spective, are organizational disciplines. Therefore, as
each individual part of reality can be controlled and
organized through a mental scientific and abstract disci-
pline, the idea of autonomy of the various forms of intel-
lectual expression appears and an art such as urban design,
which bears its meaning and purpose within itself and its
sets of rational rules, becomes conceivable. For the
spatial conception, the drawing, as a coherent set of scien-
tific interlinked images, became the direct form of artistic
creation of spaces,for it gave the most complete expression
possible to the fragmentary, "uncompleted" and "uncomp-
letable" social space. The design method as an achievement,
per se, began to be regarded as a realizable project
instead of as a formula for an artistic independence and
complete creation. The raise in the mere capacity for
achievement above the real achievement itself is the first
step from our modern inability of the individual genius to
communicate himself with society and to the appeal to pos-
terity against our present verdict. However, the basic idea
derived from this historic process has a powerful cultural
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impact on today's spatial creativity: the idea that spatial
forms are independent of "external" laws, and that they
belong to a certain particular individual and exclusive
creative process occurring in the creator's mind. Urban
form and social space from this point on can remain in an
intellectual sphere in which it is possible to organize an
individual image of the social space from one individual or
class standpoint, since the world is now divided in a trans-
cendent professional ideology as a separate entity from
practical affairs. Nowadays, this tendency is typically
represented by the transference of the professional interest
from the social results of the planning concepts to the
analysis of the formal elements and aesthetic contents of
the spatial plan. Also, the idea of an ideal urban model,
a master plan idea, the conception of the internal coherence
of the model as distinct from the coherence of reality, has
the same cultural roots in the idea of an autonomous
professional and exclusive production of a distinct know-
ledge. More important, these conceptions of cultural
autonomy are directly affected by the degree of the division
of labour in society, which increases the contradiction
between intellectual and physical works within different
social strata. As an "independent" structure, the cultural
forms are under direct influence of class concepts or
interests in a given historical epoch. Uniformity and
aesthetical consistency were the highest criteria of truth
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during the Renaissance, as well as for the Rationalists of
our century. However, if we are interested in change and
social mobility, we have to see reality not in the form of
a consistently organized and unified space but rather in
scattered groups from different spatial values, and that
the whole urban space is composed when we add together the
total panorama of these different and unequal views of the
whole. The discontinuous representation of space, at any
rate, makes a much more "scientific" representation of our
modern space than the central and hierarchical rationalistic
conception.
As the principle of division of labour and speciali-
zation are triumphant and gradually attain supreme power,
academic education and theoretical abstract training became
more and more the prerequisites for professional efficiency.
Historically, the representatives of the lower class began
to form an ever decreasing proportion of the total number
of working "professionals." As the upper bourgeoisie had
formally allied itself with other dominant oligarchies the
professionals were basically recruited in the ranks of the
middle class. This process explains the latent conflict
between the intellectual as a "professional" and the
dominant classes. A partial "humanistic" solution is the
escape into the "ivory tower." The whole modern rationalist
movement followed this pattern, ideologically serving the
interests of the conservatism without being able to "adapt"
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itself to the order it supported. They became passive and
uprooted, serving the interests of the upper strata and
abstaining from all political activity in order tot to "tie
himself down," but by this passivity the professionals only
confirm the present coflict. The "rationalists," as
"humanists," began to lose touch with reality, becoming
romantic or social utopians as a result of their "intel-
lectual" independence and social indifference. Meanwhile,
a society based on the idea of authority and submission will
naturally utilize "rational" planning to favor the expres-
sion and manifestation of discipline and order rather than
surrender to reality. Such a society will want to invest
in the work of physical planning to prove that there are
universally valid, inviolable standards and principles that
the world must be ruled by -- a technical and neutral
purpose -- and that the individual man must submit to these
purposes. Rationalistic ideas of independent and indivi-
dualist urban form served these purposes of social domain
in which the ruling class will look above all as a symbol
of the calm and stability which it aspires for all society.
For example, if Brazilian architects develop a rational
and "artistic" urban composition for a new symbolic capital
and force urban reality into the pattern of an erudite
composition, that does not imply merely a solution of a
formal or intellectual problem, but a political and
economic outlook of life as a desire to perpetuate the state
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of affairs which corresponds and reinforces this outlook.
A "rationally" planned city is a normative instrument which
places an individually conceived norma and rules above
personal freedom and considers this norm itself as a way
of perfection rather than the degree of freedom between
different societal values. The individual submitted to
this inflexible urban scheme felt himself small and power-
less and surrendered himself to the powerful. However, how
can this comparative uniformity in the theory of urban
form be reconciled with the social changes? The polarity
between plan and reality was already felt and mitigated in
the Renaissance and represents the real modern contradic-
tory inheritance from the "classical" cultural propositions.
Since then, we think of a work of urban design as a con-
centrated and organized picture of reality seen from a
single and uniform point of view: a formal structure that
seems to "overcome" the tensions between the world and the
cultural object opposed to the world. However, as this
historical formalism was itself a period of short duration
covering no more than twenty years, this shortness is also
typical in the "classical" modern periods (Bauhaus, Cubism,
Rationalism, etc) and correspond in nothing but short
periods. These historical phases proved that strict formal
istic and normative attempts were and are unable to hold
their own propositions of formal order against the contra-
dictions and conflicts not only of the historically
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significant epochs but for modern reality where these contra-
dictions have been economically and socially accentuated.
This contradiction between reality and a physical form,
submitted and reducible to a series of formulae, was there-
fore more an aesthetical ideal and a fiction than a reality;
and as any "classical" age - even the Renaissance - remained
as we know today, a very dynamic epoch which was unable to
maintain more than a precarious and narrow equilibrium
between such diversity and "ideal" urban form. These pat-
terns of academic and classical urban design are therefore
"embedded" in this basic contradiction and professionally
result in attempts to "normalize" the typical individualism
of the professional planning activity with the necessity
which arose from the economic and social conditions to
normalize through impersonal and scientific methods, social
conflicts of antagonistic forces. We have analyzed the
Renaissance where we have localized the basic historical
sources of our historical conflict. We will now turn again
our analytical focus to the foundations of the contemporary
rationalist urban ideologies.
1.1.4 Urban Form and the "Impersonal" Design Methods
The modern rationalistic attitude toward the build-
ing of an "effective" theory for urban planning essentially
emerged from these historical predisposing causes, renewed
through the Twentieth Century cultural and academic environ-
ment. The main ideas were originated in a cultural
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background in which new societal values as the sense of an
architect's responsibility to the society in which he finds
himself, a philosophical structural approach to the theory
of the design and tradition of academic instruction were
the main issues. On the first account, one must understand
the basic ideas underlying the design theory from the
"Beaux Arts" instruction. These ideas regarding the methods
to be adopted by the architectural and urban design were
derived from the direct comparison with the painterly
methods. The professional ideology of the Western physical
planning was basically founded in the principles stated at
that time, with its emphasis in aesthetical and technical
methods of expression as composition, form, equilibrium,
etc., as against individualistic and free complex interpre-
tation and ordinance of reality. The main focus is placed,
as in the painting theories, in the basic contradiction
between form and structure as two basic moments in the urban
artistic creation; and the key issue is the avoidance of
the individual stylistic problem and the adoption of a
scientific, impersonal method of design. The meaning of
science here is adopted as a result of the general formula:
science is equal to erudition plus method. Science, there-
fore, is not understood by the rationalits as a mental
discipline based on experimental research and free to face
reality, but as an application of historical aesthetical
erudition. 39
The "impersonal" method can be considered as the
first attempt to introduce in the cognitive process an
impersonal and alienated educational method and the repres-
sion of the individual personality and individual research.
In that context, the form built-form is now generally
regarded as having laws of its own (harmony, proportion,
etc.) and the methodological cultural search is focused in
the theory to give currency to the word form as an inde-
pendent historical variable in the design process. Isolated
form can be regarded as having an abstract and impersonal
rule as LeCorbusier points out: ..."the proportional setting
out of a door in a panel with m' and n' ... In reality,
construction results in giving the door a width equal to
one-third of m'n' and a height equal to twice the width,
but the graphical method that leads to this result is
interesting in itself and contains the whole method."
The alternative, an individual personal taste, is
considered as an "ambiguous sentiment of harmony named
taste." As capitalistic industrial relations technolo-
gies developed, it was clear that time and energy required
for professional competence and skills might now be devoted
to the direct importance of an educational productive
method rather than the development of individual creative
capacities. Thus, even in the artistic and cultural sector,
the professionals trained through the elitist educational
system must accept the molding of their personality through
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cognitive cultural models normalized by rational rules
rather than noncognitive individual behavior. As a result,
the planning design processes were mounted in a threefold
cultural and philosophical assumption: history as a cultural
repository of themes, science as a normative too , and the
educational system as an impersonal "scientific and neutral"
institution intended to disseminate the methodology. Regard-
ing the urban design methods, the historic connection was
made by recovering the "impersonal and scientific" methods
of the symmetrical composition and the use of multi-axially
symmetrical plan patterns. The Beaux Arts program, for
example, has for its object of study the composition of
buildings in their elements and their totality, from the
double viewpoint of adapting them to defined programs and
to material necessities. Therefore to compose a city is to
make use of the individual elements (buildings) and to put
together as a unit the parts in a whole superior unity
controlled and assembled through the disciplines of regu-
latory axes. Urban composition can be therefore defined as
cultural action of assembled small historically informed
functioning volumes (buildings) conceived in terms of a
separate entities for each separated and defined social
function in a final composition following axes, in such a
way that this separation and definition was made visible
through the axis coordination. This theory of the ele-
mentary composition has survived throughout the Nineteenth
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Century and entered our century underlying all the profes-
sional theoretic assumptions regarding town planning. We
will find LeCorbusier using the method as a basic idea in
the formulation of his basic planning concepts, totally
reproduced in the basic idea of Brasilia's monumental two
axial conception. The cultural appeal of these design
methods was due to a series of historical and cultural
opportunities: First, the proliferation of the eclectics
and decorative ideas widely regarded by the newly rising
industrial methods as harder to adapt to the modern indus-
trialization processes with their specific demands for
standardization and mass production. Complexity had
reached its peak and the return to simple elementary forms
was the only way to open new industrial opportunities.
Secondly, ideologically, because the control on the social
forms will be performed by a kind of impersonal discipline
and by the construction of a deterministic view of the
urban history that depreciates any personal effort and
tends to leave the professionals waiting for a new struc-
tural principle to be derived from a new single and over-
riding art of design, embracing all others as an independent
FORM. In this context, the form considered now as a common
urban form can be regarded as having its own specific laws,
as the systematic use of proportions, equilibrium, symmetry,
etc. The rationalistic system develops, therefore, a sort
of logic and theological view of the urban nature linking
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the evolution of the system, and thus the development of the
Western Modern Movement to a sort of a rigorous moral and
intellectual middle class discipline acquired through
academic training.
1.1.5 LeCorbusier: The Codification of the
Rationalistic Urban Planning
LeCorbusier created, starting from the cultural
framework of the Beaux Art ideas, an entirely homogeneous
and didactic set of urban physical propositions as a kind
of cultural market product whose homogeneity and structural
clearness had answered the basic professional aims of the
middle class planning intellectuality for most developed
and underdeveloped countries. These planning principles
were described in his basic document, Urbanisme, where he
states:
"Our modern culture, acquired by the West, has its
roots set deep in the invasions which extinguished
antique culture. After the check of AD 1000, it
began to build itself again slowly through another
ten centuries. With a primitive but admirably
ingeneous equipment invented in the Middle Ages, it
inscribed certain points of great splendor in the
Eighteenth Century...Where the Eighteenth Century,
defined the fundamental principles of reason, the
Nineteenth Century,by a magnificent effort, gave
itself up to analysis and experiment and created an
equipment which was entirely new, formidable,
revolutionary, and destined to revolutionize society
...We are the heirs of that effort; we are aware of
our modern feeling, and we know that an era of
creation is about to commence...This modern senti-
ment is a spirit of geometry, a spirit of construc-
tion and synthesis. Exactitude and order are its
essential condition...This is the passion of the age.
With what astonishment do we regard the disordered
and spasmodic impulses of Romanticism' A period when
the soul was thrown back on itself in such an effort
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of analysis that it was as though a volcano were in
eruption. No longer do we get these eruptions of
overcharged personality. The amplitude of our means
imp ls us toward the general, and to an appreciation
of the simple fact. In place of individualism and
its fevered products, we prefer the common rule, the
everyday, the rule to the exception. The everyday,
the rule, the common rule, seems to us now the strate-
gic base for the journey towards progress and the
beautiful. A general beauty draws us in and the
heroically beautiful seems merely theatrical. We
prefer Bach to Wagner...Throughout the world we see
the array of mighty powers, both in the industrial
and the social spheres; we see, emerging from chaos,
ordered and logical aspirations, and we feel that
they are in harmony with the means of realization at
our disposal. The industrial achievements of our
own age, which impress us so profoundly today, are
created by placid and modest man whose thoughts
are limit d and direct: engineers who do their addi-
tions on squared paper...yet, these men can bring
those of us who have something of the poet in us to
the very extreme of enthusiasm and emotion..." (5)
In this passage we can simultaneously remark the main ra-
tionalistic ideas as the restating of the familiar prejudice
against diversity and complexity in urban environments
through a pseudo-scientific inclination for using schematic
geometric processes as a basic tool to perceive and inter-
pret the external world; the concept of the ancient ages as
of "chaos and disorder," and an attack against variety in
planning as opposed to uniformity in detail.
Regarding LeCorbusier's central ideas for town plan-
ning, the basic concept is to elaborate an urban solution-
type in the abstract as, for example, the basic "urban lay-
out" first developed for the Salon d'Automne (1912) under
the title, "Une ville contemporaine pour 3 millions d'habi-
tants."(6) This plan would be the basic idea upon which
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Lucio Costa's plans were based more than fifty years later,
for the conception of the Brasilia Master Plan. The simi-
larities between these two plans are total: both plans call
first for a sort of Beaux Arts major and minor axis. At
points of maximum traffic: pressure near the central zone,,--
there are no fewer than three superimposed traffic levels
at the central station. The basic commercial and bureau-
cratic buildings cluster around this core area.
"And actually, these skyscrapers will contain the
city's brains, the brains of the whole nation. They stand
for all the careful working out and organization on which
the general activity is based." Lucio Costa's plan also
divided Brasilia into two principal axis (the Monumental
Axis and the Residential Axis) and in his basic report he
states:
"The crossing of this monumental axis, of a lower
elevation with the residential axis, imposed the
creation of a great platform free of traffic except
that headed for parking there, a calm area where
logically were concentrated the amusement center of
the city..." (8)
The housing sector envisaged for the "Ville Contemporaine"
consists of entirely middle class housing (apartment build-
ings) grouped in neighborhood unities. Likewise, Costa's
plan called for ninety-six such housing blocks, plus four-
teen sub-blocks of doubled area whose elevatorless buildings
were to be limited to three stories, as opposed to six in
the single blocks. The blocks were to be laid out in
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double rows on either side of the residential secondary
axis, with its fourteen lanes of traffic, paralleling the
Residential Axis and dividing it into upper and lower seg-
ments. Regarding spatial succession, each group of four
blocks (neighborhoods) at the point of juncture was to have
a church, a secondary school and a movie house. For the
whole city, the same geometric and progressive scheme was
adopted for different social groups in related local acti-
vities regardless of individual social differences. Within
the neighborhood area, the intention was to facilitate the
creation of a neighborhood unity in which a series of
activities centering on the domestic and education were to
take place on a local scale, in order to obviate any need
for automotive or mass transportation for their execution.
Although this seems to imply a view of the scientific method,
the approach is not an unexpected one. All these solutions
were elaborated first as an abstract solution type in which
the real standards of social and economic life are ignored
for the clearness of aesthetical composition using building
blocks in a sort of pictorial composition.
Thus, these ideas are not taking into consideration
such matters as the culturally and socially determined
needs and standards or complex problems such as the probable
mix of the social strata and their dynamics through time.
This holds strongly for the squatters' settlements, for
which there is no place in the well-defined and highly
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standardized material provision made for the superblocks.
As an investigator in a laboratory, the rationalistic process
avoids all special cases and all that may be "accidenta"
always adopting an "ideal" site of form to develop with.
1.1.6 The Rational City - A Structural Analysis
1.1.6.1 Spatial Organization
The rationalistic logic accepts the "scientificism"
as philosophy of order, and thus it would be natural that
the rational city, as an object of study, ought to be ini-
tially reduced to an analyzable autonomous unity in which
it is possible to find an eminent logic possessing evolving
coherency, and as such, provisible through time and space
as "variables."
The basic rationalistic assumption about the urban
space is that the urban form can be considered as a coherent
three-dinaensional physically uniform object, upon which the
human thought can reflect in grounds of "reason" to
organize different social and economical spaces in logical
formal structures. The result is not a real "social space,"
but a "configuration space," where the three-dimensions
statically conceived substitute the complexity and dynamism
of the real system. The aim of the physical design is to
reproduce in this "configuration space" all the phenomena
that the human perception learned from the sensible space.
But, as the space in which we "see" is totally different
from the vivential space, the notion of physical organization
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of space will run through an inverse trajectory; starting
from the ideal organization of a metaphoric space ruled by
rational criteria toward the submission of reality at these
principles and generic laws. At this point, the analytic
geometry which is the geometric of the systems is trans-
formed in a "geometry of the thought." The rationalistic
space organization in this process begins assembling first
a tri-dimensional plane upon which we can build the volu-
metric differentiation. The cartesian axes which are
capable of guaranteeding accessibility toward any point of
the horizontal system, can be performed by road feeders as
a backbone structural element of the whole system. The
global dynamic system can, by this way, be coordinated to a
rational experience from the thought. The whole urban net-
work is transformed in a clear, direct, and logical know-
ledge at the moment that we can correlate basic inter-
relationships with the laws of individual variation. But
this clear physical knowledge has to assume a standardiza-
tion on social behaviors and has to take into consideration
a range of "medium" social values basically idealized,
because the design coherence does not correlate with the
social-economic topologies. Moreover, if we clearly define
a certain "medium" social quality, less can be its degree
of variation in relation with several other variables com-
pounding the total system. This statement corresponds to
the Cartesian criteria of clear evidence, purity and
48
separativensss of the phenomena, which philosophically means
the over-valuation of the intuitive knowledge against the
(9)discursive knowledge. In other words, clearness without
individualization vis-a-vis individualization without
clearness. The rationalistic structure can, only by this
physical way, be coordinated to a rational experience from
the thought. The whole urban network is transformed in a
clear, direct and logical knowledge at the moment that we
can correlate basic inter-relationships with the laws of
individual variation.
The rationalistic spatial structure can thus be seen
as a synthetic structure which tries to rationalize,
formalistically, the reality. The best example of this
fact is the Master Plan concept, where all the spatial
sequences depend, each and everyone, on a systematic and
complete formal structure capable of fostering locational
certainty to all the future "actions." This apparent solu-
tion of the contradiction between dynamic social locations
and design certainly gives to the general plan a powerful
image, as a tool, of spatial urban organization vis-a-vis
the "chaotic nature" of the "real world."
The rationalistic city thus considers first the
physical urban object and later the social knowledge. On
the other hand, the plan can be "easily"expandible because
the new addition is, itself, equal to the old one; perform-
ing, thus, concrete cases which always justify the general
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law. The city form is considered as a continuous physical
achievement, homogeneous and quantitatively valuable. The
coordination of the parts "profits" with the uniformity
which would lose with contradiction or innovation. One
zone of activity is thus considered "correctly" assembled
if it succeeds a neighborhood zone with the same charac-
teristics performing thus a creative, orderly and progres-
sive system. The physical design reproduces itself without
"accidents." The rational systems always try to achieve
an internal physical coherence, an economy of explanation
and an excuse to adopt external new and complex spatial
elements which can "threaten" the scientific coherence of a
design so well constructed that it can even leave behind
"empty" spaces suitable for future unknown forms which,
by that way, become, themselves, clear, allowing a forecast
of their future spatial form. The development of the
Master Plan is achieved through a system of unfulfilled
present activities zonings waiting to be fulfilled in the
future by the addition of new activities considered as
equal as the present ones.
1.1.6.2 User's Standards
The human users' characteristics are idealized and
split into abstract levels as "clear" as their individual
"specifications." The principal city's functions are clas-
sical summary distinction between work, housing, circula-
tion, and leisure. For the rationalist's architects and
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planners, the substitution of the urban chaos ought to be
turned in a rigid transportation netowrk, limiting the
activities zonings equally "pure" and keeping between them
correspondence between relationship of clear spatial
association. In this process, simultaneity and overposition
are eliminated, favoring aesthetic homogeneity and mechani-
cal functioning. Summarizing, the urban rationalistic
thought assumes:
1. That the city is a generic object, uniform and
homogeneous; thus capable of accepting a general
law of organization.
2. That this law or organization can be seen as a
transference toward reality of a cartesian
geometric structure as a backbone structure
articulating a rigid zoning system. This zoning
is assembled through idealized standards for the
economic strata, as well as to the social
behavior.
3. That the "aesthetic meaning" is achieved through
a general diminishing of the symbolic effect of
each architectural individuality, and by the
external aesthetic meaning of "noble" architec-
tural objects capable of communicating emotional
and aesthetic messages.
4. That this whole urban structure under formation
ought to be maintained aesthetically intact
through a process of growing which reproduces
the basic structural web or, under the impos-
sibility of any future forecast for new activi-
ties through the reserve of vacant and green
areas for the future locations, in order to at
least maintain the whole urban object existing
in space and time without significant symbolic
chiange s.
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1.1.6.3 Brasilia's Spatial Planning: Lucio Costa's
Plan (10)
What are the consequences of such assumptions in
Brasilia, the city in which these methods have generated the
whole urban physical pattern?
Once the Master Plan has fixed the Cartesian trans-
portation structure (main axis) the several different acti-
vities are separated and connected: mixed activities are
"isolated" in homogeneous activities zones in order to
achieve "clean" activity zones. The banks in the banking
sector, the local commerce in the local shopping sector,
etc. It's clear that reality will change all these patterns,
linked only by transportation facilities and zoning codes.
Complementary and interrelated activities cannot be con-
sidered on such a system. On the other hand, the rigid
spatial boundaries imposed upon each activity needs "death
zones" for future expansion "built in between" in such a
way that the urban structure is born spatially discontinu-
ous to ensure mechanic functionality. We have, thus, formal
order replacing human possibility. This paradigm is, itself,
clear: as much as we try to give a precise shape for a
certain location, as much we lose in its functionality and
in its future possibility of interconnections.
The different space requirements also cause severe
losses in human functionality if we idealize the different
economic levels in order to overcome the economic barriers
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through formal manipulations. For the housing sector of
Brasilia, the plan projects three different economic levels
located in three different and "democratically" continuous
spatial locations. The basic assumption was that the dis-
tance to the center of the city for each social stratum will
be the same for each socio-economic neighborhood equally
located on space.
As architects and engineers, the "rationalistic
planners" believe that the city is a system of buildings and
land uses which could be arranged through aesthetic and
visual values without taking account of the existent social,
economic, and political structures. This belief is based on
a utopian view of the society and in the possibility of
achieving a "rational city" or "democratic city" through
manipulation of physical variables. Lucio Costa did not
ignore the social "gradations proper to the current regime
regime" (1 as he states in his initial report, but at-
tempted to provide for them by following a policy of physi-
cal determinism: "propitiate social coexistence to some
degree, thus avoiding excessive and undesirable stratifica-
tion," he states again.(12) However, the means used to
avoid social and class stratification would be differences
in density and/or in the living space per person or per
family, employing more or less "expensive materials" and
using various types of finishing, according to the social
level of the users. But, when the political group
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manipulates the "ideal plan," the final result was the
achievement of high land values and the maximization of land
costs in the low density residential districts of the upper
and middle class, and the displacement of the low income
strata toward "nonplanned satellite marginal zones" - as we
will show in other chapters that the prediction that the
major social distinction would be only physical is totally
disproved . It is the economic discrimination on location,
related with the job market and the new city's facilities,
that are so distinguished.
1.1.6.4 The Zoning System
The middle class ideology underlying the concept of
a "rational city" also results in attempts to eliminate as
"nonaesthetic zones" all the facilities, land uses, and
institutions of the lower income class. Brasilia's "ra-
tional" plan neither made, for example, provision for
tenements, rooming houses, second-hand stores, and "margi-
nal" industry; therefore forcing them to spread out in the
satellite cities in which all land uses are permitted.
The "official plan" divided the city in a correlation
between transportation routes (based on individual automo-
bile as the principal mode of transportation) and neighbor-
hoods for middle and upper income classes. Favoring low-
density and the automobile maximization use, the zoning
codes sought to achieve the cessation of the residential
mobility and increase the bureaucratic control of every
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future growth. The only land uses programmed for future
growth (within the plan's original framework) were for the
high standard expensive superblocks. The city resulted,
thus, in a static plan as a finished "objet d'art," favoring
at the same time the small-town suburban type of living. As
the zoning called for middle class life style for all, it
did not recommend or even encourage building standards to
enable low-income people to stabilize themselves as a "frac-
tion" of the "rational plan." The concern of the planners
with zoning the city, stopped at the physical limits
projected; although the growth processes cover a much wider
area, as low-income populations with their living facili-
ties were beginning to move to the new "satellite cities"
before the plan was even in the early stages. At the same
time, rational idealistic zoning standards also contributed
to accelerating land speculation. The land use's standards
only deal with zones of activities without computing the
effects of the highest levels of automobile accessibility
in the central city low density zones. The rationalistic
zoning assumption that excessive land coverage inevitably
produces traffic congestion was only accepted to avoid
urban concentration and densities, but for this reason
produced "diseconomies" for the whole population. As a
result, the public facilities are scarce and expensive, due
to under-utilization (sewer system, water supply, trans-
portation, etc.) and the governmental expenditures "per
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capita" are lowering each year, while on the other hand,
land prices, with the limited supply of land, are soaring.
Moreover, some of thos public facilities are already located
in empty areas" (shaped by the overall infrastructural resi-
dential and service axes), enabling private developers to
earn huge profits. In some of these new residential areas,
land prices speculation almost reached the land prices of
the Rio de Janeiro's expensive seashore. It's interesting
to notice that at the time when the physical plan was being
elaborated by the architects, an independent commission
studied zoning and the land tenure problem, and in its
final report recommended that no piece of land would be
purchased in a land market. The commission's proposal was
a movable rent on land, varying according to inflation
rates. They emphasized the "social aspect of land tenure"
against future land market speculation. The position of
the planners, instead, was to enforce the existing private
ownership and control of urban land in order to maintain
the statical physical interdependencies of laws generated
by the "rational" plan. As a result, the physical zoning
concept of "object" of the Master Plan got transformed into
fixed social interdependencies in order to prevent "violent"
future aesthetic changes. The institution of land ownership
and land market with government land gives rise to strong,
nonspatial appropriation for low-income people who have,
nevertheless, to share unevenly the expenditures of urban
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improvements through their social labor surplus (social
overhead capital) and tax structure.
The landowners, in fact, take an extra advantage
because they are allowed to control scarce urban developed
land (within high rigid zoning standards) which only the
government can provide. The potential social benefits
deriving from increased urban growing get systematically
transferred to speculation as higher land values and rents
also rise at each governmental action to increase the
quality of the city's facilities.
Finally, we want to establish a formal comparison
between a pure zoning system (Brasilia) and an "informal,"
"chaotic," nonplanned zoning system (Rio de Janeiro).
Map I shows the population distribution in both cities,
related with time and distance to CBD. In the case of
Rio de Janeiro, the black dots represent zones of shanty-
towns and'bquatments." As we can see, almost all of these
populations are located in a reasonable distance from the
potential employment centers. In the case of Brasilia,
these populations are scattered in several satellite cities
around the central planned city. The effect of the zoning
low density gradients is also clear; while in Rio de Janeiro,
80 percent of the total population of 5 million inhabitants
are located within a 35 km distance circle and less than
50 minutes travel time; in Brasilia the same amount of
population is located within a distance range of 10 km to
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57 km and a travel time of 100 minutes, for a total popula-
tion of 700,000 inhabitants. While in Rio all the urban
land is continuously occupied, in Brasilia (Map II), each
one of the satellite cities is separated by large stretches
of vacant land functioning as a zoning "protective ring."
The continuity is merely functional, and each satellite
city performing the role of suburban "dormitory" settlement.
From one example to another we have the path from the
relative to the absolute segregation of the urban functions
and classes through the "rational" zoning patterns. (12)
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PART A: THEORY
1.2 Analysis of Brasilia's Alternative Physical Plans:
A Critique on the Brazilian "Rationalist" Urban
Design Methods
The competition for the pilot plan of Brasilia had
great critical importance for an analysis of the "rational-
istic" thought behind the modern doctrine or urban design
in Brazil. In the first place, the diverse urban plans
papers presented the contributions of the best Brazilian
city planners and the opportunity for presenting a "physical
design," disconnected from the major interdisciplinary con-
siderations, proposed a "disarmed" vision of the formal
schemes developed by rationalism; in sum, the idea of a city
as a "pure design," as a completed formal scheme. Costa
notes this point perfectly when he proposes in his plan a
"basic idea capable of furnishing the immediate reading and
comprehension of the city as a utilitarian object, under-
standable and analyzable at a glance." ,( 3 ) Considering the
fact that a city is founded and developed starting from the
absence of whatever prior physical structures, even if we
could consider the existing cities (Planaltina and
Sobradinho) as evidence, there is no doubt that the creation
of a capital in such a short time constituted a fundamental
problem in urban design, regardless of the fact that, as
reality would demonstrate, the original sketch hardly was
transformed into an urban archipelago, now irremediably
consolidated in its disequalities, disequilibrium and
injustices. The first analysis to be made is, after all, a
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proof that the presented projects sought to provide a pre-
diction of the long term physical structures, based on the
fact that a capital must mark its symbolic aspects by the
perpetuity of its significant physical structures. There
were no tendencies, of this type, for the creation of open
structures supported in optional processes of growth, in
which the creative cultural participation of the future
population could be projected. "Humanism begins with
language," (14) and it is at that epoch, the discussions
about open-ended works, (15) about the creative participation
of the population and in profoundly diversified language,
while democratic, did not find the receptivity that today
could be found. It was left to the users of the future to
adapt to, or "strangle" the city (16).
At any rate, it is from an "anti-rationalistic"per-
spective that we see Brasilia today, also including at this
point the contention over the creation of a "city-design,"
be it or be it not the capital.
We do not believe in the creation of the city as an
"object," without community groups working out their respec-
tive spaces of everyday life, leaving both positive and
contradictory marks, in all cases never uniformly in line
with a culture. The difficulties of this position are
evident, as we lose the certainty of a "clear performance"
orienting all activities, but which reality demonstrates to
be lacking in the make-up of a future urban scheme
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formalized by its default. (17) Modern academism of a formal
urban tendency has caused many problems in urban planning
as it has in architecture. In reality, what we can get with
rigid design is, as we saw, a "programmed immobility." The
generations of professionals which arose have already ten-
tatively observed the outcome of academic solutions of
rationalism andccertainly they will absorb the task of
arming the structures of the future, enabling their trans-
formations in rhythm or form, continually and dynamically
adopting themselves to a renovation in their later lives.
Understood as the cultural equation in which we move, we
will see how in a general analysis, the principal charac-
teristics of the alternative plans, besides that of
Lucio Costa, presented at the competition for Brasilia.
The purpose of this section is to look at different versions
of these other rationalistic plans in order to underline
their "method" and their main theoretical framework. We
choose three apparently different plans in order to under-
stand that behind an apparently physical differentiation
embodied in each one, the same physical determinism and
mechanical functioning are present in all of them, as a
sort of planning ideology. However, we stress to what
extent some of the "open ideas" used as "detail" in each
one are potentially useful in order to build new oppor-
tunities for a more diversified spatial language.
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1.2.1 Plan of Joao Henrique Rocha and
Ney Fontes Gonpalves (18)
The Rocha-Gon9alves plan obtained second place in the
competition immediately after the Lucio Costa plan, from
which it is distinguished by not having a symbolic unity as
the objective. The plan is a clear example of rationalist
"as emblage": the zoning comprises an administrative "head"
bordered by four eight-laned roads, two of them going to
the contiguous and symmetric habitation zones, and the other
two assuring accessibility to the autonomous commercial
sector and to the industrial zone bordered by the residen-
tial zone of office workers and working class which is
functionally connected. The solution resembles that of
Costa differing in the isolation of the public transporta-
tion area in a central bus station used by Costa in his
plan, as the center of the axes, without the creation of an
autonomous zone of marginal traffice to the urban center.
In the Rocha-Goncalves plan the traffic is organized peri-
pherally in relation to the central administrative nucleus.
This structure introduces the problems of concentric geo-
metric systems: a great quantity of land remains disposable
for the urbanization around the transportation structures
and the posterior introduction of radial new arteries
tending to transform the system into a radial concentric
pattern increasing the functions of the peripheral ring.(19)
The functional delimitation of the center of the city
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obtained by the peripheral roads do not end by the addition
of equally important zones besides the zones destined for
the administration like the commercial center or the trans-
portation center which remain in this way, inorganically
situated in relation to the center of the city. The func-
tional distances between these activities of basic life-
support and the administrative center requires transit
access with a substantial loss of time. The residential
zoning of the plan proposes a classical rationalistic system
of neighborhood unities aesthetically composed with apart-
ment blocks containing typically mixed and basically
equipped middle class habitations: school, local stores and
services. The proposition for different types of habita-
tions acknowledges three types of housing levels within the
same neighborhood: individual habitations and collective
apartments of both low and average density. Despite the
rigid rationalist design, the contiguity of these different
types constitutes an "open" attempt in the diversification
of atmospheres at the level of the basic cell. (20)
The functional organization of the plan establishes,
in summary, a central zone for the government activities
as a nucleus out of which the rest of the functional zones
develop interconnected to the principal axis of traffic,
composed by local roads of rapid traffic. The transference
to the local roads of slow traffic are made by complete
clover leafs. At the level of residential and commercial
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sectors, the road crossings for pedestrians would be under-
ground through walking passages. The residential zones are
divided into two main sub-zones: one for the office workers
directly connected with the government and the other for
those inhabitants whose livelihoods are derived directly
from the industrial or commercial activitieor from inde-
pendent services. For the industrial zones there would be
the typical mechanical process of growth in which new resi-
dential cells would be continually added to the axes of
rail and road circulation intermingled within the industrial
zone, assuring an urban development of a "linear and con-
tinuous type," allowing for an "unlimited flexibility"
within a prediction of up to 673,000 inhabitants in the
year 2050. The solution merited criticism of the jury
based on an argumentation that the growth of functional
areas within the city, basic for a growing population,
would implicate "undefined" limits. However, reality demon-
strated to our view that the spontaneous process of the
growth in the satellite cities obeyed principles basically
similar to those predicted in the Rocha-Goncalves plan:
with the urban growth, new complete satellite nuclei were
being joined together to the principal axes of circulation
without any long-term programming and a strategy of special
events ordering these developments. Wilhelm(21 ) compares
the urban growth of the region of Brasilia with the
"linear cellular added" development proposed by the
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Rocha-Gonpalves plan establishing an analogy between the
spontaneous growth of the satellite cities and the proposal
of linear development for the city region. As regards the
functional spatial structure of the housing system, the
Rocha-Gonpalves plan adopts a system of neighborhood units
built around a "basic cell." The process of programming
was classically based in the determination of "efficient"
densities for the functioning of communitarian urban
equipment and basic life-support services. A base popula-
tion of 8,000 inhabitants was judged appropriate to merit a
primary grade school for 1,000 students. From this can be
obtained a few measurements: 1,600 inhabitants with an
average of five persons per habitation, 12% living in
isolated unifamiliar types for high income, 57% of the
habitations in collective blocks of three stories for mid-
dle income and 31% of the total inhabitants in collective
blocks of 12 stories for low middle income. The basic
neighborhood cell, therefore, was composed with a set of
mixed unifamiliar habitations in a lateral band, a central
band occupied by residential blocks and the communal equip-
ment divided into different topologies, one at the local
level and the other an intercell commercial business and
life support services serving a larger residential area.
The 'hssemblage" of these cells resulted in three distinct
axes of circulation forming distinct residential and com-
mercial roads. Each functional zone of activities in each
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join together with others in new cells to form units of a
superior degree (neighborhood units) for every six units,
allowing for an accessibility by foot of 1,200 meters or
12 minutes. The accessibility within each cell was calcu-
lated in six minutes by foot for the alternative residence-
local commerce.
The physical implementation of the plan in the local
topography brought into consideration the orientation of the
transit axes in such a way that the solar orientation can
propiciate adequate insulation for all the residential
blocks in each cell. This established two fixed orienta-
tions: one for the residential area and the other for officei
buildings. Another consequence of this method was the
delimitation of inter-blocks distances as a direct function
of the maximum winter shade proportion projected by the
different buildings. Asa result, not only formal organiza-
tion of the housing system but economical or anti-economical
densities resulted from these aesthetical and physical
optimalities. The process of growth of the city would be
borne by the continuous addition of new modules: an addition
in the administrative central area corresponding to the
construction of a new residential module in the space clos-
est to the center; a second addition of commercial build-
ings in the commercial zone; a third addition in the indus-
trial zone, and a final addition for services in their
respective zones. The process, although tentative of
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modulation, falls into the typical difficulties of classical
rationalism resulting in the following problems:
- The separation of the central area of activities
and the forecast of new activities around the
CBD left a large empty area for future develop-
ment. It does not allow the emergence of the
idea of an urban functional center in continuous
change even outside the "symbolic" governmental
buildings zone.
- The separation into slightly different zones
does not permit the habitual scale economies of
agglomeration for the low intensity of activi-
ties and low concentration of potential users.
The predominance of empty spaces over built
spaces (horizontal occupancy hardly reaches 20%
of the total lots) makes the urban spaces
poorly socially animated and the excessive
individualization of the activities prevents the
mixtrue of complementary activities contributing
to the formation of undifferentiated spaces
favoring a "neutral" life style.
- The urban framework does not take into considera-
tion the diverse economical thresholds of urban
growth in which, after a determined population
limit, the workings of a new urban infra-struc-
ture must receive new massive investments
necessary to build a new stage of proportional
growth. The addition of "formal nonurban
modules," despite the "logic" of the rationalist
point of view, takes only into account an
"additive" process of growth. Actually, neither
the urban equipment nor the urban investments
increases in the same linear reason in relation
to the population growthT.Maliz (22) clearly
demonstrates this point in order to establish
his threshold theory which for various predicted
population sizes there exist diverse economic
thresholds within which urban growth demands
relatively constant limits of infrastructural
investments. (23) Starting from a certain li-
mit of population, the basic urban infrastruc-
tural investments grow until they reach a
second threshold. Each phase of development in
that way remains contained between two adjacent
thresholds. It is possible in that way to
establish the critical costs of investments
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besides those which perhaps are not economically
acceptable, since they arrive at a new threshold.
It is acknowledged, by this, the notion of an
efficiency tax, or be it, the calculation of the
economic efficiency of an urban investment and
the critical limits of the process of growth.
The efficiency tax is directly proportional to
the costs of maintenance added to the basic
investments necessary and inversely proportional
to the growth of the urban population.
A rational solution is sought which permits an eco-
nomically controllable growth, taking into account the raw
population curve and the infra-structural investments as a
basis of the process of expansion and not only in the pos-
sibility of a geometric process for growth of the urban
structures imagined by rationalist urban design. There
exists also, a divergence between the process of growth
imagined by rationalist design and the urban economic pro-
cess. A comparison between the costs of investme ts for
superseding different thresholds in different-sized cities
shows that the major scale economies are situated in
cities of more than 250,000 inhabitants, which makes us
consider the hypotheses of several low densit satellite
cities as totally anti-economical. It is clear that the
process of successive decentralization followed by the
authors Rocha-Goncalves brings into account at least only
the formal possibility of the addition of sub-nuclei without
a basic consideration of their economic efficiency. This
thesis is retaken in the plan of M. M. Roberto (24) when
the authors propose a succession of urban nuclei with
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population limits between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants.
In one plan as well as in the other, the optimal population
target hypothesis was not analyzed for economic performance
but for the feasibility of a mechanical geometrical growth.
he adopted process in rationalist urban design to encompass
different hypothesis of urban growth is, after all, merely
mechanical, not taking into account calculations relative to
urbanization costs in future remodelling. In summary, the
Rocha-Goncalves plan represents a clear comprehension and
use of the classical urban techniques for the rationalist
town planning within their limitations, in those aspects
already criticized. The rationalist conception of urban
design is insufficiently open and complex for a more dynamic
and democratic comprehension of urban realities.
1.2.2 The Plan of Rino Levi (25)
The Rino Levi plan presents a solution which is
unique among the group of plans presented in the Brasilia
contest. It is the only solution with zones over very high
habitational density, and this basic premise conditioned all
of the physical disposition of the proposed city. The
hypothesis adopted was one which contained almost all the
target population in residential mega-structures, forming
large groupings of 48,000 inhabitants arranged in three
super blocks of 16,000 inhabitants each. A so-called "inten-
sive neighborhood" unit of these habitations contains the
super-blocks situated on an axis of roads which connect them
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directly to the urban center. The urban center in this way
organizes all the residential groupings by using only three
basic transit axes which integrate all the intensive neigh-
borhood units. Beyond these limits the axes go on to form
mised gypes of habitational units, both extensive and semi-
intensive for 15,000 individual inhabitants. These units
look like the classic neighborhood unit, centered in turn
around the local community center which contains the local
commercial center, schools, clubs, etc. In these nuclei
a gradation is proposed in which habitations of the greatest
density are closer to the local community center (semi-in-
tensive) and at the edge of the nucleus for the extensive
types. The fundamental interest of the plan in our view
is in the proposal of the intensive habitation areas. The
utilization of mega-structures is not a new idea in the
rationalist formal dictionary. Its use in this project is,
nevertheless, extremely well studied and offers at the
same time, some points for comparison with other strategies.
Particularly in the discussion of the "ideal" population
density for middle class housing systems.
The basic idea of the super block for 16,0000 inhabi-
tants is based on a system of high habitational densities.
As we know today, the gains made by the new techniques for
foundations, elevators, and steel super structures in
continuous technological development insures new forms of
habitational systems, particularly in the growth of densi-
ties and moreover in the conjunction of factors which can
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facilitate economic use of urban space. The "cultural"
restrictions to high urban densities are, nevertheless,
strong and connected to a series of preconceived ideas of
which the most common is that any increase in population
density corresponds to a lowering of the overall quality of
urban life. This idea is based on the fact that high densi-
ties of some actual cities are mainly'responsible" for the
socially negative urban aspects. The emphasis on these
pathological issues prevents the possibility, on the other
hand, of observing the positive results generated by the
intense density urbanization patterns. The typical example
is the consideration of the neighborhood Copacabana in
Rio de Janeiro by "rationalist" "architects" and "planners"
who view it as the typical example of what is qualified as
urban "chaos." In reality Copacabana is a narrow belt of
land, limited by the ocean and the mountains, where a con-
tinuous intensive growth was established through three
generations of buildings; first four, then eight, and now
twelve story buildings. These buildings came to shelter a
population of close to 200,000 inhabitants. The densities
are very high, especially when compared to the rationalist
"standards" (between 200 and 300 inhabitants per building).
Copacabana has the greatest urban density in the city of
Rio de Janeiro. The lowest local density being 566 inhabi-
tants per sector, and the greatest being 1,146 inhabitants
per sector. The mean density excluding plazas and streets
was estimated by the Doxiadis Plan at 730 inhabitants per
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sector (1956). (26) The figures from a study by the Depart-
ment of Planning, in 1956, calculated a population of
273,180 inhabitants, with each inhabitant occuping an
average of 20.2 square meters. These figures indicate
that, if constructed on the basis of all the empty area
still remaining and following the regulations and best esti-
mates strictly, the total population capacity will be
634,380 inhabitants. In these circumstances the density of
the developed area would reach 3,330 inhabitants per sector.
Copacabana is also a district for the upper and middle
income classes, and "Favelas" embracing a population simi-
lar to that of an administrative city like Brasilia. How-
ever, what is the social reaction of the residential popu-
lation and the urban expectations of the occupants of
Copacabana in relation to the urban environment in which
they live? Recent work by Velho(27) tries to analyze
anthropologically the district of Copacabana through a
survey of one of its typical apartment building; apartments
of the living room, one bedroom variety. The acceptance
of the district by the middle and low middle class is
great; this is relfected in the intense intra-urban migra-
tion from other classic middle class districts (Tijuca,
Botafogo) from the suburbs and from cities of other
Brazilian states. The majority of those interviewed did
not change their occupational status upon moving to
Copacabana. The unchanged occupational and income levels
basically confirm the importance of a social preference for
75
the urban attributes of the district. Meanwhile, the people
who leave the district seem to belong to the upper middle
class, denoting a typically elitist behavior.(28) The
reasons presented for the move were based on the accusation
of "environmental pollution" or "social pollution" and in
the pursuit of new locales more "pure," made possible
evidently by a greater income level. For these people the
move to Ipanema represents the recuperation of the "tran-
quility" and "calmness" lost by the arrival of "intruders"
accused of destroying the formerly peaceful district life.
The social composition of the typical apartment
building analyzed by Velho shows the predominance of
salaried professionals, students, domestic servants, civil
employees (state and federal) and office workers (white
collars) in apercentage of 52 to 60% of the total, or
a proportion indicative of the predominance of the "white
collar" worker. The image of the district was described by
its average citizens, according to Velho, by the following
urban qualities:
Urban Qualities Frequency Typical Phrase
(objective of
response)
1-shopping 43 best shopping in Rio
2-beach 31 "north zone" doesn't have
any beaches
3-entertainment 24 you're not looking for
things to do
4-apartment costs 20
5-living 17 it's the only district
in Rio where you can live
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Urban Qualities
6-relatives
7-transportation
8-facilities
9-activity
10-comforts and
personal liberty
11-modernity
12-convenience
13-privacy
14-happiness
Frequency
16
15
13
13
12
8
8
5
5
Typical Phrase
I want to remain close
to my relatives
it doesn't lack trans-
portation
it has all the facilitiE
everything is on hand
Tijuca is very dead. Here
there is a lot going on.
it's a district full of
comforts. Here there is
more personal liberty.
I like people who are up
with the times.
for convenience,
Copacabana offers every-
thing.
it's nice here - everyone
minds their own business
I came here to feel the
happiness of the district
The questionnaire verifies that diverse positive qualities
of urban life, such as happiness, animation, greater indi-
vidual freedom, typical of areas of high density, result
evidnelty from the facility for activities made possible by
the scale economies (shopping, business, movies, etc.).
According to Velho, "It's important to note that in the
very rare cases in our sample of people who did not like
Copacabana, the very characterizations of "traffic,"
"agitation," "noise," etc. became "anti-life" while
"tranquility," "calm," "peace of mind" were defined as
"pro-life" qualities. Further, "everything indicates that
in a sector with a lesser predominance of white-collar
population, especially in groups shocked by the "excesses
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of urbanization" the relation is similar to the one pre-
(29)
sented by the minority of our sample"( . In sum, high
populational density, the mixture of activities and the
intensity of social activities must be reviewed if we want
to establish a strategy of urban design based on the
potentiality of riches that the urban social dynamic of the
highly populated areas can create in the context of develop-
ing countries' urbanization.
The notion of high density areas is again adopted in
the Rino Levi plan. With the habitational concentration in
the residential mega-structures, the total area occupied
by the city is obviously reduced, principally when compared
to the classic all-horizontal solutions. On the other
hand, the solution for the super-blocks presents some
propositions of interest for the future development of
middle class habitational systems in great densities.
The super-blocks incorporate the idea of the
"internal street," originally used by LeCorbusier in the
residential units of Marseilles. Within the super-blocks
are included the local streets with local commerce and
facilities at the community-cell level such as health
center, schools, and stores. The blocks are built with
metal-skeletoned structures, reaching a high of 300
meters and length of 435 meters. The transit access is
made by elevated roads crossing the zone of the "pilotis"
in each block. At these points the passengers board,
assuring the pedestrians covered access from the "pilotis"
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to the general set of elevators. These elevators, with
capacities of 28 passengers and speeds of 210 meters per
minute, and with intervals of 10 seconds between consecu-
tive cars, would proportion the "output" of 10% of the
building's population in less than five minutes.(30) The
general elevators conduct passengers to the three internal
streets for the horizontal circulation of pedestrians at
the 20th, 40th, and 60th floor levels. In these areas are
located all the common utilities for each unit of 4,000
inhabitants; stores, kindergartens, nurseries, playground-,
health centers, all adjacent to an internal square. Acess
to the residential levels is made by local elevators, each
with a capacity for 12 passengers and velocities, allowing
for carrying 11% of the population in five minutes. The
habitational cells within the steel structures are doubly
expandable: horizontally, through the construction of new
block extensions, and vertically by the possibility of the
addition of new floors; both in phased construction. Struc-
tural stability is obtained by concrete towers for the
elevators and by neutral empty floors equipped with all the
public services such as water, sewer system, fire preven-
tion, etc. All these populations are housed in a community
formed by three super blocks (48,000 inhabitants), sepa-
rated from each other by 400 meters and covering an area of
only 64 hectares, the density approximately reaching
the Copacabana density: 750 inhabitants per hectare.
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Therefore, the urban image is easy to assemble and
read; the urban center can be situated in great proximity to
the residential areas for the middle classes and enough land
can be left for unformal development around the tiny central
area. The middle class buildings dominate the total urban
panorama while taking a few sectors of developed land.
However, the jury of the contest of Brasilia criticized
these aspects of the plan, considering it inadequate for a
capital to have the "physical vertical dominance" of the
"housing blocks" in the urban profile, instead of the domi-
nance of the governmental principal buildings as in the
Costa Plan.
The concentration in super-blocks also permitted the
total separation of pedestrians and local traffic by the
elevation in viaducts of small passages of highways stretched
between the urban center and the super blocks. Figure 1
shows us in the same scale, a comparison between the land
occupation patterns of the Costa Plan, the Rino Levi plan
and the two other plans described in this section.
The Rino Levi plan does not treat, however, the final
consequences of the effects of the concentration obtained by
the high density areas, since it admits the dispersion of the
so-called "extensive" communities to the margins of the lake,
beyond isolating the federal administration center in the
principal nucleus of the city. One solution as well as the
other would have been easily incorporated into the high
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density group, adding to and changing the quality of living
more efficiently.
In conclusion, the Rino Levi plan accepts, perhaps
in that epoch - prematurely, the modern notions of concen-
tration in highly mixed high density populations for the
habitational sectors, finding through technological proces-
ses an urban image of economy and simplicity. An important
social consequence is the reduction of the social distances
between any suburban area and the central habitational areas
of the upper and middle income populations, allowing for an
intensive use of the urban spaces.
1.2.3 The Plan of M. M. Roberto(31)
The M. M. Roberto plan is marked by a double reality
realized by its interdisciplinary team, there is a lower
degree of theoretical accuracy in its formulations for urban
structures, than that technical presuppositions are preva-
lent, for example, in the studies for the implementation of
the rural nuclei. This disequilibrium demonstrates that the
interdisciplinary approach only articulated parts of the
whole project, where some of the resulting positive points
relected a high level of the studies and final proposals.
The urban plan starts from the principle of "decen-
tralization in functional autonomous urban nuclei" going
from the presupposition that a monocellular metropolis of
500,000 inhabitants will possess all the inconveniences of a
megalopolis aggravating them all through the continuous
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growth:
"The urban controls will be practically impossible
and the private speculation would create the
interminable expansion of the suburbs, and before
the end of the plan's implementation there would be
congestion, waste, and the confinement of inhabi-
tants who would become prisoners in the "flames of
traffic." (32)
Hence, therefore, the basic rationalist idea of the geome-
tric decentralization in a series of urban units of 50,000
to 100,000 inhabitants, each judged "ideal" and linked by
roads to form a "federation of urban units." (33) For the
total predicted population there would be projected several
urban units of 72,000 inhabitants each, enabling the metro-
politan population to reach a limit of 1,260,000 inhabitants
in fourteen urban unities. Only the buildings which were
seats of the national federal powers and its immediate
assistant organs, would be found in a separate urban center,
and the other public functions would be distributed between
the urban units, considered "equally independent." We argue
that these "optimum" conditions for the cities of popula-
tions between 50,000 and 100,000 are debatable. There do
not exist urban size calculations and studies particularly
on the basic urban infra-structure costs; repeated in every
unit, these very probably would be uneconomical. Another
problem to consider is the process of implementation of the
nuclei. This process of implementation has consequences
in their own urban form; in the measures in which any unit
surpasses another, be it in the facilities offered and even
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by social stratification, there would appear, highly
regarded economical and social urban zones, voiding the ten-
dency toward "equalization and equilibrium." (34)
Certainly the development of an initial nucleus by
the economic concerns would take the rest of the nuclei
as dependents. However, the study of the growth of the
urban units, although scoring the social value of stratifica-
tion, considers important data such as the working class
population of the construction camps, as we will see consti-
tuted an urban population officially considered as "margi-
nal;" therefore established in a great hurry in satellite
cities. (See Table XV) The study also included the formation
of the rural dynamic as part of the formation of the urban
settlement, and without doubt, owing to the interdisciplinaiy
work, light was shed on the aspects involving the use of the
rural space in the framework of a regional perspective. In
this work basic predictions were made about the costs of
implementation and construction, as well as the probable
income distribution among different social groups. The
studies on the rural planning included analyses on the use
of land for various crops, areas for ecological conservation
the minimum parceling out of land for agricultural experi-
mentation; all detailed down to the level of "modern farms."
Such studies were recognized by the jury as the most
complete of all in the contest. However, the technique
developed in the regional studies does not correspond
directly in its dimension determining of urban structures.
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After the initial arbitrary division of "autonomous nuclei"
each unit was domensioned and formalized according to a
distinct geometrical and "rational design." Each unit was
designed as a circle to "escape from the usual regularity"
and as "the form most simple and logical" to inject "more
discipline." (35) The thrust of the units obeys a classical
principle of 1,200 meters for a distance walkable in 15
minutes, in the rationalist belief that in that way public
transportation could be "dispensed"with. A more accurate
examination of the aglomeration economies, stemming from
the daily time allotted to commuting to work, as well as the
economic structure of contemporary industrial capitalistic
society, certainly would deny such "ideal" vision. The laws
of the centralization and/or decentralization are analyzed
in other sections, and we hope to confront economical
realities against the rationalist physical determinism, par-
ticularly in the case of Brasilia's urban form. Therefore,
the diagram of the basic cell corresponds only to formal
requirements and follows the nature of the geometric pro-
cesses rather than the economic topology. However, an
analyses of the geometric methods can be useful in order to
understand the mechanism of the rationalist composition.
The diagram of the basic urban cell, in this way, was pro-
jected by geometric processes:fixing the formal urban shape,
the classification of densities follows a criteria of
"proximity without promiscuity,"(36) accenting the low
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middle class densities. From 100 to 150 inhabitants per
hectare distributed in the classical habitational typologies;
individual single family houses of one or two stories;
residential and office buildings of two, three, and seven-
teen floors. In the center of every cell a mixed core of
local life-support services and governmental institutions
functionally subdivided throughout the diverse specialized
urban cells: business, administration, etc. The traffic
flows divided in roads of LeCorbusier-type(37) forming a
fabric interconnected to the central ring, leaving the
interior of each satellite cell to local pedestrian traffic.
The systems of rapid transit cross the nuclei in their own
levels, allowing for the transference of passengersin the
core. There is an implicit "condemnation" of the use of the
private automobile, left to be the means of transportation
to the other units or for "pleasure" riding. The average
distance of circulation within the neighborhood is 150 meters,
within the sector, 350 meters, and within the urban unit,
600 meters. The reasoning, although geometrically logical,
is inexact if we consider the dynamics of urbanization, and
the market economy. The theory of central places of
Cristaller(3 8 ) admits, for example, that the basic economic
function of a city is to serve as a central place propor-
tioning goods and services for the broad space which sur-
rounds the core. The distances, external as well as
internal, must not exceed certain maximum parameters forming
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a network of "formal markets" whose centers and subcenter
compose hierarchies of economical networks through different
territorial levels. The idea calls attention to the struc-
ture of the urban spaces following principles which take
into account the territorial division based on functions of
supplies, transportation and administration unities. The
improvements proposed by Losch(39) to this model refer to
the advantages of putting the group of urban networks in an
economical system in such a way that the urban form must
consider mixing the networks which serve the populations of
a lower income level with those of the other levels, not
through geometric considerations but by a systematization of
the main economic standards. Subsequent contributions came
to configurate the theoretical bases for a more realistic
urban design that take into consideration, peculiarities of
the market economy. Beckman,(40) for example, establishes
how to calculate the population of an area of influence in
any of the hierarchical levels proposed by Christaller. It
becomes necessary, therefore, (if we want to advance in
finding new "open" urban designs) to determine design
criteria that permit a relatively dynamic formal configura-
tion for these economic phenomena.
The idea, either of a fixed and static urban network
or a geometric mechanical additive system cannot cope with
continuous economic change. The design theory must cope
with forms furnishing different combinations in order to
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achieve different and complex urban designs at the level of
creative imagination surpassing the deficiencies of the
dogmatic geometrical urban form. A new urban space armed in
this way would also permit a change in the generation of the
new subcenters through the major or minor multiplication of
secondary networks. Isard proposes for these strategies
a model based on the observation that the Loshian model
implies a relatively high density of low income workers,
and therefore of a population in the city core. The size
needed for the market areas, in order to generate a suf-
ficient demand of goods, is much less in the core than at
a great distance from it. The conclusion is that at great
distances from the city, the market area has to be greater;
not only owing to the lesser number of industries situated
there and consequently lesser population, but also owing to
the rural population employed in agricultural activities
which would be evidently more spatially dispersed. The Losh
model, therefore, requires correction, resulting in
"geometrically distorted" market areas that decrease in size
and increase in population density as we approach the urban
center. In the center, market areas are so small that they
are almost reduced to individual locations of high intensity.
This schema can be completed by the considerations regarding
the creation of sub-centers within the metropolitan area by
the comparative costs of a set of public goods. In sum, the
market formation of urban spaces is not made at any rate by
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'autonomous" units articulated by networks of transportation
routes, but, economically, by the growth of complex
economic networks which mutually determine dimension them-
selves, according with the function of a certain metropolitan
economic equilibrium. If the urban design does not take into
consideration these realities, distortions will appear under
the form of economic and social inequality; as we will try
to show in the following sections, dealing with the imple-
mentation process of the Brasilia Physical Plan in the
context of an underdeveloped and dualist economy.
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PART B: PRAXIS
INTRODUCTION:
BRAZIL'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND
In Part A - Theory - we have anlyzed the historic
origins of the main rationalistic assumptions in the field
of urban physical planning. Now, in Part B - Praxis - we
will analyze the nature and the extent of the impact upon
Brazilian reality of these concepts. To do this, we will
focus our analysis on the impact on reality of the rational-
istic urban schemes, particularly in two significant economic
and political realities: Brasilia as a city designed and
built in the context of a national economic and populist
political coalition vis-a-vis Brasilia as a city in the
context of new strict capitalistic development with free
market laws and in the absence of an institutionally
broader political system after 1964.(42)
Therefore, the evolution of the city problems will be
judged against these two following,different patterns or
processes we assume will result in different spatial require-
ments and social relationships:
- Brazilia's urban form as an initial settlement not
yet "colonized" by "free market" forces and there-
fore reflecting a certain mixture of social needs
and personal requirements established somehow
through consumer sovereignty and strongly based on
the particularly exceptional institutional and
practical situations derived from the early settle-
ments of a newly planned city, and Brazilia's urban
form emerging from the normal market forces when
the spatial pattern already shaped collides with
the new market values formed through institutional
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markets in which decisions concerning the alloca-
tion of urban activities and resources are strongly
made in the framework of the new market oriented
economy, with growing governmental unilateral
decisions.
We will look at urban locations and urban land and
housing problems as different but coherent aspects of the
overall contradictions between each of these two related
issues. The conclusion to be drawn from these paradigms
is that urban form can be analyzed as a function of the
general political process operating in society. Therefore,
any professional tendency to solve either "independent"
urban aspects as land, housing, locational problems for
establishing alternative choices under an individual and
particular set of assumptions has to deal with the nature
of the dominant economic models and the resulting social
relationships and the prevalent institutions of society in
oerder to forecast the impossibility or possibility of
significant changes.
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PARADIGM II.
BRASILIA'S URBAN FORM AND
POPULIST DECISION MAKING
2.1 The Populist Governments
After the world depression of the 1930's, it became
impossible to provide for all the domestic needs,either of
Brazil or of Latin American countries, by importing finished
goods from Europe and the United States, because
Latin American exports were brought to a drastic reduction
by the international market crisis.
Even in those favorable international conditions,
national self-sustained development had not reachd a stable
level. When the process of import substitution took place
after World War II, the national markets of Latin American
countries proved to be too small. The process of national
development after World War II was also prevented by the
economic entries united with the primary sector interrupting
any process of chance and reestablishing the dualistic
society. After a longer or shorter time, duration depending
on the economic capacity of the countries, the process of
import substitution started local national industrialization.
In some countries, as Brazil, the political instru-
ment to bring about national industrialization were
in populist governments that took power through mobilization
of the growing urban masses in the electoral process. These
populist Latin American leaders were firm believers in
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national capitalist development through private initiative,
considering that the state's role as investor should be
only subsidiary to the private sector. However, the
traditional economic elite, in spite of the support given to
national development by some industrial sections, was on
the whole hostile to populist government. The populist
government and the economic elite kept playing an economic
game that Brazilian economist Furtado defined as the "pri-
vatization of benefits and socialization of costs" in
public investments.(43) As the old economic elite was able
to prevent increases in taxation and thus afford revenues to
populist governments, those governments, to overcome finan-
cial deficiencies of the development process, had the only
available financial alternative put in local currency,
starting inflationary processes.
To accomplish the task concerning the implementation
of national governmental development projects, it was also
necessary for populist governments to create and manage new
public corporations in which the state keeps a controlling
majority. These projects demanding high capital and long
range profits could only be developed in national terms by
public or mixed corporations. The preference of private
capital for the investment of early high profits rather than
those basic and international sectors led the populist
government to settle "national corporations" for the achieve-
ment of "national policies" for the economic development.
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In this process, only Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina,
the three largest countries of the region reached a higher
level and started the state controlled production of inter-
mediate and capital goods. However, autonomous development
processes could not succeed becoming large exporters due to
international divisions of the market and institutional
barriers such as tariff - barriers adopted by the developed
countries. Brazil, with her large population of more than
100 million inhabitants, was confronted with double limita-
tion of the internal and external markets for industrial
goods. Brazilian internal consumers constitute about only
25% of the total population which is an inheritance from
her dualistic past. Fifty percent of the population is
composed of peasants who are living at a subsistence level,
practically out of markets. Half of the fifty percent that
constitutes the urban population is composed of low income
people, earning a minimum wage which is only enough to buy
basic foodstuffs and does not allow the acquisition of
durable goods. This market proved to be insufficient to
maintain the spontaneous development of an "independent"
capitalistic economy.
These obstacles to national development led
Latin American governments to a growing interference in the
economic sphere, with the purpose of promoting state-
oriented development. However, the Latin American govern-
ment's economic policy was never able to propose boundaries
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between the sectors to be reserved for the initiative of the
state and those open for private national capital or those
for foreign capital.
The problem of middle-class unemployment gave the
public corporations an excess of personnel that had to be
employed somewhere. The consequence of these overall condi-
tions was an increase in the cost of the "national develop-
ment," giving arguments to political pressures raised by
the traditional elite.
The populist economic model thus developed the
economy in two ways: (44)
1. by the initiative of the state in basic economic
and social sectors,
2. by increasing the participation of the new masses
in the urban market represented by the lower urban
strata electorally efficient as a "calculated risk."
In this process, the ancient economic elite was also favored
by the general growth in the production and supply of
commodities and the increasing expansion of their demand.
The limits of the system lay in the compatibility between
the growth of the whole economy and the increasing partici-
pation of the masses in the market. We can understand now
the proposal for a new capital as an economic, social and
political strategy necessary to cement and broaden the
Brazilian national populist coalition in the 1950's.
The construction of Brasilia symbolized economic
development and democratic political order. Economic
development because the establishment of the new city stood
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for the continental scale of the nation and the consequent
unification of the internal national markets through the
building of new roads; democratic political order by
providing a sort of democratic fraternization "above class"
for the task of building towards a collective technologically
advanced future. The mobilization of popular and bourgeois
support under Juscelino Kubitschek's government was achieved
through the first comprehensive national planning, the
"program of goals." This program in which the construction
of a new capital was later included, was the first national
attempt to build the alternative to a governmental central
planning in developing countries. Therefore, the main
distinction between this new approach and the former govern-
ment's was the transition from a policy destined to build a
national capitalistic system toward a policy oriented to a
dependent economic development. At that time, the
United States government was already convinced of the neces-
sity of local national government participation in organiz-
ing and deciding on basic economic decisions as a political
guarantee for the multinational enterprises. These facts
explain how the construction of Brasilia and the rise of the
multinational Brazilian automobile industry, for example,
were considered as symbols of the Kubitsheck achievements
as well as symbols of the "new modern Brazil."
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2.2 The Kubitschek Government: National Policies(45)
The election of President Juscelino Kubitschek was
the direct result of a political and economic alliance
between the PSD (Partido Social Democratico) and the PTB
(Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro), and helped iron out the
differences between the heterogeneous social forces support-
ing these parties. Although entirely dependent on its rural
and conservative base, the PSD became identified after
Getulio Vargas' government with the effort to promote indus-
trial development under federal government sponsorship. The
PTB had, on the other hand, consistently reinforced its
working class commitment and left center ideological leanings;
although as support for the parties spread from the cities
to the rural areas, it had been obliged to incorporate all
political contradictions expressed by regional ideological
influences. This discrepancy between the role of the
political parties at national level (cities) and their
regional basis (countryside) had the final effect of forcing
them toward national coalitions in order to build a
nonpolarizing coalition. Moreover, this coalition was
reinforced by an electorate that as a rule felt no lasting
connection with the existing political party. The lack of
genuine participation in the everyday political activities
was a major factor behind the continuous and self perpetua-
tion control of the parties by a tiny circle of professional
politicians rather than by new competitive and innovative
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elements. All these aspects explain how political associa-
tion and alliances became the most important factor in
winning elections at the federal level. Moreover, for a
country as large and diverse as Brazil, different stages of
regional development increased the divergence and uniformity
of the political sphere. The north and northeast zones and
the backlands of the central east and the central west,
representing 41% of the electorate are still at a traditional
and backward stage. The southern part of the country, which
enjoys on the whole a more advanced and industrialized
economy, represents about 31% of the electorate and is more
inclined to modern forms of liberalism or welfare laborism.
Viewed against this economic background, we can
understand why the Kubitsheck's populist goverment followed
two contradictory lines of political and economic goals.
The essence of this strategy consisted of a bargain between
the central government and the Brazilian conservative elite,
the basis of whose power-property ownership and exploitation
of the rural agricultural complex, the government would
refrain from altering in return for their agreement to a
governmental Target Program which allows for a growing urban
industrial modern complex. The key point was the assumption
that the natural dynamics of the urban complex must
inevitably provoke a corresponding structural change in the
rural agricultural system by unleashing the natural economic
forces that would unify the internal national market.
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This problem had already been unsuccessfully tackled by the
second Vargas government which failed to overcome the
resistance of the "conservative" coalition formed between
the rural oligarchy, the mercantile bourgeoisie and the
traditional urban middle class, which in the end overthrew
it. It was to avoid this confrontation that
President Kubitschek adopted a double policy which only
corresponded to a strategic postponement. The government
energies were, therefore, devoted to carrying out the
Target Program with the aid of any palliative that came to
hand in order to avoid structural confrontation of contra-
dictory class interests. During the Kubitschek administra-
tion (1955-1961) whose campaign slogan had been "fifty years
of progress in five years of government," the Target Plan
incorporating existing plans in a broader and more syste-
matic framework, set up thirty-one targets grouped under six
main areas: energy, transport, food, basic industries,
education and the construction of the country's new
capital, Brasilia. If we look now for the economic inten-
tions, the construction of the new capital, besides the
ideological and political factors, appeared as a coherent
economic goal matching other specific projects. Therefore,
more than 40% of the Target Program resources were allocated
to expanding the production capacity of the energy sector,
chiefly hydroelectric power and as subsidies for oil
production or import. Likewise, transport accounted for the
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second largest percentage of the estimated total investment
required to implement the Target Program. The Program
envisaged the construction of about half of the existing
federal highways. In the capital goods sector, the most
relevant goals set up by the plan were those for the motor
vehicle industry. In the intermediate industries, the
most important target was for the production of steel and
cement. Brasilia can be considered as a coherent goal in
this industrial context. For example, the mileage of the
road network expressly built to link Brasilia with the
other cities was as follows:
From Brasilia to:
Belo Horizonte 700 km Belem 2,000 km
Goiania 200 km Fortaleza 1,500 km
Acre 2,500 km
We can understand now the proposal for a new capital
as an economic, social, and political strategy necessary to
cohere and broaden the national populist coalition in the
1950's. Brasilia symbolized economic development and
democratic political order. Economic development, because
the establishment of the new city stood for the continental
scale of the nation and the consequent unification of the
national internal markets through the building of new roads;
democratic political order by providing a sort of
"democratic fraternization," "above class" for the task of
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building a collective advanced future. The mobilization of
popular and bourgeois support under Kubitschek's government
was achieved through the first comprehensive national
planning, "Target Program" or "Program of Goals." This
program, in which the construction of Brasilia was later
included, was the first national attempt to build the
alternative of a governmental planning in developing
countries. Therefore, the main distinction between this
new approach and the former government was the transition
from a policy destined to build a national capitalist system
toward a policy oriented to a dependent economic development.
At that time the United States was already convinced of the
necessity of local national government participation in
organizing and deciding on basic economic policies as a
"political guarantee" for the multinational enterprises.
These facts account for how Brasilia and the rise of the
multinational Brazilian automobile industry, for example
were considered as symbols of the Kubitschek's achievements,
as well as symbols of the "new modern Brazil." However, if
politically, Brasilia's construction was the basic support
for Kubitschek's "developmentalism", the funds necessary to
build the new city were provided by huge emissions of money
(thus contributing to the nation's sweeping inflation) and
by continuous overseas loans and credits.
The costs of building Brasilia, based on estimates
by Lessa,(46) are in the neighborhood of three percent of
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the gross domestic product during the period 1956-1961. As
a result, if this period witnessed rapid growth and signi-
ficant structural changes, it was also marked by increasing
acceleration of the rate of inflation. Table II shows the
growth per capita production from 4.9 in 1955 to 5.9 in
1961 (1,000 million of cruzeiros) or in consistent prices
from 297.8 to 425.0 in the same period. Now, if we compare
the rise in the cost of living index with the growth of
the real per capita product, we will have an overall idea of
the contradictory effects between economic growth and
inflationary process.
As we can see from Table III, the growth of the real
per capita product was 7.4% between 1952 and 1956, and 20.8%
between 1956 and 1961; whereas the rise in the cost of
living index was 22% between 1952 and 1956, and 290.5%
between 1956 and 1961. This means, in effect, that whereas
the rate of growth of the real per capita product increased
2.7 times from the first to the second period, the rate of
growth of the cost of living index increased 13.9 times.
In these circumstances, it became evident toward the end of
the Kubitschek administration that the economic achievement
and the construction of Brasilia were being paid for at an
uncontrollably rising price, and that the rate of economic
growth could no longer be maintained without drastic changes
in the economic as well as political and social structures,
in order to overcome distortions that appeared in each of
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TABLE II
BRAZIL: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
1949-1961
Total Production
CRS 1,000 million
Constant Prices
(1949)
Year
1949
1954
1955
1960
1961
Per Capita Production
CRS 1,000 million
Constant Prices
(1949)
215.2
278.9
297.8
394.7
42.50
4.3
4.8
4.9
5.7
5.9
Source: Getulio Vargas Foundation,1963.
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TABLE III
COST OF LIVING INDEX FOR RIO DE JANEIRO
AND PER CAPITA REAL PRODUCT (1952-6.1)
Cost of Living Per Capita Real Product
January 1952 100 100,000
August 1956 222 107,000
October 1961 867 129,800
Source: Economic bulletin for Latin America--Vol. IX No. 2 November 1964
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Year
these areas. In the social area, the main distortion
revealed that the unblanced growth of the urban and rural
complex as well as that of the central-south region and the
rest of the country were marked by an enormous and growing
difference (Table IV) between levels of any of the signi-
ficant social indicators as productivity, income, political
participation, etc. The rural complex remained backward
and semi-feudal. While the peasants represented 50% (1960)
of the population, their share in the national income was
less than 15%, and their share in the total income of rural
and urban labor combined is no more than 27%. The same
holds true of the other indices. This disequilibrium
resulted from an uninterrupted economic and political pre-
dominance of the rural oligarquies with preferences for
semi-feudal methods of production and organization. The
fact that 50% of the urban half of the population spend most
of their incomes on food, represents additional barriers to
the expansion of the internal market; therefore reinforcing
the conservative rural complex status-quo. In the economic
sector, disequilibrium between income and wealth in the
hands of a tiny urban minority were at the same time
preventing the country's ability to raise the domestic
savings ratio and rate of investment and creating inflation,
which around 1964 became uncontrollable. The alarming
growth of the deficits in the national budget can be seen
in Table V. The difference between federal receipts and
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TABLE IV
BRAZIL: DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL- INCOME BY REGIONS
Regions
North
Northeast
Central South
Central West
Brazil
1950
2.2
16.4
79.5
1.9
100.0
1955
2.0
15.9
81.5
2.6
100.0
1960
2.2
15.9
79.4
2.6
Comments
"Natural" Economy (Fruits, Natural Fibers, etc)
Impoverished Zone (Sugar cane, Fibers etc)
Leading industrial edge
Brasilia's regional location
100.00
C)'
TABLE V
RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCE 1955-1962
Receipts
8.0
8.3
8.1
8.9
8.8
9.2
9.0
9.0
Expenditures
9.2
12.2
11.2
11.3
11.1
12.4
12.9
14.1
Source: [Carlos Lessa], "Fifteen Years of Economic Policy in Brazil"
The deflated values of receipts, expenditures and deficits from 1958
to 1961 were:
B: BRAZIL REAL VALUES OF RECEIPTS, EXPENDITURES AND
DEFICITS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN 1961 CRUZEIROS
1958-1961 (N Cr$ 1,000,000)
Expenditures
390.8
365.9.
415.7
455.0
Deficits
80.8
99.1
109.0
137.5
Source: Banco Central in A Economia Brasileria e suas
ana VIII (julho), 1969), Estudos Apec, quarta
tistical annex, F. 1.
Perspecti vas,
parte, sta--
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A:
Year
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
Year
1958
1959
1 960
1961
310.0
291.9
308.3
317.5
revenues, as a result of continuous official policies of
urban subsidies and paternalistic loans, was offset by
increasing the supply of paper money, therefore increasing
inflation in an ongoing vicious circle, as shown in
Table VI.
In summary, these are the main characteristics
underlying the political ideology of the Kubitschek populist
government. In order to evaluate, now, the functioning of
the populist urban decision-making regarding the initial
settlements and implementation of the Brazilia Plan, we have
to develop the following theoretical framework to show that:
1. Traditional, "old, unplanned" cities are more
open; therefore "more democratic" for the
locational needs, particularly for the low income
strata.
2. Conversely, "rational cities" are less open due to
a series of extra institutional constraints
imposed on the low income population in regard
to urban locational choices.
3. As a result, populist decision-making in the
settlement of a new city has to operate in a
political environment characterized by the
inherent regressivity of the urban rationalitic
schemes, vis-a-vis the political and symbolic
necessity to emforce these new restrictive
urban patterns through a political environment
which allows for an electoral process and for
increasing participation of the urban masses.
In order to understand these complex and contradic-
tory processes, we will first compare "old" and "new" cities
in order to evaluate firstly their degree of freedom and
later the democratic willingness of the Kubitschek populist
government to face the constraints for locational choices
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3TABLE VI
RATES OF INFLATION IN BRAZIL 1950'1967
Rate of Inflation
13.4
19.8
10.3
15.1
30.3
1313
19.2
12.5
12.2
37.7
30.9
38.1
53.3
73.5
91.6
51.2
36.8
25.4
Kubitshek
Government
Source: FundagTo Getulio Vargas in Mario Henrique
2001 (Rio, Apec, 1969)
Simonsen, Brasil
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Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
in Brasilia. Subsequent governmental policies (after 1964)
will also be seen as a radicalization of the regressive
rationalistic process under new restrictive market mechanisms
which ultimately only brings a reinforcement to the original
elitist purposes ideologically represented in the formalism
of the Master Plan. A general conclusion that considers
'hew cities" less democratic to the participation of the low
income strata than old cities is now mentioned in order to
introduce the following argument.
2.3 The New City and the "Old Traditional" Cities:
A Comparison
In order to analyze the impact on reality of the con-
cepts described as characteristics of the rationalistic
assumptions, we will approach the following "paradigm" in
respect of the implementation of the rationalistic urban
form in Brasilia: the creation of a new city implies a basic
contradiction between the organization of an urban form on
an environment without historicity and therefore without
historicity of urban values. These values are not yet con-
formed to by everyday transactions and therefore they have
to be enforced by institutions capable of molding the urban
space in such a way that some current historic trends can be
at least maintained. Our first task will be to determine
in what extent the economic and social transactions under-
lining the use of space in a "new" city is different from
the "old" and what these differences are ranked with in the
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building of the traditional cities molded through centuries
of economic history. We want to stress the interaction
between space as a private monopolistic privilege in the
'hormal" urban markets in which several "owners" possess
monopoly over pieces of space, and in a new city where at
the beginning, the sole monopolistic landowner is the state.
Therefore, allocation of urban spaces in new cities will
occur following different patterns. In "historical spaces"
private appropriation of space is a consequence of a contra-
dictory process in which the private sector's interests are
opposed by the use-values necessary to the reproduction of
the productive process in such a way that urban form reflects
these contradictions and the result is a complex system of
intermixed uses and a consequent set of highly complex land
uses and land values. In this process, the use of the urban
space appears as a sequential historical process in which
the bidding power of each individual and class are opposed.
As a result, traditional and new urban form can be compared
through some of their most important contradictions and
social barriers.
2.3.1 Locational Constraints in "Old Cities"
Brazilian "traditional" cities reflect the national
economic process of growing concentration of income as
capitalistic relations begin to shape the national space.
Spatially, the results in that Brazilian cities show a group
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of areas developed under the old transit system (tramways)
and those which result from a combination of the automobile
age and the old patterns. Moreover, some areas entered the
automobile age faster than others, depending upon their
income level. The areas between the transit lines became
very accessible to the automobile as ownershp increased and
the road systems were improved. A pattern of mixed social
locations developed from this scenario. Some areas
developed at much lower densities side by side with luxury
neighborhoods. Changes in the central areas were also
mixed: manufacturing and wholesaling were not totally
replaced either by offices or services. The overall ten-
dency is to develop both suburbanization and a series of
"low income pockets" throughout the metropolitan areas.
Suburbanization of lower strata is not total because the
need for domestic services for the middle class allows a
high percentage of squatter settlements to remain either in
central locations or alongside wealthy neighborhoods.
For the medium and upper urban strata there is a
tendency in the "historical cities," as income rises, to
reduce food and housing-related expenditures either by
changing the food quality or by building their own family
house, or increasing family income through the purchasing
of urban industrial appliance goods, such as a television,
refrigerator, sewing machine, washing machine, etc. As an
example, in Sao Paulo, 58.2% of the urban population lives
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in rented houses in which the mean rent amounts to 19.4%
of the family median income. From these disposable incomes,
we assume a saving after the consumer expenditures. For
the working class, we can only talk about a barely main-
tainable equilibrium between income and savings: actually
the mean family expenditures observed in 1969/70 were
Cr$634,370, while the family mean income was Cr$612,000;
showing a real deficit of 3.6%. If the wage purchasing
power would be maintained during the same period, with the
family income following the price variations, the corrected
value would be Cr$739,380 in 1969/70. From these data we
can understand how important for the low income families
are the incomes due to locational advantages, near the CBD,
particularly for the very low income strata, for which the
main job source is provided by the civil construction jobs,
which absorb unskilled workers through an on-the-job train-
ing education.
For example, of the total of Rio de Janeiro's urban
population of five million inhabitants, there exists a 20%
squatters population whose majority goes to work at places
localized either within or near their residential zones.
We have drawn a map (see Map I) showing the relative dis-
tances from the housing areas occupied by these settlers in
the city to the C.B.D. On this map, we see that 90% of the
favela population is within the boundary of one-half hour
commuting time to the C.B.D. As a consequence of greater
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funds, we have a great social and thus economic mobility for
some strata, either by the appropriation of income differen-
tials by location or by preferences for better environments
which include better public services: the educational system,
or the wealth of public networks. However, the Brazilian
traditional cities' sprawl left behind either a series of
'slope lots" or areas "unsuitable" for the normal marketable
constructions or "decaying areas"; and as a result these
areas near the job market were occupied by favelas and
illegal settlements. In these areas, low income families
took advantage of the locational incomes as they began to
perform more skilled tasks in the workplace. Likewise,
these areas allowed for the supply of domestic employees to
the nearby middle class neighborhoods. Table VII shows the
spatial distribution of the squatters families in
Rio de Janeiro by zones and their quantitative relationships
with the different workplace zones. This data shows that
the percentage of the low income families working within
their residential zones is respectively 50%, 66%, and
for the south zone, central zone and north zone. (The west
zone is considered totally rural and all their population
works within the residential zone.) If we now compare this
data with the Brazilian Metropolitan Locational Patern (see
Map II) we can see how the satellite cities in which the
working class is located, as a result of the institutional
restrictive policies, are isolated and distant from the
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TABLE VII
SQUATTER FAMILIES BY RESIDENTIAL ZONE AND "SPATIAL" JOB OPPORTUNITIES
(CITY OF RIO DE JANEIRO)
South
Zone
Total Number of
Familes (1964)
Number of Families
With "Fixed Working
Places
I. Familes Working,
Within Their Resi-
dential Zone
II. Familes Working
in Other Zones
Central
Zone
12.300 28.300
10.000 23.000
(75%) (81%)
5.000 15.300
(50%) (66%)
2.000 4.000
Source: Doxiadis Plan--1964
-- 
- .~ i?7j
.
West
Zone
5.100
4.000
4.000
North
Zone
41 .?00
33.000
(80%)
22.000
(66%)
17.700
Total All
Zones
86.900
70.000
46.400
23.700
pilot plan (C.B.D.). Some of them (for example Brazlandia
a typical low-income working class settlement is 57 km. away
from the pilot plan) have a traveling time of 100 minutes for
commuting. The following data is showed for these working
class cities:
City Distance from pilot plan Travel Time
(C.B.D)
Gama 52 km. 80 min.
Planaltina 54 km. 90 min.
Sobradinho 33 km. 50 min.
Taguatinga 36 km. 60 min.
Whereas in "old" cities, suburban neighborhoods are
contiguous to the urban fabric, in Brasilia these satellite
settlements are surrounded by empty land.
Returning now to another comparison, we can see in
Table VIII the basic distribution of necessities and housing
expenditures for the working class in Sao Paulo, in two
different periods of time between 1958 and 1970. The most
striking percentile increase is in transportation costs.
Thus, while the housing costs percentile dropped from 30.0%
to 23.0%, transportation expenditures rose from 2.0% to
8.8% (a percentile variance of 28% for lower strata,
26.9% for medium, and 19.3% for the upper strata). If we
look at Table IX which shows the percentile increase in
different expenditures shared by each low income subcategory,
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TABLE VIII
SAO PAULO: EVOLUTION OF THE DOMESTIC EXPENDITURES STRUCTURE
(WORKING CLASS)
Types of -Expenditures
Food
Housing
Clothing
Health
Personal Hygiene
Housing Maintenance
Appliances
Transportation
Education & Culture
Leisure & Smoking
Total
Source: Dieese, Sao
Key: Low Strata
Medium Strata
SuperiorStrata
1958 (%)
45.0
30.0
10.0
4.0
1.5
3.0
3.0
1.0
0.5
1.00.0
1969/1970 (%)
39.0
23.0
8.1
3.6
1.2
1.7
6.5
3.5
4.1
100.0
Paulo--1974
- Less than 2.74% of one official minimum wage
Cruzeiros--500,000 (1958 prices)
- From 2.74% to 3.10% of one minimum wage Cruzeiros
501,000-1,000,000 (1958 prices)
- More than 3.10% of 'one minimum wage Cruzeiros
1,000,000 (1958 prices)
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TABLE IX
SAO PAULO: TRANSPORTATION EXPENDITURES STRUCTURE (WORKING CLASS)
Items Low Strata % Medium Strata % Superior Strata %
Vehicle Acquisition 5.2 13.9 58.4
Gasoline 2.9 7.7 12.2
Bus 91.9. 78.4 22,4
100.0 100.0 100.0
Total
36.6
9.5
53.9
100.0
Source: Dieese, Sgo Paulo--1974
Key: Low Strata - Less than 2.74% of one official minimum wage Crueiro--500,000
(1958 prices)
Medium Strata - From 2.74% to 3.10% of one minimum wage Cruzeiros 501,000-1,000,000
(1958 prices)
Superior Strata - More than 3.10% of one minimum wage Cruzeiros--l 000,000 (1958 prices)
4-A
we find that the economic impact of the different increases
effects much more significantly the lower working class
strata than the medium working class or the superior working
class strata, not only in reference to transportation
expenditures but to housing as well. Table X shows that the
income increase for the upper strata is a direct consequence
of income regressivity for the lower strata which suffer the
consequence of higher percentile increases in almost all the
different consumer expenditures, most of all in transporta-
tion expenditures. The conclusion is that housing expen-
ditures are being lowered for the lower strata, either by
relocation to cheaper and more distant suburban lots or
by location in favelas; while the upper strata are using
personal savings to change to more efficient transportation
means, including automobile ownership for personal travel.
Table IX shows the expenditures for different means of
transportation for each working class strata. The upper
strata spends 58.4% of their transportation budget on
acquisition of private vehicles, 12.2% on gasoline and 22.4%
on bus fares; while the lower strata spends 5.2% on
vehicle acquisition, 2.9% on gasoline and 91.9% on bus fares.
By example of Brasilia, we have shown how location is not
spatially continuous. Therefore, for the working class
there is a double income appropriation. First by the
impossibility of locational choice near the pilot plan,
second because the potential economic use of the adjacent
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4,:
TABLE X
PRICE VARIATIONS (1971) SAO PAULO
(FOR THE WORKING CLASS CONSUMERS)
Items
Food
Transportation
Housing
Leisure & Smoking
Health
Low
33.0
28.0
26.4
21.9
20.8
Personal Hygiene 20.6
Housing
Maintenance 18.3
Education &
Culture 17.5
Clothing 14.3
Appliances 9.8
Source: Dieese, Sao Paulo--1974
Medium
31.2
26.9
26.0
21.9
22.2
20.4
Superior
30.2
19.3
24.3
21.9
24.2
19.9
18.7
18.6
14.6
10.9
18.5
17.8
14.5
10.4
Total
31.4
23.0
25.3
21.9
22.6
20.5
18.5
18.2.
14.5
10.4
Key: Low Income
Medium Income
- Less than 2.74% of one official minimum wage
Cruzeiros--500,00 (1958 prices)
- From 2.74% to 3.10% of one minimum wage Cru-
zeiros 501,000-1,000,000 (1958 prices)
Superior Income - More than 3.10% of one minimum wage Cruzeiros
--1,000,000.(1958 prices)
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land is prevented through the restrictive regulations stated
in the Master Plan; as a result, the same amount of urban
space location in the old and new city follows distinct
patterns: relative continuity and a whole economic price
spectrum for the old cities, and a regressive single
"satellitization" choice for all working classes in
Brasilia. Regarding the economics of locational choices,
we can make one final comparison.
Table XI shows that the number of family members of
the working families incorporated in the job market in
Sao Paolo, grew from 1.0 to 2.0 persons in each family
whose mean number of members grew from 4.5 to 4.9 persons.
Therefore, the number of persons incorporated as new workers
in the job market had doubled in ten years as the family
size increased proportionally. Now if we consider
the evolution of the real wages values in the same period
(Table XII) we can conclude that real wages had fallen from
Cr$10.15 to Cr$9.20. The increase in the working class
families income is, therefore, due to the increase of the
working members which had doubled in ten years. To confirm
this hypothesis, we can look for the real decrease in value
of the head family's wage during the same period. The
monthly real wage had fallen from Cr$8.54 to Cr$5.42
(-34.1%). We can therefore see that extra family employment
is a very important source of income. In Brasilia some of
this informal employment such as domestic servants and
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TABLE XI
COMPARISON BETWEEN WORKING CLASS FAMILY-TYPE
(SAO PAULO) 1958/1969
1958 1969
Number of Members 4.5 4.9
Working Members 1.0 2.0
Monthly Income (Relative Prices--Cruleiros 10.15 512.00
Real Income (Cruleiros) 10.15 9.20
Monthly Wage (Family's Head) 8.54 361.03
Real Wage (1958's Prices) 8.54 5.42
Source: Dieese, Sao Paulo, 1974.
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TABLE XII
EVOLUTION OF THE REAL WAGE
SA PAULO) 1958-1969
Nominal
(in Cruzeiros)
8.54
11.53
15.86
23.00
36.79
66.23
121.20
169.68
220.58
275.73
344.66
430.83
Real
(Deflated from Inflation)
(in Cruzeiros)
8.54
8.29
8.67
8.98
9.36
9.25
9.61
8.14
6.88
6.49
6.51
6.58
Source: Dieese, Sao Paulo, 1970.
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1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
personal services are prevented by locational disadvantages.
Large distances between potential sources of employment and
the residential areas prevent the social compatibility
between domestic part time employment in middle class
neighborhoods. Since for the lower strata, locational
urban choices depend on the availability of a large informal
job sector, we will further argue below that in large
metropolitan areas the degree of these economic and social
choices is greater than in "rationally" planned new cities,
since institutional locational controls are submissive to a
more effective community reaction against "economic losses."
2.3.1.1 Metropolitan and Urban Locational "Control"
Large and traditional metropolitan areas lack a
restricted institutional system to coordinate different
local jurisdictions and to enforce a radical segregatory
locational process over the whole urban area. Although
there are interferences and the private sector owns the
majority of urband land and absolute private rights are not
affected by insitutional interferences, in large metropoli-
tan areas it is always more difficult and at the same time
less political, to control all locational patterns. There-
fore, spatial concentration in a great metropolis such as
Sao Paulo for example, and a few other Brazilian capitals,
coincides with the general advantages that permit the
development of the capitalistic forces characteristic of the
development of the Brazilian economy. For the capitalistic
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economy, the disadvantages of the urban agglomerations end
by being paid for by "socialization" of costs through the
public sector's intervention for the provision and financing
of public services. The explosive demand for urban services
of all kinds remains unsatisfied because not only the urban
population is growing too fast, but because income increases
and the urban market mechanism are not able to meet these
demands. And so the only way to reduce the gap between the
provision of infrastructures and the demand for urban goods
would be to continue the expansion of the cities and the
urban economy in the context of the capitalistic framework.
The conclusion is that, in the framework of urban capitalis-
tic development, there is a tendency to intensify geographic
concentration of activities which leads to "hypertrophy" of
the metropolitan areas. It can therefore be concluded that
"decentralized" decision making characteristic of capitalis-
tic market decisions tends to be biased in favor of the
metropolitan areas and of the superagglomeration of activi-
ties - a bias that is reinforced by the "socializations" of
the economies of agglomerations, particularly by the
absorptions of new urban and rural migrants in the labor
workforce. These industrial reserve forces make up a large
segment of the population that becomes mobile to the extent
that the chains tying it to the rural structure are broken;
they head for the large cities which offer better prospects
for employment. In this intense urbanization process,
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several factors explain the relative mixture of activity
and the locational "liberal" patterns for low income strata
and new immigrants. First, there are little governmental
controls or even unilateral class control of the urban land.
Even though landowners, auctioneers and subdividers specu-
lated on the basis of individual market lots, the intensity
of the migratory process, coupled with populist political
coalitions prevented an intensive and regressive use of
governmental discretionary standards and controls over the
urban space. Location for the lower strata can be achieved
either by the occupation by succession of the central areas
abandoned by the upper classes, or peripheral location in
lower priced, low density subdivisions in areas of urban new
expansion or by location around old or new decentralized
foci or economic activities where the main factors of house-
hold location were accessibility to employment and conse-
quent reduction in transport costs, coupled with a spectrum
of continuous low land prices. Moreover, local urban plan-
ning and institutional control is not ingegrated in a re-
strictive way coherently with other levels of the central
decision making. The following example of control on land
rights will highlight our argument.
2.3.1.2 Land Tenure; Legal Rights and Institutional
Control
According to the Brazilian Civil Code, the squatters'
legal rights can be considered in terms of three time
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periods: (47)
Possession of land for less than one year and a day
may indicate a usurpation of the land by its possessors.
The titleholder in such a short range situatin can obtain an
eviction order against the squatter with relative ease,
through a special summary proceeding. The squatter is then
given notice that he is to depart within twenty four hours.
He is reimbursed for damages caused by his wrongful usurpa-
tion. However, when the land is held for longer than a year
and a day, the Code guarantees that its possessor will be
maintained summarily until he had been found the wrongful
possessor through ordinary judicial proceedings. As a
practical matter, this requires protracted hearing of proof
that could tie up the squatters possession from two to
three years. In this case a usurpation of theland is no
longer assumed, and it must be proven that the squatters
taking was, in fact, clandestine or violent. "The frustrated
landowner will usually resort to threats and to bribery and
could be successful in removing the squatter with these
tactics." (48) However, the squatters legal rights have
matured at this period of possession, and he may seek
judicial help to preserve his possession or to restore it in
the case he is removed by force. While the squatter will
lose possession of the land ultimately,he can still receive
indemnification for violation of his rights to remain if he
was driven out of the land by threats of violence during the
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period of just holding. In the case of Brasilia, however,
all the "favelados" are located on public land. Thus the
"favelados" in Brasilia as located on public land do not
have the standing to request an injunction to protect their
position. Unlike favelados on private land, they do not
retain their rights to general claims to security of posses-
sion in the second period of holding (one year and a day).
As in the case of favelas on government land, empty dwellings
if discovered, are demolished. However, in large metropoli-
tan areas, lack of adequate manpower to make daily removals
lack of an adequate census or maps to "discover" new
arrivals in the complex urban fiber, and lack of social and
political conditions for resettling the favelados on state
land has led local state governments in "old" cities to
adopt a more democratic and "more generous" legal inter-
pretation of the favelados' rights. The state must live
with the favelados that it finds on its land, and even
preserve under political pressure the squatters communities
on private property. Unlike for the lower strata of
Brasilia's population, however, the "squatment" on govern-
ment land was simply the unique locational choice, for they
were blessed only with political influence at the beginning
of the construction process as they plainly lacked the
money to resolve their housing problem in the face of the
absence in the Master Plan of any land and housing market
within their economic levels. The alternative was either
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one of obtaining a legalized lot in a satellite town distant
from the labor market, or squatting on government land near
the official plan. Hence the decision to invade or squat on
official land as in some abandoned superblock areas, in the
forestreserve area, in construction sites and finally in the
largest area within the perimeter of the Social Security
Hospital. In all case, however, the local government had
the legal right to move the favelados, with the argument
that they are invaders of publid land. Only a fear of a
public incident which would reflect on the populist and
labor credential of the government of the time, could change
the overall official attitude regarding land tenure.
Therefore, in "traditional" cities, even in the frame-
work of the capitalistic real estate and land market, the
official planning process, while playing a role providing
the development of the private sector, cannot control all
locational patterns, and the result is a negative social
"activity mix." Institutional planning actions, while will-
ing to prevent private appropriation of land for low strata,
are impotent as we have shown, to restrict "invasions" of
public and private land for migrant families as their
numbers increase proportionally with the decreasing capacity
of the city to provide for the minimal infrastructural
requirements. In other words, restrictive centralized
planning is confronted with "community decision making."
Institutional devices as zoning codes do not achieve control
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in some areas, particularly those occupied by upper income
strata. However, the urban governments in old cities are not
interested by economic and political compromises in norms
limiting speculation on land. Their main interest is to
enforce zoning ordinances only in urban sectors intensely
integrated in the real estate and civil construction markets.
As a result, elaboration of a coherent regressive urban
policy for the urban regulation of metropolitanareas is
difficult, requires an impossible uniformity and coordination,
and the elaboration of a single overall platform in concrete
forms cannot be matched by conflicting economic and political
interests. Consequently, some coercive and authoritarian
institutional tools are prevented from molding the urban
form in the total interest of the upper strata.
However, the accelerated growth of large "unplanned"
cities in developing countries, emphasized and brought into
sharper focus a series of "imbalances" occurring throughout
the complexity of the urban space. The perception of these
problems and the rapid growth of the so-called "marginal"
populations in the large cities provoked numerous attempts
to criticize "urban mixed" and "chaotic urban forms" from
the standpoint of a "new conception" for "new planned
cities." The core idea of this analysis stems from the
concept that urban social problems are a dependent variable
from the lack of social and professional control. Instead
of pointing out these contradictions as contradictions of
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the capitalistic development, the tendency is to attack the
resulting "chaotic" urban form as responsible for the
structural social problems and therefore proposing measures
such as control of urbanization, control of population,
zoning, standards, codes, suburbanization, segregation, etc.,
embodied in a new formal and controlled spatial environment
of the "new cities." Therefore, the "new city" ideology
tries to avoid the basic contradictory characteristics of
capitalism by formally limiting the "old" system's dynamism
and contradictions. New cities appeared thus in the context
of an urban civilization as cities without "citizenship"
characterized by the relationships between the calculus of
forces in tensions and by the desire toward techno-bureau-
cratic "rational" role. In these cities, as we have shown,
the everyday contradictory forces of urban life did not
prosper, and instead of a political democratic system, an
"enlightened professional autocracy" will define and channel
contending social interests through the manipulation of
social desires summed up in the idea of a "rational urban
design" and controlled development. In the past, the
Brazilian cultural elite frequently accepted the impotence
of the liberal democracy, but the activation of the national
duality through the industrialization process and molded
the idea that with urban tension and struggle it would be
impossible to implement "true" urban evolution.
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2.3.2 Locational Patterns in Brasilia
In the case of Brasilia, the amplitude of the market
choices is initially limited through the Master Plan's high
physical standards. Here the consumer's surplus considered
as the difference between what an individual actually pays
for a good and what he would be willing to pay, rather than
go without it, suffers a distortion as the Government pro-
vides a "fictitious market" in order to stimulate, for
example, the economic warfare of the public servants not
willing to change from the comforts of the "old" cities to
the uncertainties and discomforts of the new capital. (49)
The assumption that the consumers surplus will increase with
increasing income of the group has to be corrected. In
Brasilia, the first disproportionality is caused by govern-
mental preferences as the different land uses allocated
followihg the Master Plan are already baised not only by
preferential locations but also through high use standards (50)
and financial advantages. The richest group (public
servants) has to bid the same amount or less than the next
group to obtain the rights of occupancy in the prime loca-
tion already reserved in central places by the framework
of the master plan. Lucio Costa, the Brasilia Master Plan
author, did not ignore the social "gradations proper to the
current regime" but attempted to provide for them by follow-
ing the policy of national physical determinism: "Propitiate
social coexistence to some degree, thus avoiding excessive
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and undesirable stratification," he states in his basic
report. (51) However, the means to avoid this social and
class stratification as we have seen, would be differences
in density and in the living space per person or per family,
employing more or less expensive materials and using various
types of finishing, according to the social level of the
residents. But, when we look at the building code standards,
we can see that for housing typologies, only middle class
apartments and row houses were provided in the pilot plan,
following rationalistic volumetric and aesthetic standards
rather than low class economic "informal" demands.
The degree of choice for urban location is greater
for the higher income strata, and the degree of choice suf-
fers strong institutional constraints in the case of new
cities where the tight zoning controls the "a priori" loca-
tion designations, introduces a new obstacle besides the
protective and unequal operation of the "common" market
laws. These locational constraints in the process of
chosen environments is aggravated by the intensity of the
migratory process, particularly in new cities.
The bulk of the migrants were unskilled workers
attracted to Brasilia, among other things by the relatively
high wages. In Brasilia, at the beginning of the construc-
tion, the minimum legal wage was close to the nation's
highest, and nearly twice that prevailing in the impoverished
northeast. If we look at the results of a survey by
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the Department of Geography of Brasilia University on popu-
lational migrations, we can conclude that between the
migrations toward Brasilia, the most significant flow is
composed of the poorest economic strata coming directly from
their original cities without suffering other urban
experiences. These migrants, prevented from establishing
themselves in the pilot plan area, have to choose locations
around the satellite cities. As a result, a growing pattern
of social and economic spatial segregation was achieved.
The survey displays the following results:( 5 2 )
- 38.5% of the total sample analyzed had the following
social economic characteristics: long distance
migration (interior of the poor agrarian northeast
zones), straight from this origin to Brasilia,
earnings less than the minimum official wage,
construction worker status, primary education;
- 14.05% of the total sample: migrational origin in
the local state of Gilas or on the Federal District
periphery; no prior mobility and same socio-economic
characteristics of the preceding category;
- 8.9% of the total sample: migrants with urban
origin (Rio de Janeiro, Niteroi, Belo Horizonte,
Goiania, Natal, Anapolis and Aracaju). Migrants
originated directly in their local cities had been
recruited and brought to Brasilia by civil construc-
tion enterprises. They had the same socio-cultural
status as the two preceding categories;
- 3.28% of the urban migrants: from the interior of
the State of Sao Paulo. Same socio-economic status
and intermediate path through the cities of
Anapolis and Goiania.
- 2.67% of the migrants originated in the peripiphe-
ral localities of Brasilia with more than ten years
of residency in the new capital. They had a high
rate of illiteracy and unemployment - peddlers
with income less than the minimum official wage.
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From these data we can see that the most important
migratory flows did not pass a prior process of urban
experience. The migrants came from their local agrarian
zones directly towards Brasilia without any urban experience.
Almost all of these migrants provided the hands for the job
of building the "central city." In 1959, 54.5 percent of
the labor force was employed in civil construction. Only
5.2 percent were engaged in commercial activities.
Since the official plan made no provision for low
income settlements, temporary housing and impoverished
solutions began to arise - location for example, as finan-
cial security was the most important priority. These
priorities change as income levels change.(53) The low
income immigrant having recently arrived in the city is far
more concerned with future than present security. In this
case, proximity to unskilled jobs is essential. The loca-
tional pattern was highly correlated with proximity of jobs
for the low income strata, since either tenure or transporta-
tion were irrelevant. Two types of official settlements
then appeared: the "free town" as a "tolerated" area of
shacks where the main commercial activity was located, and
the proliferation of construction camps located near con-
struction sites with the "permission" of the authorities.
Squatment was largely tolerated by the authorities because
the workers housed in them were required for the achievement
of the goal of completing the new capital in time.
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As the proliferation of construction camps failed to
provide for all those who came to Brasilia in search of work,
new migrants took advantage of the vast open spaces in the
"holes" of the pilot plan and put up their shacks and
sometimes tents improvised from truck canvases.
Hence, squatting occurred in a) abandoned superblock
areas or in the forst reserved areas (green belts), b) a
few commercial shacks which appeared wherever a construc-
tion site was active. These settlements were very small,
since they would have to be able to move when under official
pressure. The largest "squatment," however, was the
Social Security invasion which beban as a "tolerated" zone
of shacks within the perimeter of the Social Security
Hospital.(54) The settlement growth was assured because at
that time the official attention was concentrated on the
construction timetable. With the extinction of Vila Amauri
(workers' initial camp) by the rising waters of the future
city's lake, a number of shacks were moved to the social
security area. Unlike the "old" cities, electoral politics
do not provide a motivation for some "official interest" in
the local squatments whose residents cannot trade their
votes for official favors and "protection." Brasilia as
capital city depends on the federal authorities for politi-
cal decisions. Thus, the official policy was a "negative
policy" to prevent the expansion of the invasions. The
local administration maintained "inspectors" to prevent the
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construction of new shacks.
We can thus understand that the location of the
Social Security Invasion on the main road access routes to
the capital is particularly important to those who think in
this manner. Otherwise, the satellite towns, though their
growth was in part the result of emergency measures, are an
opportunity for those lower-middle income people whose
security will be, by far, the most important determinant of
their longer-term plans.
As the social security invasion, the other squatters'
settlements nearby the plan have the following social
advantages:
- The proximity of the market and warehousing center,
located in the "free town" as a source of supply
and employment. The daily market provides an
opportunity for small trading in produce also.
- Because of its size, the Social Security Invasion
also provided more security of land tenure than the
other small squatments, some of them within the
perimeter of the future constructions. Besides,
the social cost of removing the social security
invasion would be prohibitive. Most of the land
was public and the structure of the "city" was
growing. Businessmen were selling materials and
goods, and a whole urban economy was ongoing.(55)
- Another important factor in addition to the access
to the labor market was the ideal location in
regard to the bus routes and the routes taken by
the trucks which some construction companies pro-
vided for their employees or even for those who
used bicycles. (see Table XIII)
2.3.2.1 The Satellitization Process and the Populist
Urban Decision-Making
Faced with the prospect of seeing the Pilot Plan
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TABLE XIII
MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION TO WORK OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS
IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTION (IAPI) 1967
Means of Transportation
Public Buses
Employer's Vehicles
Walking
Bicycle
Others
Total
Source: Social Service Foundation, 1967
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Percent
44.4
30.6
15.7
6.3
3.0
100.0
surrounded by a ring of low income shanty towns, the planners
accepted the idea of satellitization as a tool for prevent-
ing continuous social pressure as population increased. The
development of Taguatinga gives a good example of urban
decision making leading to an increasing process of spatial
aggregation in which new locational patterns could be open
for the middle and the lower strata without threatening the
official settlement. Epstein(56) provides an accurate des-
cription of the politics underlying the decision to create
the first satellite town of Taguatinga.
In the gold rush atmosphere of Brasilia in the late
fifities, with the government preoccupied above all with the
rapid completion of the main government buildings of the
capital and masses of migrant workers and get-rich-quick
operators flocking to the region, the orderly growth of
housing and amenities for the lower classes was impossible.
The solution these people adopted for their pressing need
for shelter was an expedient familiar to other Brazilian
cities and, indeed, one of the standard forms of urban
expansion in all the underdeveloped countries: squatting.
While a Free Town had been established with commercial
interests especially in mind, this zone and other encamp-
ments soon proved inadequate and squatments began to appear
in various regions of the future Federal District. Such
squatments were largely tolerated by the authorities since
the workers housed in them were required for the achievement
140
of the goal of completing the new capital on time, so long
as they did not seem to pose a massive threat to the public
order or to the eventual execution of Costa's plan.
However, eventually they did begin to pose such a
threat and the emergency expedient adopted to deal with them
proved as fateful for the future of urban Brasilia as the
outcome of the original contest for the city-plan itself.
The largest area of squatting was across the Brasilia-
Anapolis highway, the main route from Sao Paolo, whence came
most of the supplies for the construction effort.
Ernesto Silva, one of NOVACAP's( 5 7 ) directors and a parti-
cipant in the events, recounts: "Nearly four thousand people
installed themselves in less than a week. They lived in
the most precarious manner" barracos (shacks) of old wood,
cans, zinc sheets, cement sacks. There were no sewage pits;
no water. Promiscuity and lack of hygiene. Everything
built in a few days, especially at night, to get around the
vigilence of the inspectors" (Ernesto Silva, CB June 4,
1967). (58) That Saturday, the president was visiting
Brasilia and had been invited to dine in the JK Restaurant
in the Free Town. A mass of people, perhaps as many as
four thousand, were gathered around the restaurant, waiting
for the president and bearing signs saying, "We want to
stay where we are!" "Viva President Juscelino." and
"We have founded Sara Kubitschek Town!" Dona Sara was the
president's wife, and the choice of the name was obviously
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a maneuver to gain the sympathy of the authorities and even
a subtle form of blackmail to prevent any move against the
invasion.
It was necessary to do something rapidly, to avoid an
incident that would not look good at all in the newspapers,
and could even threaten the construction timetable if things
got serious enough. Israel Pinheiro, President of NOVACAP,
asked director Ernesto Silva to go and try to calm the
situation. Recounts Silva:
"I climbed onto a wooden box and addressed the demon-
strators. I told them that Novacap had already
arranged for the creation of a satellite town, 25 km
from the Pilot Plan, and in this place each worker
would have his own lot and could acquire it for a
reasonable price over a long term. I arranged with
the committee or representatives of Sara Kubitschek
Town, a meeting for the next day, Sunday, at 7 a.m.
when we would show them the plan of the new planned
city and examine the means by which the transfer
would be made."
The President's dinner was nevertheless cancelled, and the
next day the meeting did not go too well. Silva promised
that NOVACAP would "move everybody, put up the shacks," and
take steps to provide medical care and schools.
Silva puts part of the blame for the resistance on
some businessmen in the Free Town who stimulated invasions
because their residents were customers for building materials
and later for food. He charges that they were among those
who incited "indiscipline and resistance." Another reason
for the resistance was the fact that the Free Town was one
of the principal points for odd jobs and petty commerce;
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living near it represented a form of security for recent
migrants. To be moved summarily to a distant, empty loca-
tion, dependent upon the whims of the authorities -
preoccupied with the timetable for Brasilia, more than
worker's welfare - would be at best a leap in the dark.
So the following Monday when the attempt to persuade
the invaders to move was begun with the aid of two nuns
trained as social workers, only one family accepted the idea.
That night a hundred people marched to the provisional
headquarters of NOVACAP, still demanding the right to stay
where they were, while some allegedly proposed setting fire
to the offices.
A series of additional attractions were offered to
those willing to move. A mobile hospital was sent to the
new city, Taguatinga, NOVACAP bought wood, nails, zinc, and
provided them to the workers to improve their shanties. The
shacks were located in the back of each lot as a symbol of
the hope of future stucco construction in the front. Writes
Silva:
"We dismantled the shacks, transported them, rebuilt
them, transported furniture, utensils, men, women,
and children. We built nearly a thousand sewage pits,
one for every lot. We demarcated every lot so that
each person already occupied his own lot. We put in
a provisional water network, God knows how (He will
forgive us!). We instituted daily transportation
for the workers in NOVACAP and construction company
trucks. We assured a minimum of medical assistance
(CB June 4, 1967)."
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In effect, then, the move was finally carried out
(in ten days) because a series of advantages were offered,
as well as because the dialogue between the government
officials and the workers was essentially unequal, since the
former were invested with legitimacy and potential police
backing.
Perhaps because the difficulties of the transfer had
put the fear of God (or of social tumult) into it, the
administration moved in the next six months to consolidate
the new, hastily installed satellite town. A school, a
hospital, and houses for the schoolteachers were put in. A
few months later an industrial school was built. One should
note the difference in tone and orientation between the
original Pilot Plan of Brasilia and the immediate, impro-
vised, down-to-earth process ("plan" would be saying too
much) by which Taguatinga was instituted. On the one hand,
an aesthetic ideal, the lofty sweep of monumental design
and its rhetoric; on the other, harried administrators,
workers seeking a chance so far denied them, in an often
grinding interaction, produced a solution that pleased
nobody but met pressing and immediate needs.
The improvised creation of Taguatinga set the
precedent for the creation of satellite cities outside of
the watershed of the artificial Paranoa Lake. Taguatinga
itself became the fastest growing segment of the Federal
District, with the exception of the Social Security Invasion.
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From this description we can infer that the double
policy that President Kubitschek's administration adopted
was transferred to the urban decision making. In order to
avoid social confrontation of contradictory social interests,
the problems were postponed in the political interest of the
broad governmental coalition. Therefore, we can understand
the double role of the government in proposing first the
beginning of a social and economic process of segregation
coupled with additional offers and attractions to those
willing to accept. The dialogue between government and the
masses was biased by an unequal treatment for those willing
to accept governmental proposals while giving an "appearance"
of democratic and spontaneous decision. In this sense,
governmental incentives as higher wages, financial aid for
housing and location, and the raise of continuous segrega-
tion were instruments for the shaping of the urban form in
such a way that present problems were distorted by govern-
mental interference. This explains the official acceptance
of the relative and contradictory social mixture of
shantytowns in the central areas at the same time that a
process of "erradication" was in the beginning. These
distortions were reinforced by the governmental policy of
continuous deficit to finance political achievements. The
public sector's continuous deficit was due to the insuf-
ficiency of fiscal revenues and by the underpricing of
goods and services provided by the government-owned concerns.
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In the urban areas the underpricing policies were an expe-
dient for curbing raising inflation and this meant that
transportation systems and huge urban expenditures were
systematically increasing the federal deficit while
"succeeding" in acquiring a basic positive political image
in the great cities and in the new capital construction.
2.3.2.2 Populist Governmental Incentives and
Relocational Policies
The use of official incentives as land, public provi-
sional services, etc. as a reward system was aimed at alter-
ing worker's ways of thinking and feeling. Populist policies
regarding urban relocation and the beginnings of the segre-
gational process were achieved by making workers individual
desires (housing, property, tenure) congruent with the
governmental intentions and conflicting with the workers
collective self-interest (job accessibility, use of urban
infrastructures). The "reward system" contemplated those
who played by the rules with concrete gains in terms of
income status.(59) Moreover, the first to accept relocation
in the new satellite cities took locational advantages in
the new spatial areas, therefore molding a permanent new
locational system in such a way that,over time, newcomers
and and migrants will not see the satellite cities as a
social handicap but instead as the natural way to relate
themselves with the job market in the central city. In this
scenario, official incentives were coupled with private
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enterprise incentives such as free transportation and free
housing construction materials. While the government pro-
vided an underpriced bus service, many workers began to
travel in trucks belong to construction companies, used to
commute workers directly from their homes to the place of
work. Since the trucks stopped only at satellite cities,
they basically reinforced suburban locational patterns. As
a result, in face of the low wages and great distances to
the satellite cities, free transportation was usedas official
policy as a basic element designed to show the workers that
it was to their advantage to accept satellitization. The
second element in this strategy of subsidies was the provi-
sion of raw materials for the construction of shacks. A
common source is the discarded wood used as mold for the
reinforced concrete apartment houses in the Pilot Plan.
This is of very little use to the construction companies,
since it is difficult to reuse, and in the context of the
public contracts in Brasilia, the higher the total con-
struction costs, the higher the profit.(60) Therefore,
waste in materials was computed as a necessary expenditure
in the final cost components. So the gift of lumber is of
little value to the giver and of considerable worth for the
lower strata workers. As a result, the gifts of lumber to
the construction of housing were channeled through a process
of private incentives toward the satellite cities. Quali-
fied workers were contemplated not only with the lumber but
148
with transport of the material to the new site. For the
unskilled workers, they must as a rule hire a truck for the
job. Location in these two cases began to divide workers'
interests either by preferential locations or by income
segregation. Moreover, in the new satellite areas, minimal
public services were supplied to the extent of providing
for the settlement of the new community up to a level
necessary for avoiding social confrontation. Government
policies regarding these satellite cities were heavily based
on changing the "uncontrolled" locational patterns. Under
the old uncontrolled settlements, the building of the city
as a major task and the populist political coalition-govern-
ment reaped the political and economic profits of the
enterprise. In the second phase, as the city began to
develop, the populist government began to assert itself in
the control of the metropolitan area using urban incentives
in order to create spatial subjection for the lower strata.
Should the national upper strata be willing and
economically capable of bearing these costs of political
stability, of an urban continuously subsidized system at
least at the minimum political level of security, particu-
larly providing the middle class with highly subsidized
urban goods and the working class with a continuous subsidy
in order to accept economic losses from segregationed
locations, this model of dual concentrated urban settlement
could last "indefinitely." Brazilian political experience
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has shown that when the upper limits of these social bargains
were reached, economic and social development has had to
have been rechanneled within the boundaries of strict
capitalistic development.
Fixing, through political decisions, higher economic
targets than those that were likely to result from the
relative free play of the forces of the market, populist
governments were relying on the mobilization of the urban
masses to accumulate political power to choose and to obtain
these targets in the electoral process. At the same time,
these economic goals were embedded in the wider framework of
a welfare system oriented to improve artificially the living
conditions of the working classes in a way of answering
their immediate needs. In this sense, populism represented
an "artificial" victory for the masses, through a process
of forcing the oligarquies to attend to some of the popular
claims. However, these participatory processes did not
impose any real redistribution of income and welfare because
the system kept growing without any change in the underlying
economic structure. While the whole system kept growing,
a minimum of compatibility was always achieved between the
increasing demand of the masses and the increase in the
national economy, with the participation of the state for
generating new means for social assistance. In the case
of the beginnings of the satellite cities, this double
strategy appeared through the concession of new urban
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locations outside the central area, feasible through the
continuous provisional state incentives as a viable urban
basis for the first settlers. In the course of this
process, many social sectors in spite of their potential
or actual conflict of interest, were favored, although in
the same uneven social terms, by the provision of restricted
welfare facilities. The urban growth of Brasilia at its
populist beginnings was maintained in the framework of such
a dialectical system, in which the resultant inflationary
distortions were accepted as a calculated risk. The urban
system deriving from such economic strategies was therefore
contradictory; while accepting some squatters' settlements
near the central area, the government at the same time was
trying to preserve institutional values and managed, through
a policy of continuous economic and welfare incentives to
move some of these populations to suburban locations,
initiating the process of segregation.
2.3.2.3 The Planner's Position
Segregational policies were enforced as shown in the
Taguatinga example, more by political expediency than by a
clear understanding of its underlying mechanism. In the
whole process, the planners, by supporting a continuous
attention to the problems of the Master Plan and the central
area, contributed to enforcing a pattern of decision making
through which the demands of the lower strata were always
transferred from the bureaucratic and technological decisions
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to the local political processes in order to alleviate pres-
sure from the centrally planned area. Actually, the plan-
ner's concern with the city stopped at the physical limits
of the Master Plan. We can see now the peculiar professional
ideological weakness of the middle class intellectual plan-
ners when confronted with real socio-political realities.
The main concern with formal order was precisely the cause
of this inability to obtain a critical understanding of the
whole social process. Moreover, the middle class profes-
sionals were frightened in their political and cultural
framework by the huge ascent of the masses, which actually
tended to "disrupt" the formal plan. And finally, what is
worse, is that they did not accept any changes in their
professional ideology in order to allow the participation of
the masses in the framework of the new city, even when the
political conditions of a populistic government indicated to
all, the historical feasibility of a similar project. As a
result of their distorted professional ideology favoring
physical and aesthetical achievement above all contradic-
tions, the planners never gave their full agreement to the
ongoing social process. As middle class intellectuals,
they were gratified only with the task engaged in the
official planning conception, and not in the implementation
problems. They accepted the social benefits of building
the city and the palaces as an opportunity to test their
professional ability to participate in historic events, but
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they never had any tool to gear the development of the
informal urban sectors as soon as these difficulties began
to be felt. We can understand now how the dualism of the
Brazilian society can be reflected in the dual consciousness
of the planners. The double position of the planners cor-
responded at the professional level to the double position
of Populism and the fact that middle class involvement in
the process of populistic development was superficial and
opportunistic, and was easily broken and changed into posi-
tions of extreme hostility toward the lower strata, as soon
as the process was changed through new institutional
crises. (61)
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PARADIGM III
URBAN FORM UNDER NEW GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
TO ENFORCE "FREE-MARKET" TRANSACTIONS
3.1 New National Urban Policies
The crucial question for understanding the government
policies in Brazil after 1964 is the feasibility of the
overall new national economic model's external capability to
bear the costs required for subsidizing the system at least
at the minimum level necessary to maintain its economic
viability. Therefore, unlike the main characteristic of
the former populist model, the main problem is not the dis-
content of the urban masses which can be controlled by the
absence of an electoral process, but the dissatisfaction
among the middle classes. As a result, a double institu-
tional strategy was devised.
First, for the lower strata, the adoption of means of
reducing their demographic pressure, coupled with the need
for a territorial allocation and containment.
Second, for the middle classes, the subsidizing of
a system of consumer goods at least at the minimum level
necessary to maintain the industrial development and the
operationality of the internal markets, and the export
sector.
As for the first strategy, government programs aimed
at channeling internal migration, either by building the
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National Highway Network and the Transamazon Highway, or
through plans for "dispersing" metropolitan and urban
growth, preventing lower strata from taking advantage of the
scarce amount of investment for urban infrastructures.
Therefore, public investments can be mainly channeled
into economic development, particularly allocated for key
sectors of the economy. As a result, the amount of invest-
ments available for improving urban centers has been
reduced, and the most rapid growth in the Brazilian cities
has occurred, not within the central socially and economic-
ally equipped area, but in the satellite cities near them,
with a striking pattern of disequilibrium between social
demand and institutional supply of urban infrastructures
and social services. The city of Nova Iguacu, a metropoli-
tan "suburb" of Rio de Janeiro, as an example, grew from
135,000 people in 1960 to 732,000 in 1970, and to an
estimated 1,000,000 in 1973. The continued growth of the
urban labor force, while economically "functional," is
considered "dysfunctional" from the perspective of the
pressures it can bear, either in the central areas or in
the middle class traditional neighborhoods. Since the new
economic model depends largely on the external inputs to
overcome the internal lack of economic expansion, it's not
feasible for the system to adopt any kind of inflationary
subsidies from the urban masses without decreasing, as a
consequence, the middle class demands. As for the second
155
item, the system, while requiring compensatory subsidies
for the middle class, such as housing and automobile
financing, strives to restrict the social demand of the
masses by restricting spatial locations in the central
urban areas. In this process, housing subsidies reinforce
the regressive allocational patterns by increasing land
costs and reinforcing suburbanization and segregation.
Some basic assumptions of the new model were aimed to main-
tain the social order at the expense of the national
political institutions in terms of the following basic
requisites:
It would require a substantial reinforcement of the
state, contrary to the expectation of the laissez-faire
liberals. However, such a reinforcement was designed to
enable the state to extend its intervention in the economic
sphere in order to ensure a minimum of economic stability.
This model would establish under the supervision of
the state the "free market" mechanism, ensuring the private
enterprise the full control and management of the economy,
chiefly in sectors such as housing, using loans and finan-
cial subsidies.
Finally, the model assumed that economic development
without changing the existing social duality and order. The
historic lessons of the incompatibility between a nationally
oriented populist development and the maintenance of the
existent order allowed the elite to choose the help of
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external factors and the development of a model on the condi-
tions of dependence for overcoming the structural distor-
tions while leaving the existing dualistic order intact.
How these macro-policies affected Brasilia's urban growth
patterns will be analyzed in the following sections.
3.2 Brasilia and the Institution of Official Housing
Financial Markets
After 1964, with the National Housing Plan, the
demand for urban land for the building of a new housing
complex increased significantly. The Plan was aimed at the
elimination of the national housing deficit through a com-
plex financial system under the management of the National
Housing Bank. This system sought to increase the demand for
housing by creating incentives to the private civil con-
struction sector, increasing therefore the supply side.
However, the first direct impact of the plan was the
immediate increase in the land market prices. We can sup-
pose, since we don't have enough data, that the repercus-
sion on the land market of the increased financial sources
allocated to residential buildings had direct impact on
the increasing land costs observed since the implementation
of the Plan. While in the developed countries, land costs
tend to decrease as a percentage of the national income,
the converse phenomena seems to occur in the developing
countries. In the United States, the values for land costs
as a share of the national income decreasedto 53% (1890),
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to 29% (1929), and to 16% (1948)(62) Grebler). In
Rio de Janeiro, the goverment official system financed
between 70 percent and 90 percent of all real estate
"official" transactions.(63) The private entrepreneur also
could utilize the system to finance the acquisition of con-
struction materials. Moreover, with the institution of the
monetary correction as a guarantee against inflationary
devaluation, the investments in the continuation sector
shifted from the purchase of land and existent apartments
to the investment of a considerable amount of capital in
new housing development. Due to the structure of the
demand (chiefly middle class), the demand for urban lots
concentrated in these urban sectors which could provide
higher standards for intensive occupation. In other words,
more permissive and intensive high physical zoning stan-
dards. As the price of land is directly correlated with
the coefficient of permitted use, central and residential
areas with higher permissive building area standards
increased their land prices. While in "traditional" cities
these areas correspond to areas in different neighborhoods
located alongside larger streets and avenues, in Brasilia
the preferential economic area corresponds to the whole
area within the boundaries of the Pilot Plan, since there
six-story buildings in each neighborhood are the only
opportunity for sound financial investment. While in the
traditional cities the most valuable areas correspond to
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those areas surrounding the larger streets, since the
number of apartments is a function of the size of public
facilities; in Brasilia all the area under the Pilot Plan
widely served by overdimensioned public services suffered
an identical intense process of valorization; preventing
therefore the last attempts for a liberal social gradation.
Since the build area of the Pilot Plan accepted the local
higher density standards with restricted supply of land, it
follows that after the National Housing Plan, housing
prices in the central area rose vertically. With the
liberation of market forces and the end of the government
"paternalism," free market forces began to reshape the
urban space. In these new conditions, housing prices
commanded the process to assign land prices as the market
prices for habitational unities began to command corres-
pondent land values. As in all sectors of the economy, the
real estate market began to concentrate in supplying the
habitational demand for the higher strata. In
Rio de Janeiro, for instance, the demand for housing was
almost entirely localized in the south zone neighborhoods,
through demolishing one-family dwellings and replacing
them with high-rise buildings. However, in Brasilia, the
rigid standards and zoning regulations prevented the more
intensive supply of land. Therefore, comparative prices
are even higher while the city continued to be surrounded
by a green belt of empty land. While inflation between
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1970 and 1972 was 40 percent, land prices in Rio de Janeiro
rose 126.0 percent (64) and probably more in Brasilia. In
Figs. 2 to 5(65) I mapped the prices by square meters of
different apartments built in the Pilot Plan. Each dif-
ferent neighborhood was disaggregatedto show price levels
for each income category. While in the upper and middle
upper class neighborhoods (100 and 300), prices are higher
than in the so-called medium and low class neighborhood
(200 and 400), their values decrease slowly from the
center of the Pilot Plan (C.B.D.). Therefore, apartment
prices for the entire city show little sensibility for
differences in income levels and for physical distances
from C.B.D. Actually, land and construction costs only
significantly decrease in the satellite cities where
mixed and liberal zoning regulation not only accept poor
building standards but an economic mix of activities.
Those submarkets are therefore similar to those of the
traditional cities. As a result, the Pilot Plan's residen-
tial sector became the best opportunity for economic
investment and under these conditions, highly dependent
on the official policies regarding the housing supply.
From this point of view, housing and the whole financial
sector devoted to support the housing market can be con-
sidered as a new economic potential that will produce
substantial economic support for Brasilia, toward the
building of a new spatial economic pattern. New communities
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and neighborhoods can be built and each one makes possible
the production of new goods and services enlarging at the
same time the urban market for a whole range of new indus-
trial products. Therefore, housing and new communities
stands for Brasilia in the 1970's, as the building of the
rodoviary infrastructure stands for Brasilia in the 1960's.
Likewise, in Brazil, several other major industries (rubber,
glass, iron works, etc.) were introduced as a direct
consequence of the automobile industry, all these invest-
ments exceeding by far the direct investments in the auto-
mobile industry itself. As a result, housing was a direct
historic consequence of these investment policies and
represented a logical continuation of the "developmentist"
policies started in the Kubitschek administration. More-
over as the housing subsidies and loans are entirely
dependent on official policies, the public sector has all
the instruments to guide urban development in the direc-
tion of their political aims. Therefore, these expenditures
in housing are bound to mold new locational patterns in the
metropolitan settlements. We will focus on the "housing
question" not through a bureaucratic or "neoclassical"
approach of a "free market" allocating housing according
to comparative marginal costs and redistribution of income,
but we will consider housing expenditures in this new set
of urban concepts such as "urban hierarchy" and "urban
stratification" to better understand the functioning of
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the housing "markets." While for the neoclassical view
housing allocational resources are consectuences of market
forces decisions, we suggest particularly in the example of
Brasilia that urban stratification and segregation can be
seen as central issues related to the attempts by the
government to discipline and coordinate the social distribu-
tion of populations within the metropolitan area, in order to
maintain and increase the social upward trend and patterns
of consumerism in the Pilot Plan area. Housing allowances,
therefore, can be analyzed through such frameworks since
90% of the housing supply in the official markets is pro-
vided mostly through some form of government action or
financial program.
The private sector produces only 10% of the overall
supply. From the total of 35,255 dwellings supplied between
1966/1972, the official share was 91% (32,137) dwellings
offered through several economic and financial public
agencies. Private agencies only had financed 5.1% during
the same period of time. Consequently, the principal
responsibility for providing housing for the different
social strata in Brasilia relies on the government's
official political and economic decisions. How did these
policies shape the different demands for housing in a new
urban form? First of all, the distribution of the dif-
ferent eligibility criteria was based upon what we call
professional middle class "rationalistic-humanitarian"
prejudices. The basic assumption of this view was to
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consider that the presence of shanty towns near the Master
Plan was incompatible with the modernity and symbolism
that Brasilia as a new capital would represent. The
second assumption was the middle class rationalistic argu-
ment that better physical housing standards would be funda-
mental to eliminating all the "pathological" phenomena
observed in the different shanty towns around the central
city. Most of all the predominant view among middle class
experts was that the presence of these shanty towns was
incompatible with the symbolic and modern role of the new
capital of the country. Costa's preventative physical
measures were actually ideologically aimed against the
growth of any squatment close enough to the Pilot Plan,
a situation which would have eventaually threatened the
aesthetical purposes of the official city through a ring
of "low-quality" housing patterns. (66) As a result,
official urban and housing policies were centered in a
triple political strategy using housing allowances as a
tool to change locational and spatial urban patterns, as we
will now try to describe.
3.3 The Radicalization of Urban Segregation and the Role
of Housing Market Mechanisms
The official strategy centered in housing allowances
were developed around the following policies:
3.3.1 The institution of market mechanisms with
government intervention.
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3.3.2 The provision of financial government loans for
upper and upper middle classes' housing construc-
tion in the Pilot Plan and in satellite cities,
respectively.
3.3.3 The "design" and implementation of a strategy for
the "erradication" of favelas located near the
Pilot Plan.
3.3.1 Regarding the first item, the institution of market
mechanisms was achieved through the correction for infla-
tion in the payments for the house, land, and a series of
requirements designed to insure that the recipients would
be willing and able to keep up with them. These require-
ments would soon eliminate those either earning less than
the amount necessary to participate in any program or
unable to prove their ability to pay. These requirements
were contained in the framework of a national housing plan
financially supported by a national housing bank. The
national housing plan affected Brasilia after the local
government adopted the following policies aiming the
creation of a local housing market:
1. The compulsory sale of the real estate belong-
ing to the national government to the middle
class bureaucracy, the mere accession of rights
to a one bedroom apartment was worth
U.S.$5,000. even though the new resident would
have to buy it over a fifteen year period. The
low income residents, who did not have resources
to meet the monthly payments, chose the con-
siderable cash they got by selling or trading
their rights and establishing themselves in the
satellite towns.
168
2. The financing of housing programs through the
federal savings bank of Brasilia, which would
finance houses worth up to U.S.$15,000. Since
the buyers are eligible only for houses for which
they can contribute up to 30 percent of the total
cost with periodic correction for inflation, it
is clear that this program was designed for the
upper middle class.
3. The creation of the Company for Housing of Social
Interest(CHIS) (67) which would deal with housing
problems of those whose incomes were below
U.S.$100. This program, as the others, would
have to pay for itself. Hence, the correction
for inflation in the payments for the house and
a series of requirements designed to insure
that the recipients would be able to pay. These
requirements included land tenure and "official
standards" in the constructions, which eliminate
those either earning less than the amount neces-
sary to participate in any program or unable to
prove their ability to pay. By early 1967, the
agency had completed only 666 houses in Gama,
1630 in Taguatina (68). Many people overcharged
by the payments prefer the free ownership of a
shack in the squatment, which is capable of
being expanded and at less expense to the
long term obligation of paying 15 or 20 percent
of their wages with the constant threat of loss
of the house.
3.3.2 Regarding the second goal, the provision of finan-
cial government loans for upper and upper middle classes,
Table XIV shows the supply of official housing by different
geographical locations and by income levels in each of the
satellite cities and in the Pilot Plan. The data shows the
following patterns: (69)
- 51.9% of all the official loans and economic
resources for the construction of new houses or
apartments were concentrated in the area within
the Pilot Plan which at that time concentrated
28.69% of the total metropolitan population.
Only 7.7% of this population belongs to the low
income group. The remaining 48.1% of the offi-
cial resources were distributed among the several
169
TABLE XIV
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCOME, LOCATIONAL DISTRIBUTION AND
NEW OFFICIAL HOUSING SUPPLY IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA
NB New
Dwel -
lings
1966-1S97a e
Satellite Cities
SOB. New PBG New TAG. New
Dwel- - Dwel- Dwel-
lings lings lings
GAMA New
Dwel -
lings
INV. New
Dwel -
lings
Low
<3000/mo. 7.70
Inf. Med.
3000/6000 26.96
Medium
6000/11000 32.00
H Sup Med
110/230
High
>230
----- 21.88 ----- 36.49 ----- 48.66
0.6 33.32 ----- 39.64 ----- 34.37
7.6 31.25 ----- 18.02 13.84
25.62 18.0 10.42 ----- 5.98 2.68
----- 32.00
----- 36.50
----- 24.17
0.9 6.07
17.32 25.7 3.13 0,7 0.67 0.8 0.45 23.5 1.21
100.00
51.9
100.00 100.00
0.7
100.00
0.8
100.00
24.4
6.1
6.1
----- 56.18
33.10
----- 8.68
----- - 7.71
----- 39.53
28.79
----- 8.48
----- 2.09
0.27 8.9 1.10
100.00 . 100.00
8.9
*Source: Codeplan,
**Source: Between
1972, %
Family Survey, 1969
1966-1972, Codeplan,
of Housing Dwellings
Sectional SLUUies, HoUsing, vol. 2v
Financed in Each Satellite city and the Pilot Plan locality by income.
= Nicleo Bandeirante
= Sobradinho
= Planaltina,Brasa1ndiaGuara.
= Taguatinga
= Gama
= Invasoes
Income
Level s
Pilot Plan
% Pop*
Pilot
Plan
% of**
Dwel -
lings
Federal
Di strict
---- 34.63
---- 29.65
20.25
---- 10.01
Key: NB
SOB.
PBG
TAG.
GAMA
INV.
5.46
100.00
I
satellite cities where 71.31% of the metro-
politan population were concentrated.
- No resources were assigned to "favelas" or any kind
of low income settlements. However, these settle-
ments accounted for more than 80% of the metro-
politan population (categories A, B, and C -
Table XVI). A comparison between these data and
the distribution of the metropolitan population
by income groups and geographical locations shows
that the official policy was to benefit the
higher strata not only in the Pilot Plan but in
every satellite city reinforcing, therefore, the
suburbanization and segregation.
3.3.3 Regarding the third strategic goal, the design and
implementation of a strategy for the "erradication of
favelas," the new government policies began by an evalua-
tion of the housing sector in order to detect the amount of
"substandard" dwellings that needed to be eliminated.
With the data from the survey undertaken by
Codeplan (1969), it was possible for the government to
estimate the total number of families in the Federal Dis-
trict by different housing typologies, in order to enforce
"erradication" processes. "Principal" families are con-
sidered as a set of people living in the same dwelling and
earning the same domestic budget. A "secondary" family
was qualified as a set of people sharing the same building
with other families. A permanent dwelling is a brick con-
structed building with "reasonable" durability within the
master plan requirements. Provisional dwellings are quali-
fied as "poorly constructed" buildings (Codeplan, 1969) and
subhabitation was defined as one with at least three of the
following seven features:
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1. Rough construction in wood or other material
of low resistance (wattle-and-daub, adobe, etc);
2. Precarious sanitary installation;
3. Roofing with improper material or tiles in a
poor state of repair;
4. Earthen floor;
5. Absence of electric light;
6. Lack of piped water;
7. Lack of space; crowding and precarious hygiene.
In order to estimate the housing deficit, the survey
only had considered the potential demand and excluded sub-
stitution demands since the housing stock was considered as
relatively new (10 years). The summation of the potential
demand and the demand due to demographic factors gives the
actual (1969) number to the housing deficit: 78,849 dwellings.
The number of dwellings officially built in the same period
was only 13,770. As we can see, even the housing demand
due to the new demographic demand could not be solved by any
government action. From this deficit, and taking into con-
sideration the income structure, more than a third of the
total population could not have their habitational demand
solved through any "formal" habitational market.
The estimate of over twenty-five thousand families
in the conditions was subdivided as follows:
A) Invasions (in Pilot Plan): 5,000 families;
B) Satellite towns: 14,500 families;
C) Rural zone: 3,500 families.
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It is believed that 25 percent of these families have a
monthly income of less than U.S.$50. It was clear that the
official housing plan could not possibly provide for all of
the squatters .and for the lower middle classes. Based on
these surveys, the official agency clme to the conclusion
that from 24,000 to 25,000 housing units would be needed to
"eliminate" "subhabitations" from Brasilia, based upon the
1965 population census and assuming no new in-migration
(However, between 1965 and 1970, we know that the total
population growth was 189,188, an increase of 52 percent')
This amounts to more than a third of the total population
(1965) living in "subhabitations"' The official policy was
to remove these populations without any ability to pay from
the areas near the Pilot Plan to pre-selected new sites in
the satellite cities. The new lots would be paid in
installments of larger payment schedules.
Therefore, the institutional land use and housing
allowance policies (the first stated in the Master Plan and
the second reinforced by the institutional markets) were the
legal and technical coercive instruments in the preparation
and application of a series of relocational measures against
low and middle low income strata. Among these measures was
the policy of "erradication" favelas by transferring shacks
located in government land, while denying the favelados the
usual rights or possession. (72) The Invasion Removal
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Commission(73) created to deal with the legal and practical
problems of the favelados, was assigned the job of setting
legal criteria. For the commission "any and every" construc-
tion in an unforseen location in the Federal District, with-
out the authorization of the competent authorities, is
considered an "Invasion." If official authorization was
given, it would be considered as an "encampment," which
should have an administrator charged with, among other
things, not permitting squatting in the area. "There were
cases in which constructions, having originated as campments,
have become "invasions" due to the absence of an administra-
tor, as in the case of the Invasions Sanitations and
Do Re Mi."(74) As a result, to emphasize to the residents
themselves the temporary nature of their land tenure, public
services of almost every variety were denited to them, and
as each family was moved, it was informed in no uncertain
terms that it was not getting an official permanent lot.
The Brasilia local government aided by sufficient personal
for removals, employed rapid physical remedies in the small
and totally controlled area under their jurisdiction, in
order to prevent the opportunity for litigation and shift
all new pressure for invasions in the central areas of the
official plan to less well inspected favelas in the satel-
lite cities (See Table XV). The government interpreted the
favela legal legislation as preserving the aesthetical
"status quo" and maintaining its tiny, centrally planned
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TABLE XV
BRASILIA: FAMILIES REMOVED FROM "FAVELAS"
TOWARD NEW OFFICAL SETTLEMENT SITES
BETWEEN 1971 and MARCH 1972
Shanty Towns
(Favelas)
Number of
Removed Shacks
Number of
Families Transferred
Total
Population
Removed
Removal Time
Period
Daily*
Travel
Before After
Removal Removal
53.639 3/27/-11/10/71
13.785 11/5/71-2/9/72
9.346 5/11/71-1/27/72
2.586 2/7/-2/28/72
2.738 2/23-3/6/72
82.094 3/27/71-3/6/72
35 70 min
40 70 min
45 70 min
45 70 min
40 70 min
Source: Codeplan, Sectional Studies, Housing, 1972.
*Daily Travel Time to C.B.D. by Bus--Sources: My Own Survey
FA
-.1
Lii
Iapi
Ti me
Tenori o
Esperanca
B Sayao
Querozene
Totals
9.931
2.289
1.570
0.438
0.462
14.690
10.696
2.712
1.886
.460
.497
16.251
area "clean." Therefore, zoning regulations plus legal
reinterpretation of the land tenure codes, linked with the
absence of a local political participation increase the
initial populist segregat on of locational urban patterns
and transform the metropolitan form in a highly segregated
"urban archipelago." (75)
3.4 The Satellitization Process
Actual urban policies can be defined as an institu-
tional attempt by the local planning agency to limit the
newly created market forces in order to stimulate growth by
the many satellite settlements, while controlling the
Pilot Plan internal growth through institutional instruments
such as zoning ordinances, land use standards, taxation, etc.
There is no actual attempt to reverse suburbanization trends
trends and to accept a certain portion of low income people
in the central city. The urban development therefore con-
tinues to follow a distinct pattern of suburbanization,
satellitization and segregation. As land prices rise as a
consequence of the increasing migratory movement, and the
peripheral open private land was subdivided and urbanized,
the central government had to absorb the increasing expen-
ditures necessary to build new infrastructures such as
roads, streets, public services, etc. As a result, the
growth of the new metropolitan area has been accompanied by
substantial rises in the public expenditures and low bene-
fits per inhabitant. This process is reinforced by the
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suburban migration of increasing number of middle and lower
middle class families fearing the impact of higher taxes and
increasing urban expenditures in the Pilot Plan areas.
Figures 2 to 5 show the costs of residential apartment units
in the four different types of neighborhoods provided by
the "democratic" Pilot Plan economic levels.(77) This situa-
tion is consistent with Table XVI showing the concentration
of high income families within the central city. The elitist
trend is also consistent with the increasing percentage of
high income families living inside the planned area, if com-
pared with similar data from other Brazilian cities, or with
historic Brasilia's data. As the migratory process is
unlikely to be diverted, we conclude that urban growth and
complete suburbanization are inevitable, unless new policies
seeking to reintroduce diversity in the central city could
be reinforced.
As a summary, the use of institutional programs such
as housing financing, while answering some of the demands
of the private sector building industry, particularly in the
Pilot Plan area, was politically designed to regulate the
overall metropolitan structure and to enforce the distribu-
tion of public goods through liberal markets mechanism
within government discipline and supervision. In this
process, cost minimization cannot be identified with
government intentions, since the growth of the low density
satellite cities, through housing incentives, is costly.
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pTABLE XVI
BRASILIA: INCOME AND LOCATION
Income Pilot
Levels Plan
A
B
C
D
E
7.70
16.96
32.00
25.62
17.32
Ndcleo
Bandeir-
ante
21.88
33.32
31.25
10.42
3.13
Sobra- Planal-
dinho tina
Bras-
isndia
Guard
36.49
39.64
18.02
5.98
0.67
48.66
34.37
13.84
2.68
0.45
Tagua- Gama
tinga .
32.05
36.50
24.17
6.07
1.21
56.18
33.16
8.48
7.71
0.27
Inva Fed-
soes eral
Dis-
trict
39.53
28.79
8.48
2.09
1.10
34.63
29.65
20.25
10.01
5.46
Level
Level
Level
Level
Level
A
B
C
D
E
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
(low income): minus than-US 30.00 (monthly)
(inferior medium income): from US 30.00 to 60.00 (monthly)
(medium income): from US 60.00 to 110.00 (monthly)
(superior medium income): from US 110.00 to 230.00 (monthly)
(high income): above US 230.00
Source: Codeplan, 1969.
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Therefore, the main role of the housing financial system
was to "stabilize" the total dependence of the satellite
cities and increase the hierarchical control of the urban
area by the Pilot Plan. In this process, housing allowances
were used as organizational spatial patterns rather than by
their socio-economic progressivity, since the result of
this process was a widespread pulverization of the resources
throughout a wide variety of satellite settlements, with the
consequent duplication of infrastructure and loss of any
scale economy. (78) However, if the intended target was to
discipline and differentiate social strata over the urban
space to prevent the "chaotic" experience of the traditional
cities, the final results were successfully attained.
3.5 Spatial Segregation and the Labor Market
In order to analyze the most important aspects of the
morphology of Brasilia's segregated metroplitan space, we
will attempt now to understand the concentration of employ-
ment and underemployment among specific social groups. In
doing so we reject the neoclassical models which state that
a free and open labor merket allocating labor according to
comparative marginal costs and distributing population over
the urban area according to the resulting income is the most
important tool for understanding urban allocations. We
believe that a new set of categories such as "urban hier-
archy" and "urban segregation" have to be introduced to
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better explain the spatial form of Brasilia, particularly
under direct government intervention, as we have described
in the former sections. I will suggest that the particular
political and institutional framework through which the city
was molded and the nature of the labor market must be seen
as important social issues related to the struggle between
urban settlers and government over the production and
appropriation of social urban space. In other parts of this
thesis, we have described the nature of the urban decision-
making under "populist" government and under the new
capitalist "nonpaternalistic" structures. Now we will
advance some hypotheses on the social structure of the city
which we believe are relevant in order to explain the spa-
tial stratification Brasilia presents nowadays.
3.5.1 The Homogeneity of the Local Job Market
The problem we will deal with is the homogeneity of
the labor market in a new city with a basic services and
civil construction jobs structure. We accept first, that as
the country entered a more advanced capitalistic phase,
differences among working class jobs tended to decline. In
developing countries, this process is accelerated by the
relative scarcity of skilled workers. Unlike developed
countries, there is no need for labox divisions based on
race or sex, since labor market homogeneity is supported by
huge migrant -unskilled workers which contribute to explaining
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the low level of working class unity it engenders. On the
other hand, the relative high presence of unskilled tradi-
tional industries, and the labor intensive techniques used
in the construction industry further contributes to a pro-
gressive homogeneization of unskilled and low waged manpower.
Therefore, divisions within the working class come to be
based less on such descriptive traits as "nationality" or
"religion" or "race" than on economic levels related to the
nature and structure of the productive system. As a result,
not only differentials income is leveled, but social patterns
resulting from consumerism are more or less undifferentiated
for the bulk of the working class. Since differential
incomes are homogeneous, and spatial location is the mani-
fest expression of these incomes, there is a strong homo-
genization of the spatial locational patterns, and therefore
for the social and spatial relations underlying these
patterns. Moreover, in Brasilia, the total absence of a
strong industrial sector and the predominant presence of
government activities tend to homogenize white collar wages
in the same way. Therefore, differences in income and
wealth are reflected in the spatial structure in such a way
that intra-class differences are not so strong as the gap
between the middle class public employees as a whole and the
totality of the working class. Moreover, this gap tends to
increase due to the differences between controlled migration
for the public employees and uncontrolled and intensive
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migration for the working class sector. Table XVII shows
the distribution of the metropolitan labor force. About
25% of the metropolitan labor force is located in industrial
jobs, whereas 20% was in government service-related jobs.
Tables XIV and XVI show the relative distribution of income
for the Federal District. From this data and considering
the high percentages of public employees who are low-skilled
with low incomes, we can understand that the total low
income-low skilled working classes amounts to more than
80% of the total population (considering income levels A,
B, and C, categories - Table XIV); whereas middle class
white collar employees amount to only 15% (levels D and E).
Table XVIII for example shows the predominance of low-skilled
jobs in the construction industry as the main source of
income for household heads living in the Social Security
Invasion. The largest single category is that of laborer,
which otherwise accounts for over one third of the house-
hold heads. Moreover, the figure of 55.1% (1966) suggests
that many of the people listed as "other or none" are in
fact in various occupations connected with civil construc-
tion. As a result of these unskilled job characteristics
in the construction industry, occupational multiplicity is
not correlated with significant differential wages, since
the supply of unskilled workers due to migration is seem-
ingly much greater than the demand. Therefore, for the
182
TABLE XVII
EMPLOYEES BY ACTIVITY AND METROPOLITAN LOCATION
19 0
Activities
Agriculture
Cattle
Industry
Commerce
(Goods)
Services
Transpor-
tation &
Storage
Social
Activities
Public
Management
Others
Pilot Plan Gama
1.679 .822
20.982 8.115
8.809 1.586
22.468 3.682
4.189 1.021
12.802
24.540
7.285
Total s*
Employment
by City 102.744
% of Total
Employment* 52%
1.930
1.885
1.032
20.73
11%
Taguatinga
1.142
8.361
5.080
6.836
2.839
3.868
3.444
2.435
34.005
13%
Brazlandia
.C48
1.086
.188
.396
.122
.215
.127
.C79
2.861
1%
Sobradinho Planaltina Total
.706
3.644
.860
1.858
.487
1.620
1.610
.862
11.447
6%
1.009 6.006
2.026 44.214
.321 16.844
.812 36.052
.256 8.914
.491 20.926
.422 32.028
.254 11.947
5.591 177.931'
Job Population
Ratio**
1.0
1.7
2.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
2.5
3% 100%
Basic Source: Demographic Census-, Federal District 1970,
*Totals and per city percentages added (rounded)
**Lewis Index
0,
Fibge
Occupation
TABLE XVIII
BRASILIA: PRESENT OCCUPATION OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS IN
THE SOCIAL SECURITY INVASION
Percent
1965 1966 1967
Carpenter 5.5 ---- 5.4
Laboror 18.4 30.6 27.9
Mason 5.8 ---- 6.8
Other Construction
(Painters, Plumbers, etc) 3.9 * *
Construction in General * 24.5
SUBTOTAL: Construction 33.6 55.1 40.1
Commerce 5.9 10.2 8.3
Domestic and Laundry 7.1 20.4 8.2
Driver 4.5 5.J 9.0
Farmer 1.0 2.9
Odd Jobs (Subemployment) 14.3 3.4
Others or None 32.6 8.2 22.7
100.0
Source: Social Service Foundation 1965,
David G. Epstein's Sampling.
100.0
1967 and
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100.0
skilled, stability of employment rather than wage differ-
entials, is often considered as the most valuable option
which further contributes to the job homogenization process.
Likewise, other sources of employment only reinforce
these patterns. Local commerce provides only minor addi-
tional sources of income and large portions of the indus-
trial sector only perform wholesale and final processing for
the southeast industrialized nationalized pole (Slo Paulo,
Rio de Janeiro), using unskilled manpower as a basic labor
input. In addition, wholesale commerce operates strongly
on the branch of building materials, also using unskilled
workers for the storage or deliveries, at the construction
sites. For women, the principal source of employment is
domestic labor. The work is rarely specialized, and the
wages are below the official minimum. The overall pattern
of employment is shown in Table XVII.
An important element resulting from the process of
labor homogenization is the consequent spatial concentration
of the types of job structure analyzed. While in the
developing countries, employment dispersal was aimed at
reducing the employment opportunities through employer and
locational restrictions and discriminations, particularly
against minorities, in developing countries factors concurred
relative to employment concentration and housing dispersion,
which seemed to be the characteristic pattern. The urban
strategy adopted by the most recent institutional policies,
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particularly in the case of Brasilia, where the government
has all the institutional tools to "outline" a new urban
pattern, seems to collaborate this hypothesis. In the case
of Brasilia, we argue that as a result of homogenization of
unskilled jobs and wages, spatial distinction between the
large majority of the working class population with a low
internal degree of wage segmentation imposes serious prob-
lems for spatial planning, especially regarding the
specially concentrated unexpected collective and contra-
dictory social behaviors.
First, populist experiences had shown the limitation
of "negative policies" intended to prevent the uncontrolled
growth of low income settlements once they are "allowed to
begin." The relative homogeneity of interests, jobs, wages,
and social demands got transferred to a struggle by a com-
mon program of action, mainly focused on tenure and
supported by a broad local coalition which included neigh-
borhood organizations and local business' financial support.
Second, the great concentration of unskilled jobs in the
Pilot Plan tends to act as a "pull factor" for greater
locational proximity acting as the most efficient means of
"income appropriation." This tendency is strongly rein-
forced by the possibility of gaining access to scarce and
well provided public services in the central and urban area.
All these factors means that any official policy in effect,
acquiescing in the continuance of the low income area near
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the planned sites, would ensure growing united and uncon-
trolled homogeneous mass demand over the institutional
welfare and association structures. As a result, official
policies were always focused on preventing the spatial
locational social mix by maintaining central employment
while dispersing the working class to different communities
throughout the metropolitan area. Different communities
were stimulated and supported by proportional financial
housing plans in new or existing peripheral cities. All
these communities continued to rely largely upon central
employment and resources, and the metropolitan area began
to show a double pattern of segregation and subordination.
Therefore, weak intraclass segregation due to wagesand job
types was transformed into strong spatial segregation. As
a result, the danger of "common and homogeneous" social and
economic demands were better controlled by the government
urban segregatory policies.
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PARADIGM IV
GUIDELINES FOR NEW METPOPOLITAN POLICIES
4.1 Employment Patterns and Urban Policies
The fact that in Brasilia the location of public employment is
directly subject to governmental control and that government employment
is the basic economic factor of the urban economy, has the result
that official policies rather than only cammon price-market forces
can mold the urban space of the whole metropolitan area. The first
consequence of this characteristic is that the urban economy depends
heavily in one side on the service production and in the other side
on the industrial production of buildings and urban equipment. In this
section, we will try to describe how the basic employment patterns
affected the actual and how they will affect the future dynamics of
suburbanization and segregation in order to outline some future urban
policies.
Our first assumption is that unlike in same developed countries,
suburbanization does not entail a reduction in the Pilot Plan central
employment. Suburbanization is mainly residential and the satellite
cities are actually dormitory cities for the vast majority of low and
lower middle classes. In order to give a dimension to these processes,
we have calculated an index to measure the relationship between the
metropolitan population, the jobs located in the metropolitan area,
the population of the Pilot Plan, and the jobs located in the Pilot
Plan. If the jobs-to-population ratio is the same in the central city
as in its satellite cities, the index will display a value unity. (87)
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Values greater than unity indicate that metropolitan jobs are higher
concentrated in the central city than in the whole metropolitan area.
Values of less than unity indicate the converse. In Table XVII we
present these indexes for Brasilia. It is clear that all indices
show a strong concentration of jobs in the Pilot Plan. Therefore, the
population is growing in all the satellite cities faster than our em-
ployment. Moreover, this gap tends to grow since the fastest growing
unskilled employment is in services and civil construction and these
activities are heavily concentrated in the central area. Therefore,
the suburbanization of the labor force reduces the potential campeti-
tion for vacancies physically located in the Pilot Plan. While in
"old cities" a large portion of the middle and lower strata campete
for jobs located in the central area by living there in Brasilia, the
absence of unskilled workers living in the pilot plan results in
easier access to services employment for the local white collar resi-
dents. Therefore, the growth of central jobs as the unique source of
employment and the strategic position of the white collar central
neighborhoods, gives to the middle and upper middle classes an
increasing social and econcmic advantage. These jobs dynamics show
that there are more centralized jobs than centrally located workers
with the extra jobs going to ccrmuters from the satellite cities. For
the total Pilot Plan population, 205,033 inhabitants, the number of
local jobs is 57,666 whereas for the remaining metropolitan area,
with a population of 500,177, the extra jobs inside the Pilot Plan
are 45,078. Table XIX displays these data. We have in the case of
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TABLE XIX
BRASILIA: HOUSEHOLDS WORKING PLACE--SPATIAL PATTERNS (FEDERAL DISTRICT)
Total Employ-
Local ment/
Employ- 100
ment Active
Habi-
tants
(B) (C)
16.931
5.165
4.389
2.587
5.173
.725
52.7%
30.9%
47.1%
50.1%
132.6%
34.5%*
22.028 4.648 21.1%
.655 40.9%
Total
Local
House-
holds
Working
in the
Locale
(D)
14.438
4.715
3.770
2.427
1.598
.608
Total
Working
Outside
Locale
(E)
17.890
11.884
5.606
2.567
2.325
1.552
4.507 17.521
.320 1.362
Total
Persons
Wor'king
on Pilot
Plan
Pilot
Plan
"Pull"
Other
Locali-
ties
"Pull"
Local
Work-
Force
Absorp-
ti on
(F(F) E
14.927
9.939
5.010
1.674
1.654
.925
83.4%
83.6%
29.3%
65.2%
71.1%
59.6%
2.6%
7.7%
3.1%
14.1%
7.2%
28.0%
44.6%
28.4%
40.2%
48.5%
40.7%
28.1%
12.781 72.9% 15.6% 20.4%
1.122 82.3% 11.7% 19.0%
TOTAL
* Immigration Employment
Source: I.C. Barboza and A.
60.707 48.032
Paviani, Commuting in
Brazilian Federal District, 1972.
Key: TAG.
GAMA
SOB.
PLA.
NB
BRA.
GRA. INV .=
Taguatinga
Gama
Sobradinho
Planaltina
Nucleo Bandelrante
Brazilandia
Grandes,.. Invasoes
(Squatter Settlements)
LOC.MON. = Localidades, Mans6es
(Provisional Localities)
House-
hold
Loca-
tions
H
1%0
C0
Total
Local
Activi-
ties
House-
holds
(A)=(D)
+ (E)
32.328
16.599
9.376
4.994
3.923
2.180
TAG.
GAMA
SOB.
PLA.
NB
BRA.
GRA*
INV.
LOC.
MON:. 1.682
Brasilia, the extreme case of disequilibrium between the jobs dynamics
in the central vis-a-vis the metropolitan area. The best job oppor-
tunities in the central city are correlated with easy accessibility for
the white collar workers. Jobs are caming to be highly centralized for
all strata, while locational residential patterns only ensure easy
accessibility for the upper strata. Either highly skilled or low skilled
jobs and governmental jobs are created in the central city. Jobs in
the satellite cities are only correlated with local services and
destined to attend to the local demand for basic activities such as
foodstuffs or personal services. In Table XX we present some data in
order to understand the nature of these local jobs. Local, suburban
job absorption is given as a percentage for three different activities
such as housing appliances, health care and basic foodstuffs. Only
this last category presents a significant local jobs absorption. The
poorer the satellite city, the less the absorption of local activities
and the more heavily the local work force depends on the central city's
employment opportunities. In Table XIX we have mapped these relatives,
"occupational pull" we have characterized as the percentage between
the total number of jobs created in the central area and the total
number of people working outside their satellite city. This data is
disaggregated by different satellite cities. The pilot plan pull
is intense for all satellite cities. Even for Brazlandia, distant
fram the central area same 57 km and at 100 minutes travel time,
the pull is 59.6%. Local absorption is more relevant only for cities
such as Planaltina, whose historical existence is older than the
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TABLE XX
BRASILIA: LOCAL ACTIVITIES ABSORBTION (IN PERCENTAGES)
Localities
Taguatinga
Gama
Sobradinho
Planaltina
N. Bandeirante
Brazlandia
Absorbtion for
Housing Appliances
65.1%
31.8%
33.0%
25.0%
20.4%
0.0%
Absorbtion for
Health Care
(Physician)
73.1%
86.5%
60.9%
55.6%
17.2%
53.6%
Absorption for
Basic Foodstuffs
91.1%
91.6%
77.7%
88.9%
92.3%
85.7%
Source: Survey on the Mobility of D.F. Population
Brasilia University--Department of Geosciences
1.0
Brazilia' s settlement. Local work force absorption is positively cor-
related with distance fro the central city. This is due to the
"capture" of activities excluded fro the pilot plan area by their
intrinsic "informality", such as public "street markets" and all
the informal sector' s activities. Activities such as grocery stores
physically attached to the residence of the owner, the cammerce of
basic foodstuffs for the local population at lower prices than the
Pilot Plan, attract to satellite cities not only the upper and middle
classes fro other areas. Other activities such as informal repair
shops, automobile repairs, and same branches of building materials
increases local employment in same satellite cities. Due to the local
prevailing low prices and proximity fram the main center, it's
also cammon for people frm the other cities to shop during the weekend
in nearby satellite cities. The most important example in which
proximity of the central area allows the local econamy to grow and
to create jobs is the satellite city of Nucleo Bandeirante, which is
the only city besides the central area, with excess jobs over local
workforce population. The number of local jobs exceeds the local
workforce population due to the proximity of the central area (Pilot
Plan). In Figures 6 and 7, we have drawn the metropolitan hourly
population profiles for each different satellite city. (82) Only
Necleo Bandeirante shows a positive profile during the daily working
hours. For the remaining satellite cities, the characteristic peak
hours show the percentage of the local population traveling outside
for other employment areas. Returning to Table XIX, we can see the
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weakness of the other localities' pull if campared with the Pilot Plan.
Therefore, the bulk of cammuting is correlated with Pilot Plan employment
opportunities. In Figure 8, we show the intensity and the direction of
these different daily cammuting flows toward central job opportunities. (83)
4.2 The Job Distribution in the Metropolitan Area
Table XIX shows the nature and intensity of the job concentration.
While the satellite cities share 70% of the metropolitan population,
they account for only 42% of the employment opportunities. Fram a total
177,931 employees in the metropolitan area, 52% (102,744) of the
workforce works in the Pilot Plan. The Pilot Plan accounts for almost
50% of the total industrial employment, more than 50% of the cammercial
jobs, and respectively 50% of the transportation and storage, 60% of
the social activities, and 80% of the public employment. From the
total population working outside their residential localities, 79.1%
of the workers have their jobs located in the Pilot Plan. If we consider
now the urban employment as the percentage of employment located in
dense urban central areas, we will have the following comparative data:
in the city of Paris, the central area (arrondissements 1,2,3 and 4)
accounts for 559 ha. An equivalent central area of Rio de Janeiro
(Zones 1 and 2 of the new subway system) has 439 ha. However, while
in the Paris area jobs concentration is 7.6% of the total metropolitan
region, in Rio this figure is 23%. While Paris region presents a
540 employment per ha, and Rio a 961, (84) Brasilia's Pilot Plan
concentrates 52% of the total employment in an area of only 20 ha.
However, while concentrating on more than half the metropolitan
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employment, the internal job density of the Pilot Plan is very weak,
if we consider the Pilot Plan population divided by the number of local
jobs. This results from the nature of the construction employment
spatially spread throughout the whole pilot plan area by different
neighborhoods and in geographically hcmogeneous zoning system for
activities adopted in the master plan. As a result, Pilot Plan' s inter-
nal accessibility of employment allows for easy access for the upper and
middle class at any point of the Pilot Plan job market, while metropol-
itan employment is highly centralized and heavily dependent on inter-
urban public transportation for the working class.
These social appropriation of ccmuting time by the upper strata
results in increasing hamogenization of high land and real estate values
in the Pilot Plan. These higher prices indicate the social advantages
of living in the Pilot Plan where c ommitingtime by private automobile
toward any point of the Pilot Plan rarely exceeds ten minutes. There-
fore upper and middle upper class public employees can afford extra
tine at night to attend special college courses in order to earn a
degree and enhance their beauracratic careers.
4.3 The Future Distribution of Jobs
According to official forecast, Brasilia will suffer significant
econamic and functional job changes in the next ten years. (85) The
main problem can be located in the structural change in civil con-
struction employment patterns, actually employing 40,000 workers, or
20% of the active working population. Therefore same 200,000 inhabi-
tants rely directly or indirectly on this sector. Several forecasts
198
show the future decreasing role of the civil construction sector, since
the task of building the main urban structures is ending. Some data
forecast for this sector an employment level of 5.4% (21,000 workers)
in 1983, assuming the same actual technology and the sector' s produc-
tivity. These numbers correspond roughly to the same level observed
in other cities like Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Table XXI shows the
estimates for the absorption of jobs through the civil construction
sector as a function of the quantity of residential and non residential
space-floor construction projected. Now if we campare this data against
the general occupational job structure in order to evaluate the
impact of these changes on the metropolitan job structure, we have the
following data:
1. Services; 24% of the total employment and defined as:
Foodstuffs, personal hygiene, repairs and maintenance of
vehicles and machines, leisure, radio, newspapers and
TV, waged danestic services, building maintenance , and
apparel and clothing maintenance.
2. Public Administration; 19% of the total employment and
defined as: Federal and local administration, legislative
branch, and military and security forces.
3. Civil Construction; 17% of the total employment.
4. Social Services; 11% of the total employment and defined
as: Public and private education, medical care, mainten-
ance of public gardens and landscape, garbage collection,
social welfare, cultural institutions, religious activi-
ties, representative unions, and class associations.
5. Commercial Goods; 10% of the total employment.
6. Transportation and storage; 5% of the total employment
7. Industries; 5% of the total employment.
In Table XXII we show the evolution of these sectors since
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TABLE XXI
BRASILIA: CIVIL CONSTRUCTION SECTOR:
MANPOWER DEMAND FORECAST
1974-1983
Residential Floor Space Non-Resident'al Floor Space
Demand (in 1.000 m2) Demand (in m )
864
864
840
800
780
720
680
620
540
440
1.296
12.96
1.260
1.200
1.170
1.080
1.020
.930
.810
.660
Total Manpower
(in m2) Demand
2.160
2.160
2.100
2.000
1.950
1.800
1.700
1.550
1.350
1.100
40.632
40.632
40.160
38.246
37.290
34.421-
32.509
29.641
25.816
21.037
Source: Codeplan 1974.
0
Q
Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
TABLE XXII
BRASILIA: OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OBSERVED AND PROJECTED
1972-1983*
MANPOWER DEMAND
Sectors 1972 1983 Change
# of workers % # of workers % # of workers %
GROUP 1 38.709 16.45 21.037 5.40 -17.672 -11.05
Civil Construction 38.709 16.45 21.037 5.40 -17.672 -11.05
GROUP 2 142.089 60.37 278.425 71.42 136.336 +11.05
Agriculture 6.726 2.86 11.804 3.03 5.078 + 0.17
Industry 10.870 4.62 23.391 6.00 12.521 + 1.38
Commerce of Goods 24.112 10.25 47.757 12.25 23.645 + 2.00
Services 56.495 23.99 105.260 27.00 48.765 - + 3.01
Public Administration 43.886 18.65 90.213 23.14 46.327 + 4.49
GROUP 3 54.552 23.18 90.368 23.18 35.816 -----
Mineral Production .188 0.08 .312 0.08 .124
Public Utilities 2.357 1.00 3.898 1.00 1.541, -----
Transp. Storage 11.311 4.81 18.752 4.81 7.441 -----
Liberal Prossess-
ionals 2.482 1.21 4.717 1.21 1.875 -----
Social Services 26.172 11.12 43.352 11.12 17.180 -----
Others 11.682 4.95 19.337 4.96 7.655 -----
TOTAL 235.350 100.00 389.830 100.00 154.480
Codeplan Estimates
Source: Codeplan
1972, and the projections for the next ten years. Comparing the
past, present and the projected structural employment patterns, we
can draw the following important conclusions:
- The agricultural activities will suffer a non significant
increment. (0.17%)
- The industrial sector, excluding civil construction, will
raise some 2%, particularly by the development of industries such as
food industries (final processing), printing sector, apparel industry,
and furniture industry. All these are light industries working for
the local market and receiving raw material shipments from other
highly industrialized regions of the country.
- The conmerce of goods is expected to increase a fair 2% during
the period considered
- The Public Administration sector is expected to grow more than
4%
- The Civil Construction sector is expected to decrease their
relative participation to 5% from 16% or almost two thirds of its
relative share in the local econamy.
- Therefore the set of activities labeled as Services concen-
trates the main potential of economic growth in the urban economy.
The category includes services such as we have described and the
expected growth is in the neighborhood of 3%.
Activities listed in Group Two, (Table XXII)are expected to
increase their share in the economy while activities listed in
Group Three, will maintain their actual share and the civil construc-
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tion sector will steadily decrease their role in absorbing human
resources. As a result the future economic structure will depend
basically on a sort of terciary based economy.
The implications of these projections shows clearly that the
overall tendency for job concentration in the Pilot Plan is irrever-
sible and intense for the near future, since significant new job in-
creases are expected to occur exactly in those categories which show
intense locational preference for centralization in the Pilot Plan.
This is true for the apparel industry, printing, transport and
utilities, wholesale and retail trade, finance insurance and real
estate, personal business and government. For these activities,
Lewis (86) has found for developed countries ratios well above the
unity and a significant pattern of growth between 1953 and 1965. Our
indices for Brasilia show numbers well above two for all these
activities. It is clear that the overall tendency for job concentration
in the Pilot Plan area will be reinforced in Brasilia, because of the
economic nature of the newly projected activities which implies a
greater centralization of the future Metropolitan jobs. Moreover, the
nature of these service-related jobs is such that the demand will be
significantly greater for skilled than for unskilled jobs. This
growth of excess supply of central city jobs for all the occupations
except civil construction, can only be slightly opposed by same new
jobs in retail sales and services, as their activities closely follow
the population movements in the satellite cities. However, the
intensity of growth for these jobs cannot offset the overall
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tendency for concentrated intense job growing in the central
area.
4.4 New Alternative Urban Policies
Considering these employment projections and the new
economic trends for the metropolitan area a synthesis of
new planning alternatives and guidelines for urban and
metropolitan policies can be summarized as follows:
A. Maintenance of the actual policies encouraging
segregation of activities and continuous division
of the metropolitan area between central employ-
ment and suburbanization of residential areas,
mainly working class and lower middle strata. In
this perspective the redistribution of new activi-
ties will reinforce central employment encouraging
at the same time sub-divisions of the housing
sector through the creation of new staellite groups
of cities, either for the upper strata or for
the working class.
B. Absorption of the new employment in the central
city by creating additional cheap supplies of
space for these new activities; but, at the same
time , by accepting continuously programmed resi-
dential locations in the Pilot Plan related with
job distribution, therefore decreasing the rela-
tive intensity of the satellite growith, in the
direction of annew metropolitanism."
We will comment first on the policies dealing with the
first strategy and after that we will develop arguments
regarding the second alternative, in the direction of a
"new metropolitanism".
As for the first strategy, several times in this thesis
we have suggested that the forced residential decentralization
of the unskilled workforce in the satellite cities vis-a-vis
the growing central employment pattern is an abnormal
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manifestation of urban growth with several intrinsically
socio-economic pathological implications.
Moreover we have argued that the urban pattern,consist-
ing of dispersing concentration of poverty throughout
satellite cities which are increasingly less able to support
themselves or to invest in their own local economy because
they depend upon the central area for employment,has been
described as a partial and discretionary metropolitan policy.
Meanwhile, all of the basic official proposals for
the "development" of the central city in the next ten years
concerns proposals for increasing decentralization and
new expansions. These proposals assume a "land shortage"
in the central city, and that the satellite cities must
be again "decentralized" because they have reached "target"
populations.(47) For the development of the central city,
the strategies in study propose a new set of neighborhood
unities for white collar workers, distanced some 10 km from
the Pilot Plan area in a new site between the Pilot Plan
and the satellite city of Sobradinho. For the working
class, there are six new urban areas considered under a
feasibility study! All these areas are further distant
from the actual satellite cities. (87) Therefore, these
proposals insist on and increases the segmented process of
urban growth we have criticized.
The basic official assumption regarding the central
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city development is the "shortage of land" for feasible
development. However, while new areas are studied and new
resources have to be allocated for their urbanization, only
60% of the Pilot Plan has already been built. The amount
of developed land suitable for construction inside the
official plan is today ordered to allow the construction of
24,000 new residential units, or more, if that is
necessary for a population of 100,000 inhabitants. However,
some of these lots are either in the hands of private
developers or in the possession of para-governmental
institutions, such as the Brasilia University. Only these
governmentalinstitutions have reserved urban land which is
enough for the necessities of a new population of 33,000
inhabitants. Therefore, Brasilia follows the traditional
pattern of external expansion, while leaving vacant land in
an internal estimate rate of 40 to 50% of the total developed
urban space. While in developing countries, the per capita
volume of vacant land decreases at an increasing rate with
the increase in population, the absence of institutional
taxation on this land in underdeveloped countries increases
the anti-social uses of the vacant land. For example, in
the city of Belo Horizonte, for a built area of 6,700 ha,
the total number of approved new lots was in the neighborhood
of 5.700 ha. Vacant areas for one neighborhood of the city
of Rio de Janeiro were found to be 40.67%(88) Regarding the
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adjacent area of the Pilot Plan, there are enough vacant
areas for building in any future development. However,
these areas are still considered officially unusable for
future development since the city is considered as pro-
tected by the "qreen belt" against future "land speculation".
Only this argument constitutes the ethical base for
preventing any future development. If horizontal develop-
ment is prevented by ethical and aesthetical considerations,
vertical development is more underutilized. The principle
of "building visual hierarchies", states that the height
of the different buildings has to be related to the height
of the official and significant official buildings. Any
imaginative plan to introduce changes in the six story flat
residential buildings is prevented through a rigid zoning
system. The "rational" character of the zoning and building
codes was intended to maintain the basic layout of the city.
Requests for variations are requested and denied, even in
the case of minor variations. There has not been a review
or update of the master plan until now, when the author
Costa retired. Any attempt to change the basic pattern was
considered as a direct menace to the symbolism and formal
aesthetic of the city. The lowest density residential zones
in the Pilot Plan continue to correspond to the row houses
and walk up apartments economically accessible only to the
middle class. The highest density residential zones corres-
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pond to six story buildings with a density of 300 inhabi-
tants per hectare. These two areas alone account for the
total availability of residential space inside the Pilot
Plan. Other areas surrounding the lake, supply the demand
for single family houses for the upper middle class. These
areas have experienced a contradictory development; while
more than double the number of actual urban units can be
built in these areas, high building standards (unifamiliar
suburban American type houses) have limited the building of
low or moderately low income dwellings, thus maintaining
the housing supply reserved only for the first "suburban
decentralization" of the upper strata. In the code ordin-
ances, there is no provision for the developer's initiative
to build a more complex set of buildings for mixed units
and higher densities, as for example cluster of units of
multi-family housing. The zoning system with its main
focus on uniformity and aesthetical homogeneity, didn't
take into account modern instruments, as the beneficial
social and economic impacts on the school or business
budgets, for instance, by the way of development of inter-
mixed neighborhoods. Under the provisions of the code, no
exception can be made on order to allow the architects and
the private sector to take economic advantage of projects
with scale economy "built in". The code called for
uniform either six or for floor buildings, even today,
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when advanced construction technique can provide for new
intensive and economical use of space. Mixed uses of
projects including apartments, offices, and combined shops
are prevented by the rigid zoning system. However, we
argue that all the areas under the right of way of the
government owned network of large avenues, can be developed
at free land costs. Following these tendencies, there are
some projects developed by the students of the School of
Architecture using, for example, the elevated structures
crossing over these road spaces. (89) These elevated facil-
ities would effectively double the supply of buildable
space in the central area, not only for housing development,
but also for local light industry and service zones. The
government could specifically authorize the lease of these
areas as "air-rights" and provide for federal grants for
the development of socially necessary facilities. Redevel-
opment is also feasible by below the ground rights, for
the construction of underground facilities in "aesthetically
sensitive" areas. As all of this land is under government
ownership, the administration has more than enough institu-
tional instruments for controlling land speculation or at
least inducing socially controlled growth in the Pilot Plan.
These new and economically creative forms of molding social
activity could provide the existing central system with the
flexibility of replacing rigid spatial planning necessary
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for those new activities. Therefore, one of the principal
urban problems, adaptability, could be introduced. These
innovations are the main issue to deal with since as we
will show above, the metropolitan region is about to change
to new significant central economic activities. This
development could be intended to retain new residential as
well as manufacture activities - within the central city
in a move intended to reduce the rate of growth of the
satellite cities by inducing diversity and variety in the
central area. The unexpected availability of urban space
such as we have pointed out,could discover additional
quantities of space for renewal of uses, particularly by
downgrading conversion on those areas displaced by new and
better economic uses. The beginnings of a differential
housing submarket inside the central city, would be
socially satisfactory, if these areas could be chosen and
transformed by changing their elitist building codes.
Fixed zone codes have made it difficult for Brasilia to
experiment with middle low income housing, even in a
limited way. Insisting on ideally high physical standards
and rigid zoning codes only prevent the development of new
economic activities in the central areas. Forbidding
mixed commercial and residential uses, the codes had only
spatially displaced feasible economic possibilities
from the central city for unplanned satellite areas.
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Our conclusion is that, facing these facts, any new
more "balanced" growth has to deal with the question posed
by the second argument:
The reconciliation of two seemingly contradictory
aspects of the Brasilia growth - the contradiction between
the center and the periphery. If the process now shows an
inherent irreversibility, this does not follow that the
degree of divergence cannot be reduced through a compre-
hensive policy aiming at reducing the central city periphery's
contradictions. The main issue for the formulation of any
democratic metropolitan policy, must consider first that
the qualitative growth induced in the central area and
molded through official policies designed to cope with
different political strategic alternatives will induce
consequent impacts on the metropolitan area. Since public
investment and the public control of the Pilot Plan area
is the main factor in molding new metropolitan urban
patterns, we will argue that the central government has
the institutional power to channel new forms for the
organization for the Pilot Plan, and as a dialectical
consequence for the whole metropolitan area. Economic and
institutional resources must be used by the government in
the direction of a "new metropolitanism". Since until now
effective governmental control of the metropolitan region
was increasingly concerned only with the "distribution"
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of some "Pilot Plan problems" throughout the metropolitan
area, official policy makers have forgotten that interde-
pendence of economic activities across jurisdictional lines,
always induce negative externalities on the whole system.
Moreover, when these districts are so spatially segregated
that the creation of a given local activity hardly can
benefit neighboring communities. Therefore, where such
external diseconomies are present, public goods and services
will be underproduced. As a result, in order to avoid
negative externalities in the central city, the net result
of the intense segregational process was the total loss of
the benefits generated through positive spillover effects in
all the metropolitan area. The final burden always got
transferred to the central government in order to provide
for services necessary in each and all the metropolitan
communities. (90) Moreover , the weak economic base of the
low density satellite communities, prevented more efficient
resource allocation from answering the local demand for
basic public services and goods. The desire to create
economies of scale is prevented not only by the strong
sub-division of the satellite cities, but by the impos-
sibility of specializing each one of these unities for
the production of different goods and to begin an inter
urban exchange process in order to increase the internal
economic viability, since each of these satellite unities
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continues to perform colateral functions of dormitory cities
vis-a-vis the central area employment monopoly. While the
estimation of the public infrastructure costs is a complex
problem, some estimations of the scale of urban production
can be made in order to compare the inherent economic
dificulties of the Brasilia's metropolitan area. In Table
XXIII we have described the historical evolution of the
population densities in the metropolitan area of Brasilia.
Using the urbanization costs proposed by Urdaneta for
Venezuela we can see that all the satellite cities show a
pattern for urban development in high costs per habitant.
Only Nucleo Banderante has a relatively economical popu-
lation density, and therefore better urbanization economies.
We have shown before how this city is a unique example of
job availability for the local residents. Therefore, we
will discuss some guidelines to reinforce the economic
feasibility of the metropolitan area through alternative
policies aiming to restructure the metropolitan population
in such a way as to affect positively the Pilot Plan area
as well as the satellite cities in a context of a more
balanced pattern of growth.
4.5 The Economic Feasibility for a New Metropolitanism
In the following section, we will try to indicate the
most important set of factors in the constitution of the
metropolitan area of Brazilia in order to present some
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TABLE XXIII
BRASILIA: POPULATION DENSITIES AND URBANIZATION COSTS
1970-HAB HAB/km2
236.477
24.392
11.133
75.947
109.584
11.521
42.782
21.932
538.351
272.002
1181.20
2974.63
7422.00
151.98
250.36
27.14
77.50
22.43
93.29
268.35
HAB/Ha
11.81
29.74
74.22
15.19
25.03
2.71
7.75
2.24
9.32
26.83
1973-HAB HAB/km 2
205.033
33.896
13.141
101.839
288.611
15.818
57.171
31 .561
753.247
252.070
1024.14
4133.56
8760.66
203.68
659.38
37.26
103.57
32.28
138.52
248.69
HAB/HA Urbaniza-
tion Costs
in US $ per
HAB
10.24
41.33
87.60
2.03
6.59
0.37
1.03
0.32
1.38
2.48
> 500.00
> 350.00
> 250.00
> 900.00
> 700.00
>1000.00
> 950.00
>1000.00
> 900.00
> 850.00
Sources: Fibge 1970, Estimates 1973
* Based on figures given by: Alberto Urdaneta in "Costo de Urbazacion", 1971
Key: NB = Nucleo Bandelrante
TAG. = Taguatinga
BRA. = Brazlandia
SOB. = Sobradinho
PLA. = Planaltina
FD, = Faderal District
Localities
N)
'-A
uI~.
Pilot Plan
Guara
NB
Gama
TAG.
BRA.
SOB.
PLA.
FD
Brasilia
guidelines for a more progressive metropolitan policy.
Our main assumption is that the actual economic distribution
of the metropolitan area in separate satellite jurisdictions
increases land values, creates and stimulates divergences
in the quality of public output between the Pilot Plan and
the satellite cities, increases the income regressivity and
permits inefficiencies in the use of economic and social
resources. The first theoretical assumption regarding
locational patterns in the Brasilia metropolitan area stems
from our former assumptions that locational constraints
are different from the Pilot Plan and for the satellite
cities. Central location has a more dense use and is
more accessible than the satellite locations. Moreover
jobs, business, culture and the whole set of recreational
activities are diproportionally concentrated in the Pilot
Plan. Therefore, the degree of substitutibility of
suburban and central locations is a function of: (92)
- Price differences between central and peripheral
locations
- Preferences for different land use patterns
- The spatial distribution of employment sources
defined in terms of relative accessibility in
each one destination
- Advantages and disadvantages of being beneficiaries
by the local government policies regarding monetary
and non-monetary "gifts".
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have shown that location in the Pilot Plan has concen-
trated all these advantages:
-Central location is favored by better environmental
and density standards
-Central location has greater accessibility not only
in the direction of employment but for any other
interurban activities
These advantages can be analyzed under two general
categories such as land use density and the effect of
jurisdicitonal separateness in order to better evaluate
our statements:
1. Land use density: The Pilot Plan has a double
standard tor land density used for the preference
system of the upper and upper middle class. As
very low densities run against the relatively
high price of land and transportation facilities,
in the developing countries, collective neighbor-
hood facilities respond more efficiently to the
demands for relative privacy - better than expensive
horizontal lots. In Br-zilia, for the upper middle--
class, and middle class both possiblities are
open by the single family resideintial lots added
to the original pilot plan neighborhoods and sur-
rounding all the periphery of the central city,
around the city's lake. The price of this social
privacy is the cost of the relative increase of
accessibility for the remaining social strata
located in the satellite cities. As in general,
higher income households will find net advantages
greater than the lower income households. It
follows that high land costs and very low accessi-
bility costs in the central city offset the overall
costs of low suburban land and high travel costs
for the majority of the metropolitan population.
This general regressive locational pattern, as we
have shown, is enforced by the zoning system of
the Pilot Plan area. For the lower classes' lot
demand, the unique locational choice now is in
the satellite cities.
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2. Advantages of the segregational spatial allocations.
As a result, by establishing themselves in the
Pilot Plan, the upper strata has to pay or earn
for the following locational consequences:
-Interjurisdictional spillover effects. Because
of the centralization of jobs in the central area,
the presence of lower income strata in the central
city is related only with the daily work journey.
Therefore, Pilot Plan inhabitants must bear the
cost of another's use of private services. However,
the suburban outsider is exactly penalized or near
the real cost in using central city facilities since
all their potentially significant economic pressure
in the Pilot Plan urban infrastructures was
"transfered" to the local satellite cities juris-
dictions. As a result the cost for the central
government in providing the extra costs necessary
to absorb the presence of "outsiders" in the
central city is limited by a minimum (such as:
daily transportation, some minor social services,
etc.) At the suburban level the costs of local
urban expenditures is borne by the local populations
since in the cross use of public facilities there
are also minimum items of expenditures due to
suburban use by Pilot Plan residents. The resulting
pattern is that the satellite cities rate tax is
increased not only by the interjurisdictional
spillover effects as an important item, but by the
loss of the welfare charge formerly paid by the
Pilot Plan residents. The Pilot Plan residents'
tax rate will not exceed that of the suburbanites,
and the advantages of the central city location
will increase with income homogeneity, as the
amount of advantages is a rising function of the
mean income level.(93)
3. Income distribution and spatial location. For
the Pilot Plan the Master Plan standards allow a
continuous income homogeneity of households having
incomes much higher than the whole metropolitan
area mean. The populational disparity between
the metropolitan area (80%) and the central area
(20%) is not enough to offset the absolute amount
of tax collected in the different jurisdictions.
Therefore, the same total public expense in any
and all different intermetropolitan jurisdictions
would result in a lower tax rate in the richer
community than in the poorer.
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As a result, prices of public services will be
relatively lower in the Pilot Plan than in the
satellite towns. Public goods in the central
area will experience a lower price due to a
larger public demand reflecting high income levels
and the high environmental qualities stated and
enforced through the Master Plan standards.
Therefore, institutional segregation resulted in
a higher level of public goods provision for the
social strata richer than the average and "segre-
gated" in the Pilot Plan area.
4. "Erradication" policies and the burden of social
welfare. The welfare expenditures are greater
in proportion to the number of welfare clients in
each different income area. Therefore, the
satellite cities by including the absolute majority
of welfare recipients will absorb higher absolute
levels of public goods the larger the percentage
of lower class welfare recipients contained in the
local jurisdictions. The example of the Social
Security squatters settlement highlights this point:
Those inhabitants, actually, induced a stronger
welfare charge in the Pilot Plan services and an
overall expenditure for the Pilot Plan administration.
With the remaining recipients spread throughout
the satellite cities, the overall burden was
divided amongst different metropolitan jurisdictions.
As a result of these overall advantages, central
city location increases income regressivity since
the advantages of the central city locations
are actually reserved for the upper income strata
due to these institutional constraints. The poor
suffer increasingly economic losses since income
selectivity is maintained through the barriers of
"physical regulations".
The most important result of this process and the
reason why the poor fail to gain from Brasilia's
metropolitan locational process is due to the fact
that the whole central area was placed "outside" the
normal market forces in such a way that normal market
mechanisms can only operate outside the Pilot Plan.
However, as the Pilot Plan commands the metropolitan price
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formation, higher inner standards result in higher
price patterns for the whole region without any significant
response in order to equilibrate the process. The impact
of the central area policies has on other jurisdictions
cannot be balanced either by the economic relocation of the
economic activities or by their consequent reciprocal
impact in the central area. With an initial policy of
economic values, the central city set a given urban
policy aiming to a potential gain for their population.
In a "normal" metropolitan area, prospective gainers can
move toward the central area therby determining a relative
response value not only for the population on in the
central city, but for the metropolitan area as a whole.
This process will change population income composition
and new marginal locations are determined. The size and
the nature of the gains from the different jurisdictions
together with income differences determine new price levels
of public goods facing each jurisdiction. These new price
levels and the relative mean income composition determine
the level and the relative quality of the public goods in
such a way that changes in the populational components
are matched with the relative scarcity of the public sector
supply. The pressure for a new equilibrium can be exerted
upon the local public sector, or result in new migrational
intra-metropolitan adjustments. Therefore, different public
outputs levels are a cause as well as an effect of
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locational decisions and the metropolitan
area can be considered a dynamic system as a whole since
households will be making locational decisions on the basis
of a given present set of output differences, and these
very decisions will change the output differences to provoke
new future sets of unsatisfied adjustment. Relative
equilibrium in the central city market means relative
corresponding equilibrium in the satellite cities' markets,
since the different jurisdictions are competing for the
same metropolitan population. Therefore we have to
investigate the general conditions leading toward a
relative equilibrium in the metropolitan area to evaluate
in what extent effective new policies can be introduced
in the central city as well as in the satellite cities
in order to promote the best progressive income distribu-
tions throughout the metropolitan area. (94 At the same
time, this process will identify what important "institu-
tional barriers" has to be modified in order to achieve
redistributional goals.
As we are shown Brasilia is increasingly developed
for richer households. Initial locational advantages for
the lower strata were "tolerated" in the populist govern-
ment and finally prevented by different new policies.
Since the advantages of the Pilot Plan are larger, richer
households have more to gain by living there. Therefore,
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the low income suburban population is becoming larger and
larger. Let us now consider the conditions for a "new
equilibrium" in a metropolitan area in which restrictive
elitist use standards are reduced, in order to compare
the results with the case of Brasilia. Theoretically,
(95)populational equilibrium in a metropolitan region
occurs at a certain populational distribution and is a
function of the net gain from moving from one city to
another, experienced by a prospective migrant. The two
main types of prospective gain are land density gains and
different jurisdictional benefits. Land benefits result
from living in an area where land density provides better
environment than the ordinary cities for the upper strata.
These requirements decrease with income until that of the
consumption of a single lot necessary to physically support
a lower income single house.
If the jurisdiction imposed restrictive zoning and higher
minimum use standards, locational choice is constrained
for the families with limited budgets and the resultant
locational pattern is less satisfactory, than what would
have been chosen given only its own tastes and "relative
face" market prices.These elements are a function of a
second set of interrelated choices including the utility
significance of the value of privacy for each income
level, the cost of accessibility and the constraint upon
lot size. At a theoretical equilibrium,(96) these two sets
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of functions neutralize the economic gains through which
the migration and population levels are determined.
Therefore urban migrational processes are a direct
"1measure"7) of the relative unbalance of these two sets
of values. Some of the properties of this new spatial and
populational re-equilibrium can be summarized:
- If the price and the quality level of public
goods is less in one jurisdiction as well as
a smaller proportion of welfare, they are gen-
erally correlated with higher income and the
imposition of external diseconomies from one
jurisdiction to another. At this point, the
potential mover finds that the comparative costs
and their relative income allows for the
migration. As others join the process, the
marginal mover finds that the costs of the
new community exceed the attractions of
better privacy standards, partly because the
population is now large enough so that the
former advantages are offset. Moreover, the
migrational process has caused a relatively
significant fall in his former local rentals,
and the accessibility is now worse due to the
new transportation expenditures meaning that
the former cheap land minimum lot expenditures
represent now a significant cost. As a result,
the extention of the metropolitan development
urban frontier has proceeded to the point where
the cost of the additional urban migration
imposes costs on the marginal mover just great
enough to reduce the migration gains of the
marginal mover to zero. Therefore, equilibrium
results from different demographic differences,
in the provision of public goods, differences in
income, differences in land price, and differ-
ences in accessibility, in the context of a
relatively free set of economic and social
urban choices.
To what extent can we identify those factors and
large institutional constraints distorting in a high degree
locational equilibrium in the case of Brasilia?
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The difficulty in analyzing the metropolitan area of
Brasilia is that cross-jurisdictional migrational flows
as responses to different constraints excludes the
Pilot Plan. Only migration from the central city toward
other satellite jurisdictions is observed, because
migration to the Pilot Plan is "exogenous" to the system,
since only new upper middle class public employees
transfered from other states are now being resettled in the
Pilot Plan. As a result, high income homogeneity is
increasing in the Pilot Plan without any mechanism for
signaling in what extent the existing national income
distribution has been amplified by the resulting spatial
patterns of the Brazilia metropolitan area. Only the
sensibility of the central government can detect the
intensity of these inbalances affecting particularly the
lower strata. On the other hand, the continuous expendi-
tures in order to maintain the higher environmental and
aesthetical Pilot Plan's ambience reflected in the symbolism
of a Capital is likely to distort the fragile possibility
for a more balanced metropolitanism. The government has
enough power and institutional instruments to direct and
to some extent reduce some of these imbalances. Therefore
relative metropolitan equilibrium between different
populational levels is a result of a particular set of
values and policy instruments. Changes in these values
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and in the nature of each one of the institutional
policies can affect both the structure and the nature
of the metropolitan components. (98) We will now give
some guidelines for the kind of policies and the impact
each one is likely to have in Brasilia's metropolitan area
in order to promote progressive income distribution and
social integration.
- Changing metropolitan standards: The first
institutional barrier that can be changed is
the residential and commercial zoning regulation
in the Pilot Plan. These regulations specify
the minimum lot size(9 9 ) permissible for
Pilot Plan's residential areas and their main
characteristic as we have shown is the preference
for higher than average physical standards of
land use. Therefore, any official policy
lowering minimum lot requirements in the Pilot
Plan benefits the poor. The actual zoning is
only a bidding in the lower middle and the lower
income strata. The positive effect of these
proposed measures will be felt by the first
household willing to move to the satellite city
due to the continuous economic changes in the
central area. The greater the lowering of
these standards, the more intense the effects in
the migrational processes affecting transactions
within the whole metropolitan area. For households
with lower and lower incomes, the discrepancy will
be greater and greater since unconstrained lot
choice is a positive function of income. The effect
of these policies on the metropolitan area depends
on where the positive effects will first be felt
along the set of expenditures relative to each urban
actual position. Since actual tendencies show a
regressive income trend it's possible that the
first results point in the direction of preventing
the out-migration of the lower middle class from
the Pilot Plan toward satellite cities. For the
upper class the effects will be negligible since
a new permissive zoning system cannot create
significant losses in the privacy due to the
relative spatial segregation already existing in
the Pilot Plan neighborhoods. The net effect would be
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a decrease in the segregational levels by different
neighborhoods. The dynamics of the impact in the
change of lot size can be used in order to increase
the metropolitan populational balance since in-
migration is a direct function of the magnitude
of the standards adopted for the minimum lot.
Moreover, since the value of accessibility from the
satellite cities toward the Pilot Plan do not
change significantly the effect of the minimum
lot policies will be amplified. While the dividing
line is important to the final effect "on equilibrium",
political decisions can set an "admissible" ceiling
for the process. As a colateral policy, changes in
the regulation of business minimum requirements are
also necessary, since the range of business desires
in the central area are also limited by official
minimum built area ceilings. As a result of a
combined measure a proportion of new businesses
would like to locate in the central area following
new populational distributions. If the migration is
set relatively free as in some "old" metropolitan
areas increasingin-migration will increase land
prices and decrease the price differences between
jurisdictions. The result will be a lowering of the
net gain from moving in the metropolitan area in
the direction of the positive difference and there-
by lowering of the land density gains. As the
different jurisdictions use standards and building
codes raises as competitive policies tools house-
holds respond to these sets of policies by inter-
jurisdictional migration. Different quantities and
income qualities of resulting populations tend to
offset unbalances, reversing the induced tendencies.
As a result each jurisdiction will discover an
interior new optimum standard value. If intra-
urban migration found relative free channels
throughout the metropolitan area after a certain
period necessary to comprehend the changes induced
by new migrants each jurisdiction will arrive at a
public policy decision and will set new best values
for their local legislation standard levels.
This change will induce further reaction of functions
and a continuous compatibility with reality. What-
ever the starting position if the system has a
certain degree of freedom a "relative stable joint
equilibrium" can be achievedoffsetting significant
losses. The spatial and populational result will
be an interior equilibrium in the population
distribution since neither jurisdiction will attract
the whole population. Therefore not only standards
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values as well as all other interrelated policy
devices will achieve optimal new values as a result
of the simultaneous interactions. The relative
metropolitan stable equilibrium is obtained by a
continuous determination of all policy variables
at their resulting jointly maximum levels as a
result of a complex integrative process between
zoning and taxation instruments. The key issue
leading to this dynamic equilibrium is not the
efficiency levels of each local police in collect-
ing revenues but the institution of a metropolitan
process of decision making through which the dif-
ferent demands of different populations facing
different and alternative sets of institutional
policies in each and all satellite cities and
Pilot Plans can be weighed by a criteria of pro-
gressive redistributional intentions. The greater
the mobility as an answer to policy signals the
greater the range for new redistributional poli-
cies since the central government has all the
political and institutional power necessary to
induce different patterns of growth and spatial
distribution for the metropolitan area. Actual
trends show that as the continuous degree of
income inequality in Brasilia'smetropolitan area
is increasing, the greater are the Pilot Plan's
benefits. This process is aggravated by the
absence of free intra-metropolitan migrations that
further prevent institutional evaluations of
urban imbalances. In summary, the democratization
of the metropolitan economic and social adjust-
ments could be a direct function of the govern-
ment democratic willingness regarding social
justic in Brasilia's metropolitan area. Therefore,
the political and institutional feasibility for
these policy changes will be outlined in the next,
final section.
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4.6 The Political and Institutional Feasibility for
Metropolitan Change
The institutional feasibility for a change in
Brasilia's actual metropolitan policies must be considered
in the framework of the present Brazil's political regimes
and their historic perspectives. For an answer to some of
these questions on the institutional feasibility leading
toward significant progressive changes we have proposed
for Brasilia's urban policies, we have to assume some
preconditions. I will try to distinguish between
three types of macro-urban policies: First, the populist
model I have described as a controlled urban mobilization
of a population that by and large had not previously been
mobilized in cities and was thus reasonably contained
through a paternalistic process. The second type we have
described as the present Brasilian stage and characterized
by the deliberate "demobilization and containment" of the
urban population that had previously been mobilized in the
framework of a more competitive political situation. This
second position is a "defensive" one based on the fact that
the system did not possess or consider that it has the
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capacity to satisfy the demands created by the urban masses
within a controlled process of change. The third option is
the one in which the present political and economic regime
wants and can create a sort of restrictive mobilizational
political urban participation in order to assure a stable
rule over highly urbanized cities. We will explore some of
this third institutional hypothesis. The need for a new
urban policy has to be connected with the equivalent need
to provide a legitimacy formula for the institutional regime
in the future. The kind of urban society the new govern-
ments want to create cannot be institutionally molded by
negative policies such as the manipulation of the urban
masses in a broad process of "segregation or erradication."
These regressive policies can be derived only as institu-
tional devices in a transitional period mainly if these
policies are molded within the scenario of political emer-
gencies. However, this model can never satisfy those who
argue that economic development and urban policies cannot
remain in the realm of a confrontation of policies based
in social coersion. The trouble with the actual economic
and social policies consists in the fact, aggravated by the
regime's actual "negative" urban policies, that these
policies are inherently unable to generate the minimal
conditions necessary for the incorporation of the huge
migrant masses into urban patterns with levels of minimum
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acceptable participation in the urban decisions. Therefore,
the immediate result is the narrowing of the urban decision-
making process in direct detriment not only of the lower
strata but even in detriment to important sectors of the
middle class. Furthermore, by establishing a discretionary
urban decision making system which is unaccountable to the
majority of the urban masses and expresses only the views
of small technocratic circles the system works toward
increasing deterioration in the "urban fabric" and creates
all sorts of imbalances that as we have shown further
restrain the development of a more stable urban society.
As a result of the new political changes after the
Revolution of 1964 and the relative freedom from pressures
that might be brought by the marginalized masses, Brasilia's
urban policy makers have been free to pursue a "radical"
policy based on the market oriented high-consumption
central city against a background of satellite cities, where
the working class was hardly balanced by a local lower
middle class sector. This policy was easily enforced
because the government has repressed certain social sectors
such as labor and the rural masses, whose economic shares
have correspondingly fallen as a result of the relocational
policies. While several of Brasilia's local goverment has
had the will and the ability to impose these socially
progressive urban policies, we will argue that these poli-
cies are no longer either economic or politically necessary
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facing the new national economic realities. As we have
argued, Brasilia's urban policies were based on the poli-
tical and economic contradictions throughout the several
national political phases, and the city was highly sensitive
to different shifts among and within the classes due to the
different political models. Therefore, we will survey to
what extent changes in the economic rational model can
induce new more balanced urban growing patterns in the
central city and in the satellite cities in Brasilia's
metropolitan area, such as we have proposed above. New
economic policies like a relative change in the income
distribution will alter the spatial urban shape in favor of
a more differentiated and balanced growth. These distribu-
tional consequences cannot be ignored in evaluating the
forecasting of new urban tendencies. The social costs of
any urban policy or the urban policy based on restrictive
growth cannot be ignored, especially since the intensity of
the future growth will be greater than the actual. More-
over, the absence of formal politics and popular participa-
tion are not bound to impose a greater constraint on offi-
cial policies, as would be possible under a freer regime.
As a result, public policies are now made by an elite in
absence of a public debate, and thereby reduced to a level
of technical discussion virtually ruling out dispute over
basic goals such as have been commented on in this thesis
as the historical development of the satellitization process
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and the continuously segregated urban growth in Brasilia.
The independent forces of urban political influence have
been progressively eliminated in favor of a technocratic-
dominated system with a minimum of institutionalized
opposition. (100) These new technocrats are basically
antipopulist, given their middle class "rational" ideology.
Their basic policies cannot be based on the functioning of
the political reality of the past. These technocrats
operate now in a "vacuum" left either by the traditional
career politicians or the populistic leaders. While the
former populist alliance was made to bring together the
urban amsses middle class groups and the national entrepre-
neurs, it was caught up in a web of contradictions and
interests ultimately based on their contradictory economic
interests intrinsically not capable of promoting radical
policies. The post 1964 regime forced out the national
bourgeois sector as well as the activist development groups,
that had until then been in a hefemonic position. These
disposed groups were replaced by the "internationalized"
sector of the national bourgeoisie which is necessarily more
dynamic and more "capitalistically modern" because they are
in essence part of the international capitalistic system of
production. (101) The urban industrial pole, which has been
growing at a fast pace since the Kubitschek period, now
became dominant in the development of Brazilian capitalism.
In the new context, public sectors and public enterprises
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function more like private corporations enjoying a market
freedom, rather than a political one. Associated mechanisms
like the National Housing Bank have reduced conflict between
public policies and private enterprises while restricting
the area for broader popular influence. Given the picture
just sketched, public policies regarding urban growth and
economic development cannot be designed anymore outside
the governmental ideology. Therefore, I argue that any
possible change in urban policies cannot be brought about by
external radical forces but by an internal economic require-
ment of the model facing some institutional or economic
or social problems. I do not believe that minor institu-
tional programs such as housing, the financing of some urban
infrastructures, and other partial policies for the metro-
politan areas, can introduce socially significant changes
other than macro decisions such as the redistribution of
some patterns of income, and the political willingness to
accept a relatively popular metropolitan share in the urban
process. Therefore, I will analyze the conditions for the
feasibility of the new metropolitanism and the possible
outcomes of new urban policies in Brasilia.
The overriding goal of the official policies regard-
ing Brasilia's urban strategies is to strengthen the state
decisional apparatus in order to guarantee political securiy
through preventing dangerous political outcomes that could
be generated by an intensive and concentrated urban growth.
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This is a negative policy whose main characteristics I
described in some "paradigms." As an alternative, I have
explored some of the pllicies regarding an "opening up"
toward a broader while "restrictive" participation of the
middle class and some sectors of the working class in the
share of the overall economic development through the
appropriation of new urban facilities. While for the moment
the official policies do not seem very interested in allow-
ing these overtures, I will explore economic feasibility
for them in the present horizon of economic choices. Anyway,
these are the main prerequisites for reversing to some
extent the regressive urban system we have described as
antisocial, and we will focus our interest first in evaluat-
ing to what extent new economic realities already allow for
some new liberal urban trends.
The main macro-economic approaches regarding the
"opening up" feasibility are based on different interepre-
tations of the national economic model and their conse-
quences in the pattern of growth. According to one argu-
ment, the actual economic regime derived its pattern of
economic growth through the import substitution process in
such a way that led to an industrial structure producing
goods for the rich. Any equalization in the distribution
of income would lead to an uderutilization of capacity in
these luxury goods industries, and consequently a low rate
of industrial growth. (102) Therefore, since politically
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the regime is basing its legitimacy on its habit of guaran-
teeing a high rate of growth, it is forced to follow an
income distribution favoring these goods and an urban policy
favoring segregational growth patterns in order to allow for
a continuously luxurious housing sector in a differentiated
spatial growth. Among the undesirable aspects of this
scenario is the probability that it will lead to a growing
social segregation between radically different and contra-
dictory social and economic strata in urban areas. Critics
of the regime assert that these implicit contradictions may
eventually lead to unbearable social pressures and toward a
highly socially instable regime. In order to evaluate how
important these arguments are, we will explore some results
of the Morley and Gordon work(103) on the effect of changes
in the income distribution in Brazil. These two economists
developed an input-output model which simulated the growth
of Brazilian industry under differently assumed changes in
the distribution of income. They wanted to test the actual
pattern of regressive income distribution in order to test
also some hypothesis such as the Fislow (104) that "the
resultant pattern may not be desirable socially, nor even
maximize the rate of growth, but inequality does not
preclude growth altogether by inevitable internal contra-
diction, anymore than growth requires inequality to be
sustained." (105)
234
The model tested different hypotheses of growth pat-
terns. Several experiments compared different growth tra-
jectories in which the goverment is assumed to alter the
distribution of income by a tax-and-transfer scheme that
creates differential rates of growth for idfferent income
classes. For the manufacturing sector, the results show
(see Table XXIV) the more regressive the distribution of
income, the higher the rate of growth of the economy, of
manufacturing and of the employment in manufacture. This is
due in good part to the importance of the consumer durables,
especially automobiles and their supplier industries, such
as rubber, machines, metals, and fuels in the budget of the
rich. This supports the hypothesis that the type of indus-
trialization built in Brazil during the import substitution
period would grow most rapidly under regressive distribution
schemes because it sells to the upper class. However, an
important result of the experience was the fact that despite
rather violent redistribution of income, the sectoral rates
of growth of output and employment shows little variation.
Within manufacturing, there is a subgroup of industries that
is dynamic in all experiments, with the exception of the
most progressive income redistribution. Those industries
whose growth rate is positively related to progressivity
are necessities: food and therefore both sectors of the
agriculture (vegetable and animal products). A significant
and dependent pattern was identified in the transportation
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XXIV
BRAZIL: PROJECTED GROWTH RATES IN 3 REDISTRIBUTION EXPERIMENTS
(RESULTS IN PERCENTAGES)
Most Most Constant
Regressive Progressive Growth
Vegetable Product 5.21 5.51 5.48
Animal Product 4.79 5.54 5.21
Electricity 6.95 5.82 6.60
Commerce 6.69 6.00 6.44
Service 7.73 6.61 7.94
Wastes 8.86 5.46 7.61
Fuels 8.32 6.31 7.86
Packaging 6.04 5.55 6.02
Mining 7.07 5.35 6.57
Nonmetallic 8.86 5.77 7.43
Metals 8.62 5.52 7.40
Machinery 8.14 6.15 7.81
Electric Machinery 10.02 V. 72 9.27
Transport. Equip. 11.37 6.08 9.45
Wood 8.35 5.30 7.20
Furniture 6.79 4.85 6.56
Paper 7.18 5.54 6.70
Rubber 11.80 5.11 9.26
Leather 6.67 5.61 6.47
Chemicals 7.40 5.88 7.03
Drugs 6.51 6.46 6.70
Cosmetics 5.17 5.66 5.52
Plastics- 7.11 4.75 6.61
Textiles 7.31 5.61 6.98
Clothing 7.25 5.99 7.03
Food 4.55 5.32 4.98
Beverages 1.55 5.46 7.06
Tobacco 4.40 5.26 4.87
Publishing 8.63 5.41 7.54
Miscellaneous 7.54 5.32 6.97
Construction 9.52 5.15 7.65
Transport 8.32 6.82 8.16
Source: S.A. Morley and Gordon W. Smith, The Effect of Changes in the
Distribution of Income on Labor Foreign Investment and Growth
in Brazil--Ric-e University, 1971.
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equipment and rubber industries on the fortunes of the
upper class. Any policy which increases the rate of growth
of the upper class accumulation will increase the rate of
growth of the automobile industry and its suppliers (rubber,
machinery, metals, etc.). Other experiments show that
electric machinery, furniture, textiles, clothing and
beverages increase their rate of growth when the middle
class share grows. This suggests that it is the middle
class which is the principal market ofr household durables
and clothing. However, this positive effect of progres-
sivity is swamped by the negative effect on the leading
industrial edge of the transportation industry. If we now
look at the composition of the industrial system controlled
by foreign investiments, it does not appear to be true in
Brazil that these foreign firms locate only even principally
in the sectors with high demand elasticities. Sixty percent
of foreign investment profits come from nondynamic parts of
the manufacturing. In several cases (tobacco, drugs) the
foreign films dominate sectors whose growth rates are
positively correlated with progressivity. However, those
firms are overshadowed in the end by the 25% of the foreign
investments associated with the automobile industry (21.8%
in transportation equipment, 4.8% in rubber). These foreign
investment patterns can be traced following different
economic epochs: old investments associated with the
traditional capitalistic dependence of the country from the
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central countries and a new sector located in high income,
elasticity goods - dynamic sectors such as automobiles,
consumer durables as a result of the substitution process
initiated in the 1950s. This double character, spread
foreign investment throughout the industrial sector coupled
with concentration in the dynamic sectors explaining the
relative insensitivity of the overall growth rates to signi-
ficant changes in the final demand when income distribution
is changed. The historical tendency for the increasing
share of the industry by foreign investment also shows that
the era of rapid growth pattern is over and we can now
forecast a more balanced growth and with it a general
stability in the share of the foreign firms. One important
result regarding labor absorption is that while industriali-
zation of the 1950s was as a rule capital intensive, it
is much more likely that future industrial growth will come
from an expansion of the internal market rather than only
by substitution of capital intensive imports.
If true, these results could lead to the formulation
of a less segregated urban policy, since the main assumption
underlying the official strategies is the incompatibility of
the rate of growth between urban employment opportunities
and the urban migrational processes. Therefore, potential
sources of political and social instability cannot be
identified in the main aspects of the economic development
since different patterns of final demand tend to produce
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similar growth in the intermediate and capital goods produc-
tion. The implications of these results are important,
aiming to create new urban policies: First, the labor absorp-
tion problems are not sensitive to changes in the income
distribution nor likely to constitute an urban problem in
order to maintain as public response a segregational and
spatial confinedment of the lower class in satellite cities.
Second, the stability of the several growth rates means
that the central government could afford a quite high redis-
tribution of income without jeopardizing its overall growth,
while only minorily penalizing important industries like
automobiles or consumer durables (transportation equipment,
metals, electric machinery, etc.). The net result for the
urban structures would be a reinforcement of those economic
sectors likely to induce a more balanced local growth within
each satellite city. These new redistributional patterns
would allow the derivation of new local and metropolitan
policies. The need for more comprehensive urban programs
would be matched by the corresponding demand, rather than
by stagnant wages and regressivity or government loans.
Particularly in the case of Brasilia, real wages in govern-
ment services would increase in pace with the leading pri-
vate activities. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect
that real levels of public services such as education will
hold constant or at least increase despite their unfavorable
cost trends. Education will be in a particularly strong
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position since it could provide access for the new service
sector we have shown will perform the progressive sector in
the future local economy. At the micro level some important
consequences could be derived: the changing income distribu-
tion will place the local government in a position to change
urban metropolitan expenditures emphasis, and urban policies
could be reconsidered in the direction of the progressive
policies we have outlined below. The redistribution of
income will be relatively greatest in low and middle income
areas. Therefore, if these needs are to be satisfied (and
they are basic necessities) the proportionate employment
requirements in the satellite cities will grow proportional
to the local economic advantage. The changing incomes and
the associated budgetary pressures in the satellite cities
will have their effects on the expenditure mixture within
each city. The progressive income distribution must be
reflected in a related progressive local lowering of urban
standards in order to prevent the upper strata in each
satellite city from "associating" urban transfer costs for
the lower strata, therefore offsetting real income advan-
tages. The role of the central government is to control
the relative progressivity by varying the local and metro-
politan policy instruments such as sale tax, real estate
tax, property tax, building codes, etc. If these instru-
ments are adequately implemented, and the central govern-
ment has all the institutional powers for that, the
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progressive income distribution coupled with the progres-
sivity of a metropolitan settlement code system will result
in a propensity to migrate for the low middle class toward
the Pilot Plan. In other words, its feasible for the
government to increase the advantages of the central city
for some new social strata and for those most sensitive to
locational inducements through taxation instruments. The
key issue in this process is the ability and the willingness
of the government to, at this moment "open up" the physical
redevelopment of the central city in such a way as to
benefit this new social strata. The dynamics of this pro-
cess, of reversing satellitization, can be summarized as
following" a progressive tax structure and metropolitan
policies whose income is tied to sectors trying to "counter-
balance" the income progressivity in the satellite cities,
while increasing employment linked to local new economic
activities could "afford" the exodus of that part of the
low middle class toward the Pilot Plan. This context
brings us ultimately to matters such as theuse of zoning
and standards stated in the Master Plan. Central government
policies should review the standards adopted in the
Master Plan, now, not as an aesthetic device for the main-
tenance of a visual order, instead as an institutional
device to "open up" locational choices in the central city
for those different social strata willing to accept it as
the result of economic accommodations at the local urban
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level due to macro economic redistributional policies. The
Master Plan at this moment must be replaced by an increasing
strategic plan for social locational planning. The point we
want to stress is that there is a social and economic need to
interconnect a particular progressive macro economic growth
policy with a particular democratic metropolitan growth
process.
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FOOTNOTES
Paradigm I
1. Hauser, Arnold, "The social History of Art," Vintage
Books: New York, 1957. See also, Manerism the Crisis
of the Renaissance and the Origin of Modern Art,
Paul Kegan, London, 1965.
2. Ibid.
3. LeCorbusier, Ourvres Completes, Zurich: 1957, Urbanisme.
Quoted by Banham, Reyner in Theory ariDesign in the
First Machine Age, The Architectural Press, 1960.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Costa, Lucio, Master Plan Report in Rev. Modulo, No. 8,
1957.
9. For a philosophical qualification of these concepts,
see Bachelard, Gaston, "Le Nouveau Spirit Scientifique."
10. For a complete description of Costa's plan, physical
strategy and formal configuration, see the Master Plan
Report which is followed by a series of illustrative
drawings showing the spatial urban organization
proposed for the new capital.
11. Ibid.
12. Map I showspopulation distribtuion (shaded areas) with-
in the boundaries of the Guanabara state (today part
of the newly created Rio de Janeiro state): travel
time in minutes is shown by solid lines linking equal
travel time zones (origin is C.B.D or in the map the
point which corresponds to the city's cathedral
named Candelaria). Circles show physical distances in
kilometers from the same origin. Map II shows the
geographical distribution of the satellite cities
surrounding the Pilot Plan, which due to the large
scale is reduced to a single point used as the origin
for travel time and distance evaluations.
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13. He states further: "The liberation of access to the
Brazilia's Plan Competition was reduced in a certain way
to a consultation, which resulted in the urban concep-
tion of a city as a matter of fact as in this case it
was not the passing away of regional planning but a cause
of it: its foundation is what will give opportunity to
the further development of the region." Costa, Lucio
Pilot Plan Report, in Revista "Modulo", No. 8,
Rio, Julho 1957 (emphasis, M.V.F.).
14. On open language and urban open design, see:
Eco, Humberto, "A obra-aberta", Ed. Perpsectiva,
Sao Paulo, 1964.
15. Ibid.
16. Costa's accusations of "alterations" of the original
Pilot Plan so uncertain as poorly located have served
the pretext to demonstrate that the problems of
Brasilia prove uncomplimentary of a basic plan, capable
itself of guaranteeing the homogeneity and the absence
of serious problems which the city lives today. In any
event, Costa insisted on citing his complaints against
the "modifications" limiting himself to the attack on
only obviously secondary problems in the development
of the city or in the lamentation against social
segregation in the residential areas. Fro example,
(See "An Interpretation of Brasilia" in Revista de
Instituto de Arquitetos, No. 76, October, Rio 1968)
Costa said: "the Pilot qlan proposed (this was his
most important characteristic from the social point of
view) to unite in every one of these neighborhood
areas the various economic categories which constitute,
in the regime power, a society, the goal of which is
to avoid the stratification of the city into rich and
poor sections. Unfortunately, this fundamental aspect
in the conception of Brasilia still cannot be realized.
For its part, the false realism of the "real state
mentality" insisted in selling apartments on the
pretext of making the undertaking self-financiable;
the utopic abstraction only would acknowledge the
same type of apartments as if the present society were
classless. And in that way, the opportunity of its
truly rational and humanistic solution for the times
has been lost." See also: Costa, Lucio, "Brasilia dez
anos depois," in Revista do Clube de Engenharia, Rio,
March, 1970. There are no references to the problms
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generated by the intense satellitization, the debates
instead focus on some of the areas of the Pilot Plan,
where some alterations particularly in the aesthetical
part are threatened more directly by the physical image
of the plan. The references to the "real state con-
spiracy" are to say the least, naive (emphasis M.V.F.).
17. Other Brazilian capital cities like Belo Horizonte and
Goiania, founded on a physical geometric pattern of
urban design, showed how those planned areas were trans-
formed into an exception to the urban fabric of the
city, at once ending the mechanics of control of the
implementation of such projects.
18. We will call it Rocha-Gongalves for brevity.
19. The judges of the competition criticized, as in the
project of Costa, the huge quantity of land left
indiscriminately between the planned area and the
artificial lake, later reduced in the definitive loca-
tion of the city. It becomes very difficult institu-
tionally to "protect" the zones remaining joined to
the transit axes all around the city, principally
when the low density adopted and the intense urbaniza-
tion process makes for an increase in demand for the
occupancy of these "institutionally empty" contiguous
areas. Rationalism continues to operate as if the
city were an aesthetical effect of a built form against
an unoccupied "green landscape" used as a background.
See the "Atas do Juri," and the papers introduced to
the competition for the Pilot Plan, in Modulo, No. i,
Rio, July 1957.
20. The authors Rocha-Gongalves projected later for the
actual city of Brasilia a super block neighborhood
where the principle of contiguous mixed location of
diverse residential units (single house and walk-up
apartments) demonstrated to be greatly acceptable to
the public for the variety of ambience and for the
social animation brought by the spatially juxtaposed
different activities.
21. Wilheim, Jorge, "Brasilia Year 2000" in Revista Acro-
pole, pp. 375-376, July-August 1970. Commemorative
edition of the 10th anniversary of the new capital,
Sao Paulo.
22. Maliz, Bolesalw, "La formation de systemes d'habitat;
Esquiss de la Theorie de Seuils," Dunod, Paris, 1972.
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23. The costs of the urban infrastructure in Brasilia shows
a pattern of subutilization in all the basic urban
equipment as shown by the figures below. Most of this
equipment was constructed in empty areas and remained
useless until full future use. The following urban
standards were published by the "Brasilian Statistic
Yearbook," 1972.
1. Water System: Brasilia has the third national network
of residential water supply if we consider the extension
of the trunk lines. However, if compared with
Rio and Sgo Paulo, Brasilia's network shows a lower
index of individual household connections, as follows:
City
Total Network No. of House- Ratio Meter/
Extension(meters) hold Connec- Household
tions Connections
Rio
Sao Paulo
Brasilia
4,211,311
6,222,834
1,804,911
376,001
622,810
43,843
11.2 meters
9.8 meters
41.0 meters
For a total urban population of less than 20% of that of
Rio de Janeiro, the total network length of Brasilia's
water network is almost 43% of the Rio network.
2. Sewer System: Brasilia has
residential sewer systems.
households served is lower
Sao Paulo, as follows:
City
Total Network
Length (meters)
the third national network of
However, the number of
than those from Rio and
No. of Dwell- Ratio Meter/
ings Served Dwellings
Rio
Sao Paulo
Brasilia
1,978,000
3,410,521
711,350
191,265
345,960
17,352
13,0 meters
9,0 meters
40,0 meters
24. Roberto, M. M., Plan published in Revista Modulo, No. 8
Rio, 1957.
25. Levi, Rino, Plan published in Revista Modulo, No. 8,
Rio, 1957.
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26. Copacabana-Leme neighborhoods (Rio de Janeiro, south
zone) population densities - 1960 census,
Neighbor- Popu- Tot. Area Density Built Density
hoods lation (hectares) per hec- Area by hec-
tare tare
only Copacabana 167,383 405 413 --
Copa. + Leme 167,383 405 413 208 805
18,267 117 117 52 351
Copacabana tot. 185,650 522 356 260 719
27. Velho, Gilberto, "A Utopia Urbana - um Estudo de Antro-
pologia Social," Zahar Editores, Rio 1973.
28. This behavior also is observable in Brasilia in the
move of families of greatest income levels from the
Pilot Plan apartments to the plots located on the edge
of the lake. These plots are composed of single
family houses in individual lots of a minimum 1,000
square meters area. Among the arguments presented for
the move, predominates the "protection" of the children
against "vices" and "companions not recommendable"
supposed to exist in the Pilot Plan neighborhoods.
29. Velho, Gilberto, op. cit., p. 70.
30. The velocity of elevators at present time is already
at 700 meters per minute.
31. Roberto, M.M., "Relatorio do Plano Piloto" in Modulo,
No. 8.
32. Ibid.
33. The same hypothesis of "urban cells" was recently pro-
posed for the plan of New Bombay (India). See documen-
tation in Meier, Richard, Planning for an Urban World,
M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1975.
34. The example of the Costa plan implementation is
interesting: it developed first the southern portion
of the city, once that its roadway residential axis
coincided with the entrance of roads to Belo Horizonte,
from where came the machinery and equipment for the
construction of Brasilia. As a result the city was
born in that way in "disequilibrium" and this unbalance
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has been accentuated with the construction of the
northern urban sector, presently a section of lower
social class distinction and built in poorer urban
qualities, as an "internal suburb" within the city.
The notion of equilibrium here is used as geometric
equilibrium, through which each nuclei would have
some form and some population levels.
35. Roberto, M. M., Relatorio do Plano Piloto, op. cit.
36. Ibid.
37. See the "Plan of the Seven Roadways," in LeCorbusier,
complete works, Zurich, 1968.
38. Cristaller, W., cited by Isard W. in Location and Space
Economy, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1956.
39. Losch, A., The Economics of Location, Yale University
Press, New Haven, Conn., 1954.
40. Beckman, J., cited by Derycke, P. H., "La economia
Urbana," Instituto de Estudios de Administracion Local,
Madrid, 1971.
41. Isard, W., op. cit.
Paradigm II
42. The military regime that came to power in Brazil in
1964 is one of the most controversial among developing
countries since it was a result of an authoritarian
political structure combined with one of the highest
G.N.P. growth rate in the world. Questions about these
new relations between political authoritarianism and
urban policies regarding Brasilia will be discussed
below within this basic framework.
43. Furtado, Celso, The Economic Growth of Brazil,
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1963.
44. See Jaguaribe, Helio,'olitical Development," Harper
and Row, 1975.
45. For a broader political discussion on Kubitschek's
government policies, see The Planning Process and the
Political System in Brazil: A Study of Kubitschek's
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Target Plan, Lafer, Celso, unpublished doctoral disserta-
tion, Cornell University, 1970.
46. Lessa, Carlos, quoted in Lafer, elso, op. cit.
47. The following remarks are based on the research,
The Squatter's Rights of Favelados, Conn, Stephen,
C.I.D.O.C. Cuarderno, No. 32, Cuernavaca, Mexico, 1969.
48. Conn. Stephen, op. cit.
49. During populist government, public employees willing to
move to Brasilia earned an "extra" wage. Other subsi-
dies such as a fund for aiding in the move to Brasilia
further increases locational advantages.
50. Apartment standards in Brasilia such as finished floor
area and neighborhood public equipment such as play-
grounds, landscape, parking facilities are far better
even than upper middle class standards in traditional
cities.
51. Costa, Lucio, Master Plan Report, op. cit.
52. The survey was made by Paviani, Aldo and Barboza,
Maria Ignez and presented as a working paper at the
conference of Latin American Geographers, the Univer-
sity of Calgary, June, 1973. The data was collected
by a. basic stratified sample in a proposition of
4,17% and an error of 0,05. The number of question-
naires used in different satellite cities was 2,540.
The results were analyzed by using factorial analysis.
53. See Turner, John, Freedom to Build, New York, 1972,
especially p. 165, Vital Needs - Income Level.
54. Some of the most important characteristics of the
populist administrative and political machinery was
the network of compulsory representatiive and social
organizations. From these, the most important from a
social standpoint was the social security system.
Brazil was a pioneer among developing countries in its
early commitment to extensive social security coverage.
The system spread by the creation of new "institutes"
or "fund" ("Caixas"). All these funds and institutes
had the basic purpose of providing pensions. The
additional social services varied widely, most fre-
quently was health care such as the social security
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hospital. The political result of this system was that
the entire urban sector under compulsory coverage (such
as shop clerks, workers, gas station attendents,
journalists, commercial employees, public servants, etc)
was incorporated into a populist urban welfare system
more comprehensive than that of many developed
economies. Therefore, a significant proportion of the
real income is received in services (such as medical
care and social facilities) than the frequent variations
in cash income in the job market. In a society of low
wage levels, high underemployment and disguised unem-
ployment, these real benefits are significant. "A
history of social security legislation in Brazil,
1923-1966 by Brumbauch, Chalmers - unpublished paper.
55. This explains the alliance between worker and business
trying to prevent official policies of erradication.
56. Epstein, David G., The best study of planned and spon-
taneous settlement in Brasilia was made in the book
Brasilia, Plan and Reality, University of California
Press, 1973. The book is a version of a doctoral
dissertaion and the author had lived in Brasilia for
several months between 1962 and 1964.
57. For the implementation of the Brasilia Master Plan, the
Kubitschek government obtained an independent govern-
ment nucleous acting as public enterprise, the NOVACAP
to the agency was assured earmarked funds and financial
resources as well as technical personnel capable of
implementing the Pilot Plan. These economic resources
allocated under titles such as "General Works," were
actually due to monetary emissions since taxation was
insufficient to cover the government's current expen-
ditures. As a result, NOVACAP's funds were used
regarding Brasilia's both political and administrative
commitments. Therefore, though the Kubitschek admini-
stration wanted development with stability, it was
forced to accept the development of Brasilia and all
urban subsidies and expenditures within a conciliatory
approach to the needs of the political coalition.
58. C.B. stands for Brasilia's only newspaper Correio
Brasiliense.
59. In the original Master Plan, the process of financing
apartments was based on market price transactions in
which public employees were the sole beneficiaries of
a financial system based on long range instruments,
increasingly devaluated by the growing inflationary
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process. Moreover, public employee's wages were arti-
ficially high as a "social compensation" for their
move from the "old' cities. After the institution of the
free market transactions (1964) with inflationary
correction for all payments, these apartments were sold
at huge profits.
60. Due to the necessity to meet political deadlines in
the construction of the city, public works were assigned
to contractors without public competition following the
criteria of competing prices.
61. The ideological roots of this kind of "professional
detachment" are commented on in 1.1.3.
Paradigm III
62. Grebler, L., Capital Formation in Real Estate,
Princeton, 1956.
63. Quoted from the monthly magazine, Vislo, 1973 -
"By official market transaction we understand all legal
land title, approved condominium juridical statement
(incorporated) approved architectural project, approved
engineering project and legalized construction. Only
this market is entitled to receive goverment financing.
64. Monthly magazine, Visao, op. cit.
65. The process used to build these figures was the follow-
ing: The prices for apartment purchase were collected
through Brasilia's Sunday newspapers, real estate and
private owner advertisings.
The cost per square meter was obtained by dividing
total apartment selling prices by the mean area of
each unit type. Therefore, prices per square meter
are mean selling prices for the Pilot Plan area.
Distances from C.B.D. were plotted in the horizontal
axis. As each neighborhood unit is 500m long, the
distance between each unit and the C.B.D. is obtained
as a multiple from these units. For example,
neighborhood numbered as 10(ten)is distant 5000m.
from the C.B.D.
Neighborhood units are classified by income levels as
stated in the Pilot Plan: numbers 100 and 300 as upper
and middle class, numbers 200 and 400 as low middle
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and low income.
In conclusion, price levels for all neighborhoods were
positively correlated with neighborhood physical
quality and irrelevant as a function of C.B.D.'s distance.
66. A recent (1974) example of Costa's middle class preju-
dice against "informal settlements" located near the
Pilot Plan we transcribe below the following verbal
exchange between Costa and Brasilia's director of
planning economist, Gilberto Sobral:
Sobral: ... the population celing for the existent
satellite cities was almost reached. Taguatinga, for
example, if we take into consideration the relation
between its population and the quantity of planned
urban lots, it's very likely that the "saturation"
point is already reached; likewise the remaining
satellite cities also display a very high population
level. What happens is that the urbanization patterns
are being made through squatters' settlements, since
the large portion of dwellings is "provisional"...at
any rate our idea is to create new satellite cities
since the actual ones are reaching their population
ceilings.
Costa: ...but within one condition, that these new
satellite cities must not be located between the Pilot
Plan and the existing satellite cities;thgymust be
further away.
Sobral: Absolutely, professor. Actually we located them
further away.
Source: Preceding from the "First Seminar for the
Study of Brasilia's Urban Problems" - Brasilia, 1974.
67. SHIS would deal iwth house problems of those people
whose incomes were below 2.5 times the minimum wage
(U.S.$37.00 in 1967) so that 2.5 times it would be a
little under U.S.$100.00. The political significancy
of SHIS is reflected in the fact that the new prefect
of the Federal District and his secretary of social
services under the Costa and Silva National Govern-
ment (1967) both were former directors of SHIS.
Therefore, the problem of squatting was always con-
sidered as the key strategical urban issue.
68. Epstein, David G., op. cit.
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69. Table XIV was organized following these requirements:
- Income levels in U.S. dollars were taken from
Table XVI showing the relationship between income level
and location in different satellite cities. As a
result the social mix in each satellite can be defi-
cient. The first column showing the social mix can be
compared against the second column showing the percen-
tage of official housing financing segragated by each
income level in each satellite city. Totals show the
following of the total housing funds allocated for
the Pilot Plan and the satellite cities.
70. It's interesting to stress the intimate relationship
between the erradication policies and the quantitative
forecast for new residential units financed by offi-
cial loans within the technical rationalist building
prejudices.
71. There is evidence of some internal "dissent" between
CEI's bureaucrats about these regressive policies.
72. See 3.3.1.2 Land Tenure: Legal Rights and Institutional
Control. The enforcement and implementation of the
erradication policies never had taken into considera-
tion the economic loss suffered by the squatters by
the loss at the occasion of the erradication move of
their physical investments such as kitchen gardens and
domestic animals raised as food, besides the loss of
all the locational economic advances.
73. CEI (Comiss'ao de Erradicajao de Favelas) - therefore
the ironically named Ceilandia for the city created
for the reception of the erradicated squatters.
74. Quoted in the Social Service Foundation Report (1965).
75. A total of 82,094 squatters were removed between
March 1971 and March 1972. The Haussman plan for the
radical urban renewal of Paris removed some 30,000
inhabitants from the city's central area.
76. The evolution of Brasilia's public expenditures can be
seen through the following data.
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Years Population Per Capita Expenditures
(in cruzeiros)**
1960 388,202 590,71
1967 432,442 492,82
1968 487,284 695,41
1969 530,122 638,00
1970(*) 574,331 513,00
(*) estimated - source, Codeplan.
(**) not deflated for inflation
77. See footnote 70.
78. See Table XXVIII Urbanization Costs.
79. For example, the percentage of Brasilian employees in
public service following the three lowest levels of
schooling is 38%; 11% are illiterate, 14% are literate
and 13% have between 1-4 years of schooling; see
Carnoy M. and Katz, M., Explaining Differentials in
Earnings among Large Brazilian Cities, Urban Studies,
Vol. 8, No. 1, 1971.
The study also considers that: "If Brazilian labor is
divided into more homogeneous skilllevels, it is only
the real earnings of low and moderately skilled
workers which are less in the slower growth regions.
It is low-skill labor-intensive industry which tends
to move to lower growth regions." Since the study was
made considering eight capital cities excluding
Brasilia, it is clear that we can expect that
polarization of growth will be enforced between highly
developed regions (the south) market by lower-cost
high-skilled labor and lower developed regions
(northeast, center-west (Brasilia) marked by lower-
cost unskilled homogeneous labor.
80. Table XVII shows the predominance of industry, services
and public management in total employment. More than
one half of these activities are centered in the
Pilot Plan area.
PARADIGM IV
81. Lewis, Wilfred, Urban Growth and Suburbanization of
Employment: Some New Data - quoted in Harrison
Bennett, Urban Economic Development, The Urban
Institute, Washington, D.C., 1974
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82. In these figures, hourly population is shown as a
percentage of the working population leaving or
entering each satellite city. "Provisional localities"
(Squatters and favelas display the deepest profiles
showing the lower local job) absorbtion and the
consequent heavy daily commuting toward the Pilot Plan
and other satellite cities. These graphs are from
the unpublished work: Mobilidade de Populacao no
Distrito Federal, Paviani, Aldo and Barhosa, Ignez,
University of Brasilia, Department Geosciences.
83. The length of each arrow gives the total and propor-
tional number of daily passengers commuting (one way
trip) toward the Pilot Plan. The most important flows
come from Taguatinga (15,000), Guara (13,000),
Gama (10,000) and Sobradinho (5,000). Some of these
movements start at 4:00 a.m. and earlier (Figs. 6 & 7).
As a result of the daily work schedule in civil con-
struction (from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.) some of the
civil engineering companies used to work in three
continuous shifts during all 24 hours, which explains
trips scheduled between 10:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m.
Commuting is made using bus services offered by one
public and three private organizations. A significant
data is the number of bus trips per person; in 1970
each individual had made 126.7 trips (per year), while
in 1962 this number was 82.1. Therefore, commuting
due to increased suburbanization grew 54.3% in nine
years (Codeplan Diagnostico do Sector Transporte,
1971).
84. Data from Villapa, Flavio, CEPAM - Sao Paulo.
85. See, for example: Codeplan'Estimativas" (1983), 1972.
86. See Table 19 in Harrison, Bennet, Urban Economic
Development, op. cit., p. 44.
87. See footnote no. 66.
88. Data from "Cura Project" - pilot survey promoted under
the supervision of the national center for housing
research (CENPHA) and H. J. Cole Associados, Rio, 1972.
89. The rodoviary axis for example is a 16 km. long avenue
using a large strip of empty land due to the physical
necessity of providing only for the rodoviary inter-
changes. As a result, this vacant area is almost half
the total area used for 2 w income neighborhoods.
Footnotes (cont.)
90. See below for the comparison of different local
government revenues.
Revenues. 1966 1967 1968 1969
1. Local generated
revenues 17.1 19.8 15.9 13.6
2. Federal revenues 81.5 41.2 53.1 56.3
3. Taxation on local
wheat consumption* -- 34.8 26.0 29.2
4. Credits 1.4 4.2 5.0 0.9
Total Revenues 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source - Codeplan, Orgamentos e Balangos, 1970
*Taxation on wheat actually is also a federal aid
since for other states taxation of this kind is a
federal privilege. As can be seen, continuous
federal aid to the city is a result of decreasing
availability of local financing.
91. Table XXIII shows the relationships between different
urban population densities and urbanization costs.
These costs were based in the work made by Urdaneta,
Alberto in Costo de Urbanization, Caracas, 1971.
92. For a more detailed theoretical discussion metro-
politan policies, see: Rothenberg, Jerome,"The Impact
of Local Government on Intra-Metropolitan Location,
M.I.T. Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 45,
1971, and "Local Decentralization and the Theory of
Optimal Government in Edel, Matthew and Rothenberg,
Jerome, Readings in Urban Economics, MacMillan,
New York, 1972.
93. Rate tax is considered from now on as the whole set
of urban tax with direct impact on metropolitan
location. The fact that each satellite city has no
administrative autonomy vis-a-vis the Pilot Plan
administration and the federal government further
increases economic inequalities, since local juris-
diction demands cannot be transformed in local urban
decisions without being mediated through the central
government. We will argue further for the necessity
to achieve a metropolitan policy combining a relative
freer degree of local administrative freedom with
macro-policies derived from the evaluation of
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metropolitan problems through the characteristics of
the intra-metropolitan migrations patterns. Taxation
while constitutionally equal for several jurisdictions,
changes significantly since they are tied to use
standards and building codes, each one different
according to each jurisdiction. Economic characteriza-
tion in the framework of the actual metropolitan
policies central government (Pilot Plan) decides on
the economic demands from all metropolitan areas.
94. We assume that the regressivity of this process is
increased by the willingness of the central government
in meeting the growing physical and environmental
demands calling for the Pilot Plan's continuous
"aesthetical symbolism." For example, growing expen-
ditures for the maintenance of the Pilot Plan's expen-
sive landscaping and gardens has reached such high
levels that local authorities were forced to substi,
tute natural grass by rock and sand in some
Pilot Plan's new lower middle class neighborhoods'
communal gardens.
95. Therefore, metropolitan population equilibrium is con-
sidered a function of the degree of freedom for the
set of local (satellite cities) responses to urban
changes derived from the actual changes in metropoli-
tan policies due to changes induced in the Pilot Plan
overall policies (taxation, codes, subsidies, housing
policies, prospective plans for new constructions,
etc.).
96. See Rothenberg, Jerome, op. cit.
97. It's clear that Brasilia's Pilot Plan can perfectly
meet locational advantages for lower middle classes
now continually expelled toward the satellite cities,
as a consequence of raising living expenditures
throughout the Pilot Plan area.
98. For example, continuous out migrations toward
satellite cities is an economic indicator for the
continuous elitization process and restrictive
Pilot Plan's policies. Migration toward Taguatinga
is an indicator of unrestrictive lot standards,
social mix and social welfare opportunities there.
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99. The Pilot Plan's residential code standards are based
on a system of "condominiums." Each neighborhood has
a total of eleven equal site "projections" in which
only a story block can be built. Minimum apartment
standards is a 30 square meter unit composed of one
single living room/bedroom, bathroom and kitchenette.
However, as the total area to be built is the same
no matter the apartment type size is therefore chosen
by market demands. Since income levels are higher and
higher in the Plan, the principal demand is for larger
and expensive apartments (chiefly 3 bedrooms with
120 square meters and 4 bedrooms with 200 and more
square meters). Therefore, the social determination
of floor space standards and residential typologies in
the Pilot Plan is a direct result of the regressive
metropolitan policies. Figures 2 to 5 show these
price levels if we consider neighborhoods numbered
400 as composed of one, two bedroom apartment types,
neighborhood 200 as composed of two and three apart-
ments with one bathroom and neighborhoods 100 and 300
as composed of either three or four apartments with
two bathrooms, service area with an extra domestic
servant bedroom and covered garage. Another conse-
quence of the elitization process is the continuous
decrease in the percentile ratio mix of different
apartment types in each neighborhood. As a result
neighborhoods are more and more becoming "socialized"
in apartments for distinct high and upper middle
income levels.
100. For an extremely useful characterization of Brazil's
economic and political changes after 1964, see
Stepan, Alfred, ed., Authoritarian Brazil,
Yale University, 1973.
101. Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, Associated -Dependent
Development in Stepan, Alfred, ed., op. cit.
102. This thesis is supported by Furtado, Celso in
Obstacles to Development in Latin America, Anchor,
1970 and by Georgescu-Roegen, in "Structural Inflation,
Lock and Balanced Growth, Economie et Societes, 1970.
103. Morley, S. and Smith, G., The Effect of Changes in
the Distribution of Income on Labor, Foreign Invest-
ment and Growth in Brazil, in Stepan, Alfred, ed.,
op. cit.
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104. Fishlow, Albert, Some Reflections on Post 1964
Brazilian Economic Policy, Stepan Alfred ed., op. cit.
105. Fishlow, Albert - Ibid.
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